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Abstract
The main part of this dissertation consists of four loosely connected chapters on the
semantics of modals. The chapters inform each other and employ similar methods,
but generally each one is self-contained and can be read in isolation.
Chapter 2 introduces new semantics for epistemic modality. I argue that the epis-
temic modal base consists of the propositions that can be obtained by the interlocutors
early enough to affect their resolution of their current practical goal. Integrated into
the standard contextualist semantics, the new definition successfully accounts for two
sets of data that have been claimed to falsify standard contextualism, namely from
disagreement dialogues and complements of attitude verbs.
Chapter 3 traces the historical rise of the may-under-hope construction, as in I
hope we may succeed. In that construction, the modal does not contribute its normal
existential modal force. It turns out that despite the construction's archaic flavor in
Present-Day English, it is a very recent innovation that arose not earlier than the
16th century. I put forward a hypothesis that the may-under-hope construction arose
as the replacement of an earlier construction where the inflectional subjunctive under
verbs of hoping was used to mark a specific type of formal hopes about good health.
Chapter 4 proposes that O(ld) E(nglish) *motan, the ancestor of Modern English
must, was a variable-force modal somewhat similar to the variable-force modals of the
American Pacific Northwest. I argue that in Alfredian OE, motan(p) presupposed
that if p gets a chance to actualize, it will. I also argue that several centuries later, in
the 'AB' dialect, Early Middle English *moten is was genuinely ambiguous between
possibility and necessity. Thus a new trajectory of semantic change is discovered:
variable force, to ambiguity between possibility and necessity, to regular necessity.
Chapter 5 argues that, first, restrictions on the relative scope of deontics and
clausemate negation can hardly be all captured within the syntactic component, and
second, that capturing some of them can be due to semantic filters on representations.
I support the second claim by showing how such semantic filters on scope may arise
historically, using Russian stoit 'should' and English have to as examples.
Thesis Supervisors: Kai von Fintel and Sabine Iatridou
Title: Professors of Linguistics
TeM, KTO HayiwiI MeHI pa6OTaTb - MOHM yIHT1eJbHHIIqM 14 y'-HTeJISIM,
H TeM, 6Iarogapi KOMy A1 >KHB - MOHM BbI6paHHOfi ceMbe 14 riQopyrFM
cIaHTa3ie, 6OFHHe .JeFKOKpHJaa,
Tu CBiT 3JIOTHCTHX MpiH qIJIq HaC OqKpitia
I 3eMJIIO 3 H1M BeceTIKOIO 3'CqHana.
TH CBiTOBe 3'eHaiIa 3 TaCMHHM,
IK61 Te6e JIIOACbKa uymia He 3Hanla,
Byno 6 )KHTTH, HK TeMHa HiM, CyMHHM.
JIecn YKpaYHKa, CiM cmpyn: Pa
Imagination, light-winged goddess,
You opened us the light of golden dreams,
And linked it with a rainbow to the earth.
You joined the open and the hidden,
If human soul had not known you,
Then day would've been as sad as night.
Lesja Ukrajinka, Seven strings: F
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Chapter 1
Modality, context, usage: the agenda
The main part of this dissertation consists of four loosely connected chapters on the
semantics of modals. The chapters inform each other and employ similar methods,
but generally each one is self-contained and can be read in isolation. At the same
time all four address different parts of the same general agenda. This introduction
aims to explain what those agenda are, and through that, to explain how the chapters
fit together.
The guiding intuition behind the agenda is that there exist empirical phenomena
in the realm of modality for which we do not yet have appropriate technical apparatus
(a trivial part), and that in order to develop such apparatus, we need to pay close
attention to how modals are used by speakers in realistic circumstances (a somewhat
less trivial part). So rather than taking an existing theory and checking its predictions
against a specially selected dataset, as a general strategy I attempt to start with the
data, and see what those data may suggest in terms of possible analyses. Specifically,
I look at how sentences with modals in them are used in the actual extra-linguistic
context of communication, and which features of that context affect the modals'
interpretation; furthermore, I look not only at isolated examples and constructed
scenarios, but also at the usage of modals as represented in corpora, applying formal-
semantic analysis to naturalistically produced data. Hence the four projects described
in this dissertation are called "pieces" to be played together by modal expressions,
context, and usage.
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Of course, I am far from alone in choosing this general direction. Attention to fine-
grained details of context is characteristic of semantic research in general, and specif-
ically within modal semantics, recent work by [Arregui, 20111 and [Rubinstein, 2012]
tie the truth-conditions of particular modals to certain features of the utterance con-
text.1 Corpus studies on modals are not uncommon either, especially in the function-
alist and historical literature, cf. [van der Auwera and Taeymans, 2009], [Hacquard and Wellwood, 2(
a.m.o., though they rarely involve in-depth, one-by-one semantic analysis of the found
occurrences.
Thus if the general perspective chosen in this dissertation turns out to be useful,
the credit should be distributed widely - and if not, that would most likely only
signify the present author's personal failures. Here, I would like to make a case for
choosing that perspective. In short, I would like to argue that we need to consider
data of more types in order to better understand modality, and to update our semantic
models accordingly, building a new analytical layer on top of the Kratzer semantics
- just as the Kratzer semantics itself is a new analytical layer on top of the standard
possible-worlds semantics for modality.
The Kratzer semantics is formulated within the general possible-worlds framework,
and goes like this. Modals are said to be dependent on (at least) two conversational
backgrounds, modeled by sets of natural language propositions. The first background,
the modal base, determines the general scope of the modal claim: only those worlds are
considered at all where all the propositions in the modal base are true. According to
[Kratzer, 1991], there are at least circumstantial modal bases, containing propositions
describing facts, and epistemic modal bases, with propositions describing pieces of
knowledge. The second conversational background, the ordering source, orders the
worlds selected by the modal base by how large a share of the propositions from the
background are true in those worlds: the more ordering-source propositions are true
1[Arregui, 20111 argues that dependencies between facts that are assumed to hold in the utterance
context affect the truth-conditions of deontic modals. [Rubinstein, 2012] argues that one norm or
preference may play a different role for the truth-conditions of a modal depending on whether that
norm is known to be shared between the participants or not.
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in it, the more optimal a world. Finally, a range of operators may be defined that are
sensitive to the two conversational backgrounds provided by context. For example,
possibility is one such operator: a possibility claim Op would say that from among
the worlds w' in the set of worlds where all propositions from the modal base are true,
we can select those w" that are optimal as determined by the ordering source, and
in some of those w"s proposition p is true. Now to analyze natural language modals,
we can specify what kind of operator they are (=what modal force they have), and
which modal bases and ordering sources from the general inventory of conversational
backgrounds they may use. Then the modal system of a given language may be
characterized in the following format:
modal force modal base ordering
source
muss necessity no restric- no restric-
tions tions
kain possibility no restric- no restric-
tions (ions
dar possibility circumstan- deontic, tle-
tial olpgical ('in
view of cer-
tain aims')
soll, necessity circumstan- bouletic (*in
tial view of cer-
tain wishes)
sol/2 necessity empty hearsay
wird weak neces- epistemic doxastic ('in
sity view of cer-tain beliefs')
dairfie weak neces- epistemic stereotypical
sity
Figure 1-1: The modal system of German, [Kratzer, 1991, p. 6501
The Kratzer framework provides us with a powerful toolkit for formal descriptive
analysis of a given modal meaning that we already identified. But by itself, it leaves
many things unexplained. For example, in Kratzer's schema for German, it is stated
that necessity modal miissen may appear with any kind of modal base and any kind
of ordering source whatsoever. We can thus expect that modal to be able to express
epistemic, circumstantial, deontic, bouletic, stereotypical readings, and so forth. But
how does the hearer know what reading was intended on a particular occasion? Or,
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in other words, how does the context fix the contextual parameters of the modal?
The Kratzer semantics by itself does not answer that question, delegating it to the
pragmatic theory of how contextual parameters get fixed.
Furthermore, we can take any set of propositions whatsoever and declare that it is
a modal base or an ordering source. But in reality we only see a relatively restricted
set of conversational backgrounds used by natural languages. How do we know which
sets of propositions are plausible conversational backgrounds and which aren't? For
example, many languages distinguish clear categories of deontic modality, concerning
permissions and obligations, and epistemic modality, concerning what is possible or
necessary given what is known. What exactly about those categories makes them
occur in language after language?
To frame the same general question a bit differently, how do the speakers of a
language converge on a particular kind of modal meaning? The propositional content
of conversational backgrounds is always hidden, and yet language learners manage
to acquire the range of possible conversational backgrounds matching those used in
their speech community. Furthermore, fully-competent speakers all use the same
kinds of backgrounds with remarkable consistency. From those basic facts, we can
conclude that there must be something very natural about the range of conversational
backgrounds relevant for modals, but the Kratzer framework as such is designed to
give us the tools for describing those backgrounds, not for explaining why we observe
the ones we do.
The question of "naturalness" of certain types of conversational backgrounds be-
comes even more acute once we note that modal meanings change over time. And not
only do they change, with individual modals gradually acquiring the ability to use new
types of conversational backgrounds and losing the ability to use old ones - modal
meanings change along particular regular routes, as discussed in [Bybee et al., 1994],
[van der Auwera and Plungian, 1998], a.m.o. Figure 1-2 illustrates one of the ways
to describe some of those routes. Thus modal meaning change is governed by precise
laws, but adopting the Kratzer semantics as such does not equip us with any pre-
dictions regarding such regularities: all conversational backgrounds are equal in the
18
1'be strong', 'know')
'arrive at', 'finish'T paCpant-intern
_ 
ffic ') possibility
-. - --particip -external
'be permtted', possi ilitycodtn
deontic possibili(
'be', 'become', V, epiernic possibility
'happen', 'befall',
'stand',
'I don't know',
Figure 8. To possibility and beyond
Figure 1-2: Paths of semantic change for possibility modals,
[van der Auwera and Plungian, 1998, Fig. 81
formal system.
The gradual nature of semantic change is also a problem. Figure 1-3 features a
table illustrating such gradual change in the case of Late Middle and Early Modern
English may. Today, may simply cannot be used to talk about internal ability - can
or able are used for that purpose. In Old English, may was the unmarked choice for
expressing that meaning. By the late 14th century (column M3 in Figure 1-3), that
use was already on the decline, but it took the modal a long time to completely lose
it: even in the late 17th century [Gotti et al., 20021 find 6% of all instances of may to
convey ability. It is clear that the difference in the ratio of ability examples between
the two periods is an important one, on some level of analysis: it tells us something
of note about the semantics of the modal during the two periods. But the Kratzer
framework as such does not provide us with tools to describe such differences in
percentages. It only provides us with the apparatus to describe formally a particular
instance of the modal.
What complicates things even further is the fact that synchronically, the same
modal may have different interpretational possibilities in different linguistic contexts.
For example, epistemic can may only occur in negative statements, 1, while epistemic
will, on the contrary, can only be used in the positive, 2.
(1) This {?ePit can / OKeptscan't} be Mary.
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Figure 1-3: The changes in semantic distribution of may between 1350-1420 (M3 in
the table) and 1640-1710 (E3 in the table), [Gotti et al., 2002, p. 94]
(2) This {OK.epitWill / ?ePitwOn't} be Mary.
In a different sort of pattern, generally may is a possibility modal, but [Portner, 1997]
has to introduce a special lexical entry for may embedded under pray, as in 3. Such
cases where a particular modal meaning is only available in a special kind of linguistic
context are pervasive, but in order to make sense of them, we need to augment the
Kratzer framework with some story about why and how the linguistic context can
affect what kind of semantics the modal can receive.
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M3 E3
Modal cat. Meaning No. o/ooo %MAY No. olooo %MA Y
dynamic possibility 357 19 53% 167 10 35%
ability 130 7 19% 28 2 6%
prediction 51 3 8% 16 1 3%
prediction/possibility 4 0.2 1% 1 0.1 0.2%
necessity 2 0.1 0.4%
habit 1 0.1 0.1% 1 0.1 0.2%
Dynamic total 543 29 80% 215 13 45%
epistemic possibility 18 1 3% 83 5 17%
necessity 1 0.1 0.1%
inference
Epistemic total 19 1 3% 83 5 17%
deontic possibility 14 1 2% 31 2 6%
necessity 6 0.3 1% 29 2 6%
(wish) 1 0.1 0.1%
Deontic total 21 1 3% 60 4 13%
dy/de possibility/permission 10 1 1% 2 0.1 0.4%
Dy/de total 10 1 1% 2 0.4%
dy/ep possibility 20 1 3% 22 1 5%
prediction/poss. 1 0.1 0.1% 1 0.1 0.2%
ability/poss. 1 0.1 0.1%
Dy/ep total 22 1 3% 23 1 5%
bleached with private verb 9 1 1% 15 1 3%
periphrastic subjunct. 53 3 8% 79 5 17%
Bleached total 62 3 9% 94 5 20%
TOTAL 677 37 100% 477 28 100%
Table 4. Distribution of MAY by modal category and modal meaning.
(3) I pray that you may succeed.
There are many further questions. But I would like to concentrate on three par-
ticular issues which an explanatory theory of modality needs to address:
(4) Three issues about the semantics of modals:
* Factors affecting which conversational backgrounds get used by natural
languages
* Modal meaning change
" Interpretational restrictions on modals specific to particular linguistic
contexts
These three issues form the general agenda which the projects reported in this
dissertation address. All three are interrelated. For example, if we get a better
understanding of what makes certain conversational backgrounds natural (the first
issue), we can better understand modal meaning change (the second issue): natural
backgrounds would be "magnets" that attract modal items during their diachronic
development. Conversely, the patterns of semantic change in modals tell us something
about why we have the set of conversational backgrounds we do: if a modal acquired
a meaning a, there must have been something about a which made that development
possible. But in the absence of explanatory theory of "naturalness", we can only
register the fact that particular types of conversational backgrounds get used by
languages quite often.
Furthermore, the second issue (one of modal meaning change) is obviously related
to the third one, namely the issue of restrictions arising in particular linguistic con-
texts: such variants of a lexeme that are tied to a particular linguistic environment
must have somehow arisen through diachronic change. Not much is known at the
moment about modal meaning change relative to specific linguistic environments: it
is often observed that an innovative variant emerges in one kind of linguistic context,
and then spreads to others, but currently we lack a deeper understanding of the me-
chanics of how a new variant indexed to a particular linguistic context may arise in
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the first place, and we do not know much about the mechanisms of spread across
contexts either.
Finally, the existence of restrictions specific to linguistic contexts (the third issue)
is naturally tied to the first issue. From the first principles, the way in which natural
language works must be natural and convenient for speakers (or at least relatively
so): otherwise the more natural option would have won. From that we can derive
that, for example, the existence of lexical variants indexed to particular linguistic en-
vironments, as in 1-3, must be natural, too. It is easy to see why fully compositional
semantics would be natural: it is convenient to have signs that have the same denota-
tion in all contexts. But at the moment we do not have a theory that would explain
how exactly having a lexical variant that is not allowed to appear everywhere that
its compositional semantics would fit may be natural and convenient, in any sense of
those words.
So while the Kratzer semantics provides us with a number of useful tools, there
are questions to ask that would take us further afield. The present dissertation makes
a modest attempt to move in that direction.
Chapter 2 on the semantics of epistemic modality addresses the first and the third
issues from the agenda in 4. In that chapter, I propose a new standard-contextualist
semantics of the epistemic modal base which is directly dependent on the current ques-
tion under discussion. This results in a very restrictive theory of epistemic modality:
as I fix the way in which the context determines the epistemic modal base, there
remains very little wiggling room left for explaining complicated empirical patterns
with the use of cherry-picked values for contextual parameters. Perhaps surprisingly,
however, this shift to a more restrictive theory allows us to solve a number of puzzles
about epistemic modality that have been claimed to be unsolvable within standard
contextualism. In particular, the new theory makes predictions about disagreement
with and retraction of epistemic claims that are equally good or better than the
predictions of relativist and cloudy-contextualist theories of epistemics.
Furthermore, the same new theory of epistemic modality deals well with epistemics
embedded under a wide range of attitude verbs, so switching to a more restrictive
22
theory for matrix contexts we also get better coverage of embedded cases. On a certain
level, this is not particularly surprising. Current practical goals of the interlocutors
must be a natural thing for semantic objects to depend on, so the theory tying the
epistemic modal base to the current practical goals produces a meaning that should
be expected to be natural in real communication. But if that meaning is natural, it
would be able to serve as a strong pragmatic magnet: speakers would favor meanings
of that sort because they are useful. So we would expect such a meaning to be easily
generalizable across various contexts, and that is what we find.
To the extent that this generalization works, the third issue from 4 is irrelevant
here. But in fact there are some types of complex embedding contexts where it is
quite hard to use an epistemic modal, most notably involving complements of suppose
and conditional clauses. I argue that what is going on in such cases is that, on the
one hand, there is rarely a need to express the relevant epistemic meanings, and on
the other, non-epistemic meanings of the same modal lexemes would be used more
often in that linguistic environment. Because of those two facts of usage, speakers
sometimes find it hard to judge or to produce the relevant examples with embedded
epistemics, though if we set up the context right, favoring the targeted construal, we
do get sentences with epistemic interpretations that were claimed to be impossible in
some earlier work, cf. [Yalcin, 2007j.
Chapter 3 directly addresses the third issue on the agenda in 4 more directly: it
traces the rise of the construction X hope(s) that Y may..., which features a non-
possibility may generally unavailable in English. Despite this construction being
perceived as archaic by modern English speakers, is in fact a very recent innovation
that has arisen not earlier than in the 16th century.
What makes the virtual absence of may in this context in the 15th century striking
is that compositionally, at the time there was nothing in the semantics of the modal
and verbs of hoping that would make that combination illicit. In fact, the 15th-
century may was distributionally very close to present-day can, and in Present-Day
English, the combination X hope(s) that Y can... is well attested. So we have a
mysterious absence of a particular combination of a type of attitude verb and a
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particular modal lexeme, which cannot be explained on purely semantic grounds.
That suggests that the compositional semantics creates a wide space of opportunities
only some of which will be recruited by the speakers in their actual usage. Thus
to explain the actual distribution in naturalistically produced texts, we will need to
augment the compositional semantics with some theory of the persistence of surface
patterns of use.
The earlier absence of the may-under-hope combination from actual use seems to
have created an opportunity for the language to employ it later when it needed a
replacement for the dying-out construction with inflectional subjunctive under hope:
the kinds of meanings that the subjunctive construction expressed still needed to be
expressed, but a new form must have been found instead of the increasingly archaic
inflectional construction. It thus appears that the archaic and elevated flavor of the
modern may-under-hope construction stems not from its actually being archaic itself,
but rather because of the kind of semantic niche which that innovative construction
occupied since its creation.
Chapter 4 primarily concerns the issue of modal meaning change. Present-Day
English modal must is a descendant of Old English *motan, which is generally taken
in the historical literature to have been a possibility, not a necessity modal. The
semantic change from possibility to necessity which is believed to have happened to
*motan/must is unusual for two reasons: first, it is hard to see how a possibility modal
could be semantically re-analyzed as conveying a necessity message in the first place;
second, while all of must's cognates in the other Germanic languages experienced a
parallel semantic evolution, outside of this historically related group of modals we
do not routinely find semantic change from 0 to E in languages of the world. My
primary historical analysis of Old English *motan and Middle English *moten solves
the puzzle: using the standard methodology of historical linguistics, I argue that
Alfredian Old English *motan was not a possibility, but a so-called variable-force
modal: a modal that is neither 2 nor 0, and does not have a direct translation
equivalent in Present-Day English.
The inspiration for this analysis comes from recent detailed semantic fieldwork on
24
variable-force modals in three languages of the Pacific Northwest, namely St'dt'imcets
([Rullmann et al., 2008]), Gitksan (IPeterson, 2010], [Matthewson, 2013]), and Nez
Perce ([Deal, 2011]). However, Old English variable-force modality has a distribution
different than in any of those three languages. I propose a novel formal analysis for
*motan that derives the variable-force effect from the workings of a presupposition
saying that possibility and necessity collapse in the set of worlds that the modal quan-
tifies over. Formulated specifically to fit Old English data, this analysis presents one
more theoretical option in the emerging landscape of variable-force formal analyses.
I check whether my analysis for Old English may carry over to St'dt'imcets, Gitksan
or Nez Perce, and conclude that it definitely is a wrong one to apply to the first two,
and that it also seems to be slightly off in the case of Nez Perce, though up to a
certain extent the data from Nez Perce and Alfredian Old English are very similar.
Having established that *motan was a variable-force modal in Old English, we
can explain why it could have the special change trajectory it actually had: being
a different kind of animal, it need not have followed the usual change trajectories
of possibility modals. But we do not yet get closer to the understanding of why it
developed how it did. In fact, we even lack a detailed description of the micro-stages of
the overall change. My analysis of Early Middle English data from the "AB language"
dialect of the Western Midlands fills this gap. In the Early Middle English of Ancrene
Wisse and related AB texts, *moten is no longer a non-ambiguous variable-force
modal. Instead, it has several well-delineated types of uses, some of them modern-
type necessity ones (namely, circumstantial and deontic II), while others should be
analyzed as featuring a possibility, or at the very least a non-necessity modal. We
thus observe the following general trajectory of change: OE *motan is a variable-force
modal, which by Early ME starts to function as truly ambiguous between 0 and l,
and by Early Modern English loses virtually all non-necessity uses, turning into a
regular necessity modal.
Chapter 5 studies the scope constraints on necessity deontics and clausemate
negation. It is well-known that necessity deontics may have fixed scope with respect
to negation (cf. mustn't P and don't have to P), and recently it has been argued
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by [Iatridou and Zeijlstra, 2013] and [Homer, 2013] that such restrictions should be
analyzed as stemming from polarity-item properties of the modals involved. I review
the data on fixed scope of deontics from the literature, add to them new data from
Russian deontics, and conclude that the landscape of deontic scope restrictions is
too rich to stem just from NPI and PPI properties. Moreover, given that scope
restrictions may be specific to particular tense-aspect-mood forms of a modal (as it is
the case for French devoir), syntactic mechanisms seem to be too crude to derive the
observed diversity of patterns, and need to be complemented with scope constraints
belonging to the semantic component, and indexed to particular constructions rather
than just lexical items.
After drawing that general conclusion, I go on to provide two examples of how a
semantic restriction on scope with respect to clausemate negation may conventionalize
in the first place. The subject of the first case study is Russian advice/ suggestion
priority modal stoit 'should, 'd better', which has fixed wide scope with respect to
clausemate negation. Once we look into the historical rise of that modal lexeme from
the mid-19th century on, we see that the modal meaning emerges as a semanticized
implicature triggered by lexical verb 8toitj 'to be worth'; in negative contexts, that
modal implicature amounts to the stronger reading D > -,, not the weaker reading
, > l. Thus the modern scope restriction was conventionalized because there was
never evidence for speakers who re-analyzed the earlier implicature as a part of the
assertion that would suggest the modal could scope under negation in its clause. The
second example is English have to, which has obligatorily narrow scope with respect
to negation. Again, once we see how the new modal meaning of have to arose in the
mid-19th century from futurate uses, we can immediately note that there were no
contexts among the ones reanalyzed as featuring the innovative modal which would
support the wide scope construal. Thus we not only have a theoretical argument
for the existence of purely semantic constraints on scope, but also specific examples
illustrating how exactly such semantic constraints may come to be. This lies at the
intersection of the second and third issues from the agenda in 4: in the two case
studies we may observe how lexical items with particular restrictions may in principle
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arise in a natural way, conveniently meeting the demands of the speakers.
Chapters 2-5 are related to independent papers at different stages of the cy-
cle of submission and publication. Chapter 2 is a slightly expanded version of
[Yanovich, 2013b], published in January 2013. Chapter 3 is related to the paper
[Yanovich, 20121 submitted for a volume with OUP edited by Ana Arregui, Maria
Luisa Rivero and Andr6s Pablo Salanova, and is currently under review. Talks fea-
turing material from Chapters 4 and 5 have been presented at several different venues
over the 2012-2013 academic year. Both projects reported in those chapters are under
preparation for submission.
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Chapter 2
Epistemic semantics dependent on
practical goals
The standard-contextualist analysis of epistemic modals says that, first, such modals
(for instance, the epistemic might) are quantifiers over a certain set of worlds, often
called the modal base, and second, that the modal base is determined by the context
of utterance and the evaluation world. More precisely, the modal base of an epistemic
modal must be epistemic: it must consist of worlds compatible with some body of
knowledge determined by the evaluation world and the context of utterance.1
Lately, standard contextualism received plenty of bad press. [Weatherson and Egan, 2011]
'This chapter is a slightly expanded version of [Yanovich, 2013b], published in the Journal of
Semantics, with two improvements.
The first improvement concerns my meta-theoretical claims about hidden eavesdropping scenarios.
In [Yanovich, 2013b], I proposed what essentially is a relativist analysis of such cases, but mistak-
enly called my analysis contextualist. I have realized my mistake thanks to discussions with John
MacFarlane in April 2013 and Kai von Fintel in June 2013. The kind of case about which I was
wrong does not affect the general argument directly, so I confine its discussion to the new section
2.1.6.
The second improvement concerns my claim that Cloudy Contextualism cannot explain the sce-
nario in 39. As was pointed out to me by Kai von Fintel, that scenario is not a definite counterex-
ample against Cloudy Contextualism. My discussion of the example now points out some avenues
that a cloudy contextualist may take to account for it, and highlights the challenges such an account
would face.
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review the criticism, and conclude that there are two areas where standard contex-
tualism faces serious problems: first, disagreement and agreement dialogues with
epistemic claims, and second, epistemic claims embedded under attitude verbs. Many
authors, based on data from those two areas, claim that standard contextualism about
epistemic modality is untenable (cf. [MacFarlane, 20111, [von Fintel and Gillies, 2011a],
a.o.)
In this chapter I show that those claims turn out to be largely false. I do so
by constructing a standard-contextualist theory, called Practical Contextualism, that
successfully explains the behavior of epistemics both in (dis)agreement dialogues and
under attitude verbs. In fact, the range of facts the new proposal accounts for is
greater than for any competitor currently on the market.
There is still one thing which Practical Contextualism cannot do: if one believes
that the very same assertion may have different truth values, then a strictly contex-
tualist proposal would not be sufficient. As I personally believe it very natural that
the same assertion may have different truth conditions dependent on the purposes for
which we assess its truth, I also formulate Practical Relativism, a relativist cousin of
Practical Contextualism. The two theories share most of the predictions, and only
differ on the treatment of a small range of cases, notably on certain eavesdropping
scenarios. The distinction between the contextualist and the relativist versions of my
As for the expansions compared to [Yanovich, 2013bj, the present chapter provides a little more
background on the predecessor standard-contextualist theories in Section 2.1.4, a couple more mo-
tivating examples at the beginning of Section 2.2, and adds some remarks absent from the journal
version in footnotes 6. Some adjustments are also made to the choice of examples for the overall
argument to accommodate the improvement (namely, the eavesdropping cases of the kind crucial
for the choice between contextualism and relativism are discussed in the corresponding section, not
as simple illustrations). I believe that the spirit of the analysis remains the same as in the Journal
of Semantics article.
The work reported here has benefitted greatly from discussions with Ana Arregui, Kai von Fintel,
Benjamin George, Martin Hackl, Sabine Iatridou, Angelika Kratzer, John MacFarlane, Paolo Santo-
rio, Maziar Toosarvandani, Stephen Yablo, and especially with Irene Heim; from two presentations
at the Semantics group at MIT in Fall 2011; and from the comments of two anonymous reviewers
for Journal of Semantics and the journal's editors.
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proposal is the most substantial difference between the present chapter and its earlier
version published as [Yanovich, 2013b].
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 2.1 concerns dialogues with epis-
temic claims, and is more philosophical in spirit. I show why dialogues with epistemic
disagreement and retraction have been taken to falsify standard contextualism as a
whole, and then introduce Practical Contextualism, a new version of standard contex-
tualism that can handle them. In many respects, the proposed theory is very conser-
vative: first, it maintains the general Kratzer-style uniform semantics for modals, and
second, it retains much of the intuitions behind the standard-contextualist proposals
by [Hacking, 1967], [Teller, 1972], and [DeRose, 1991]. The novelty of my approach
is in how exactly relevance of knowledge is defined: I take relevant knowledge to be
the knowledge that can be obtained sufficiently early for it to bear on the practical
actions which the assertion of an epistemic claim seeks to influence.
Section 2.2 concerns epistemics under attitude verbs, and is more linguistic. It
tests the predictions of Practical Contextualism for sentences where epistemic modals
are embedded under attitude verbs of different semantic classes. The range of atti-
tude verbs discussed is larger than has been considered in any previous analysis of
epistemic modality known to the author. It turns out that the predictions of Prac-
tical Contextualism formulated for matrix cases carry over well to epistemic modals
embedded under attitude verbs, and for some types of attitudes, the new theory does
a significantly better job than the other current theories on the market.
Before we proceed, a note is in order regarding epistemic vs. non-epistemic might.
All English modals which have prominent epistemic uses (e.g., might, may, can't)
have non-epistemic uses as well, as has been discussed at least since [Moore, 1962]
(cf. his Nb. IV, 17-18, and also Nb. VI, 15). While the epistemic reading should in
most cases be more readily available in the examples I use, sometimes a non-epistemic
meaning can also arise. The competing metaphysical/circumstantial readings can be
distinguished from epistemic readings as follows: if modality concerns the intrinsic
properties of the situation, then the modal is metaphysical/circumstantial; if modality
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concerns the certainty or uncertainty about whether a particular situation holds, the
modal is epistemic. The following examples from [Condoravdi, 2002] illustrate the
difference: 2
(5) Metaphysical/circumstantial:
It hasn't been decided yet who he will meet with. He may see the dean. He
may see the provost.
(6) Epistemic:
It has been decided who he will meet with but I don't know who it is. He
may see the dean. He may see the provost.
In the metaphysical/circumstantial example in 5, the situation being described is
indeterminate, and there can be no knowledge anywhere in the world which could
change that. In epistemic 6, the situation is determined one way or the other, and
it is only our knowledge that is indeterminate, though at least those who decided it
know who he will meet with. In general, a metaphysical /circumstantial claim aims to
describe how the world is, while an epistemic claim aims to describe what we know
about the world.
2.1 Disagreement and retraction
It has been argued by [MacFarlane, 2011], [von Fintel and Gillies, 2011a], among oth-
ers, that data from disagreement dialogues doom any theory using the framework
of standard contextualism. Below I describe those data and why several standard-
contextualist theories fail to account for them (Section 2.1.1), and then introduce
a new standard-contextualist theory that does not fail (Section 2.1.2). After dis-
cussing the contextual flexibility predicted by the new theory (Section 2.1.3) and
its relation to the earlier standard-contextualist proposals (Section 2.1.4), I com-
pare Practical Contextualism and two beyond-standard-contextualism approaches,
2 [Condoravdi, 2002] analyzes modals as in 5 as metaphysical. [Abusch, 2012] argues that in some
examples of that kind, the modal is circumstantial rather than metaphysical.
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namely relativism about epistemic modality of [MacFarlane, 2011] and others, and
cloudy contextualism of [von Fintel and Gillies, 2011a] (Section 2.1.5). Finally, in
Section 2.1.6 I discuss the kind of case which, in my judgement, does call for a rela-
tivist rather than a contextualist theory, namely certain kinds of hidden eavesdropper
scenarios where it is intuitively appealing to say that the same assertion may have
different truth values depending on whose purposes its truth is assessed for. For the
sake of such cases, I formulate Practical Relativism, a very close cousin of Practical
Contextualism that shares most predictions with it.
2.1.1 Argument against standard contextualism from disagree-
ment dialogues
The following dialogue illustrates the phenomena of disagreement with and retraction
of epistemic assertions which will be our focus in this section:
(7) a. Sarah: Bill might be in Boston.
b. George: No, that's not true. I just saw him ten minutes ago here in
Berkeley.
c. Sarah: Oh. Then I guess I was wrong.
There are several issues raised by 7 which any reasonable theory of the semantics
and pragmatics of the epistemic modal might needs to explain:
(8) Assertion: Sarah is not wrong to assert 7a, though she may later retract it.
Disagreement: George's disagreement in 7b is (or at least may be) about
where Bill is, not about what Sarah thinks.
Retraction: It is reasonable for Sarah to retract her earlier assertion in 7c
after she learns Bill is in Berkeley.
Those explananda may seem trivial. The reason we need to discuss them at all
is that many standard-contextualist theories fail to account for all three: they either
explain Assertion well, but fail with Disagreement and Retraction, or vice versa.
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We will now consider three variants of standard contextualism, and their criticism by
[Egan, 2007], [MacFarlane, 2011], [von Fintel and Gillies, 2011a], a.o.
All three variants, as well as my new standard contextualist proposal to be in-
troduced later, assume the same basic semantics for the epistemic might in 9.3 The
differences between them concern how exactly Epist.Modal.Base,, is defined. A
theory may be called standard-contextualist if its meaning for the modal is sensitive
only to the context of utterance and the evaluation world. A theory using the entry
in 9 is thus by definition standard-contextualist. 4
(9) [[might]]c'w = Ap(,t) . ]v E Epist.Modal.Base,, : p(v)
Given our intuitions about epistemic modality, the way Epist.Modal.Basec,2 is
defined should be sensitive to some body of knowledge determined by the context.
Three sensible definitions spelling out this idea in different ways are given below: 5,6
(10) SOLIPSISTIC CONTEXTUALISM: Epist.Modal.Base,,, =def
3 The semantics in 9 ignores some finer points of [Kratzer, 19811, [Kratzer, 1991], most notably,
ordering sources. So do all other current accounts of epistemic modality discussed in this chapter.
4In the semantic entries, I omit on the left side those evaluation parameters that do not appear
on the right side of the entry.
5 Solipsistic Contextualism can often be seen in the linguistic literature (for one of the many
examples, see [Condoravdi, 20021). It works reasonably well until one hits the disagreement data
and other complications arising in multi-agent contexts.
Both Group and Ability Contextualism are simplifications of the standard contextualist proposals
in [Hacking, 1967], [Teller, 19721 and [DeRose, 19911, to be discussed in more detail in Section 2.1.4.
The argument against Group Contextualism in the main text applies to some extent to all three
authors; the argument against Ability Contextualism applies to Hacking only.
6 Note that the theories in 10-12, as well as my Practical Contextualism to be proposed be-
low, are not only standard-contextualist, but also non-indexical-contextualist, using a term by
[MacFarlane, 20091. MacFarlane clarifies the distinction between contextualist theories that allow
the context to specify the content of a given instance of the epistemic modal (indexical-contextualist
theories), and those which have that content fixed across all contexts (non-indexical-contextualist
theories). For instance, an indexical-contextualist theory could allow for the context to determine
in each case whether to evaluate the modal according to 10, 11 or 12. An example of such a theory
is [Dietz, 2008]. In contrast to that, a non-indexical contextualist theory takes the modal to always
contribute the same content - for example, the content defined in 10.
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=def {I' w' is compatible with the knowledge of speaker(c) in w}
(11) GROUP CONTEXTUALISM: Epist.Modal.Base,, =def
=def {w' w' is compatible with the knowledge of the relevant group in c in w}
(12) ABILITY CONTEXTUALISM: Epist.Modal.Base,,, =def
=def {w' I w' is compatible with what speaker(c) could come to know in w}
Let us start with Solipsistic Contextualism, which is in a sense the most straight-
forward variant of the theory. According to 10, the content of Sarah's assertion in 7a is
roughly this: 'It is compatible with Sarah's knowledge that Bill is in Boston'. Depend-
ing on one's choice of the norm for assertion (see [Lackey, 2007] and the references
therein for discussion), Sarah should know, or reasonably believe, or find it reasonable
to believe, that that proposition holds in order to assert 7a. Whatever one's choice
of the norm is, if Sarah believes that her knowledge is compatible with Bill being in
Boston, she should not hesitate to assert 7a, and thus Solipsistic Contextualism can
explain Assertion.7
Unfortunately, the solipsistic analysis of 7a makes it impossible to explain Dis-
agreement. Assuming the pronoun that in 7b refers to the content of Sarah's asser-
In a complete theory of modality, some degree of indexicality is required of a contextualist theory.
For example, the context would need to determine whether in a given utterance we have an epistemic
or a metaphysical might, which is exactly the determination of the content of a modal. (Though
cf. [Braun, 2013] for a different opinion, and [Yanovich, 2013a] for criticism of that opinion.) But if
we fix the context-sensitive properties such as modal flavors, the distinction between indexical and
non-indexical contextualism becomes non-trivial.
7 More accurately, if one's norm for assertion requires knowledge of p to assert p, then Sarah's 7a
can be deemed improper under Solipsistic Contextualism if she is wrong about what beliefs of hers
constitute knowledge. But under that norm, many assertions that seemed harmless to those who
made them will have to be deemed improper.
Under the norms of assertion which grant that the status of an assertion is determined based on
the speaker's reasoning rather than on the actual state of the world - in other words, those norms
under which it is always under the control of the speaker to make a proper assertion - Solipsistic
Contextualism explains Assertion.
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tion in 7a,' what George rejects in 7b is that 'it is compatible with Sarah's knowledge
that Bill is in Boston'. George's claim is thus predicted to be about Sarah's state of
mind, not about where Bill is or might be. But that clearly is wrong. While it is in
principle possible for people to criticize other people for not realizing which propo-
sitions are compatible with their knowledge,' George's reply need not be a reproach
of that kind. George can very well be certain that Sarah could not on her own rule
out that Bill is in Boston, and at the same time assert 7b. Similarly, Retraction
is also highly problematic under Solipsistic Contextualism: unless Sarah was wrong
about her own state of mind, her assertion was proper and true, so there should be
no reason for her to retract it later.
The analysis in 11 can be seen as a natural reaction to those problems with Dis-
agreement and Retraction. Suppose that the relevant group of knowers consists of
Sarah and George, and that all epistemic claims are relative to that group's knowl-
edge. Assume also that the knowledge of the group is always not weaker than the
knowledge of any individual member or subgroup of the group. That is, assume that
group knowledge is aggregated, so if George, but not Sarah, knows that p, then the
group of Sarah and George also knows that p.
Now we can easily explain Disagreement and Retraction. Under the assump-
tions we just made, the content of 7a is something like 'It is compatible with everything
that either Sarah or George know that Bill is in Boston'. If George knows something
which rules out Bill being in Boston, that proposition is false. Thus George's dis-
agreement in 7b is expected in such a situation. After George provides Sarah with
the relevant piece of information about his knowledge, it should become clear to her
as well that the content of her assertion was false, even though earlier she sincerely
8 In this particular dialogue it might be possible to explain away Disagreement by saying that
that refers to the prejacent of Sarah's claim (that is, the argument of the modal) rather than
her assertion as a whole. But when other data are taken into account, that hardly helps. See
[von Fintel and Gillies, 2011a, Sec. 3J for more discussion.
9Compare the disagreement in 7b with: " Why do you say that 13 times 3 is 42? You know the
multiplication table perfectly well, and you know how one does multiplication all right. Just think a
little harder!"
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believed it was true. This change of belief explains why she might be inclined to
retract her assertion in 7c: she is no longer in a position to defend it.
Unfortunately, the cost of getting that explanation for Disagreement and Re-
traction is that we lose our explanation of Assertion. In order for Group Con-
textualism to work, Sarah's 7a must be a very strong statement, for it concerns not
only Sarah's, but also George's state of mind. In a normal conversation, we might be
willing to grant Sarah the privilege of making a claim about George's state of mind.
But it is very easy to construct scenarios where Sarah's claim must be about the
knowledge of agents completely unknown to Sarah. Suppose Sarah utters 7a talking
to Mary in a coffee shop. George is at the table behind Sarah's back, and she is not
even aware of his existence - but accidentally he knows what Sarah and Mary are
talking about, and who Bill is. The fact that Sarah doesn't know George doesn't
make it improper for him to jump into the conversation with 7b, so his knowledge
should be included into the group knowledge under Group Contextualism. But how
can Sarah make a claim about the knowledge of a group which includes people she
does not know exist? (Or so the critics of standard contextualism say. We will see
below that there is an important qualification regarding this argument.)
The Ability Contextualism in 12 also fails to explain Assertion, though Dis-
agreement and Retraction pose no problem for it. Under Ability Contextualism,
the content of Sarah's assertion in 7a is roughly this: 'Nothing Sarah knows or could
come to know will rule out Bill being in Boston'. Since George in 7 can provide to
Sarah the piece of knowledge ruling out that Bill is in Boston, he knows that her
statement was false, even though she believed otherwise. So George disagrees, and
provides Sarah with that crucial piece of knowledge. That makes Sarah also realize
her statement was false, and she retracts her earlier assertion.
So far so good, but the meaning that Ability Contextualism assigns to 7a is too
strong. Suppose Sarah is in the middle of an investigation which should determine
where Bill is. She is sure she will eventually succeed. Therefore she is confident that
after she concludes the investigation, she will know the truth value of the proposition
'Nothing Sarah knows or could come to know will rule out Bill being in Boston': if
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she learns Bill is in Boston, the proposition is true, and if she learns he is somewhere
else, the proposition is false.
We have two cases depending on our norm for assertion. In the first case, suppose
that to assert p properly, you have to know (or to reasonably believe, or find it
reasonable to believe) that p. Then in the scenario just described Sarah should be
able to assert 7a only if she is sure Bill is actually in Boston. But then she should be
able to assert the sentence "Bill is in Boston" just as well. That is wrong: in such a
situation, one may very well find it OK to assert "Bill might be in Boston", but not
OK to assert "Bill is in Boston".
For the second case, suppose we weaken the norm of assertion. For instance, we
can make it permissible to assert things we do not believe are true. But then again,
in our scenario Sarah should be able to assert "Bill is in Boston" just as well as 7a.
Thus no matter how we set up our norm for assertion, with Ability Contextu-
alism we end up predicting that if Sarah is warranted to assert 7a, she should be
as warranted to assert the sentence "Bill is in Boston", contrary to fact. So while
the problems are somewhat different for Group Contextualism and Ability Contex-
tualism, both of them explain well Disagreement and Retraction, but fail on the
seemingly innocent Assertion.
Let's take stock. Assertion on the one hand and Disagreement and Retraction
on the other seem to pull us in opposite directions. To explain Assertion, we want
to keep the amount of knowledge bearing on Sarah's assertion in 7a as small as
possible, preferably restricted to her own knowledge. But to explain Disagreement
and Retraction, we want to make that same amount of knowledge on which the
truth of 7a hinges very large: it should be so large that it includes the knowledge of
accidental eavesdroppers (such as George who happened to jump into the conversation
in the coffee shop), the knowledge that will be obtained in the future, etc. etc.
[MacFarlane, 2011] and [von Fintel and Gillies, 2011a] conclude it is hopeless: stan-
dard contextualism just cannot accommodate both requirements at the same time.
They argue that there is no meaning weak enough to make Assertion reasonable,
and yet strong enough to explain Disagreement and Retraction. Therefore both
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reject standard contextualism (we will review what they propose instead in Section
2.1.5).
2.1.2 Practical Contextualism
I will now introduce a new version of standard contextualism, called Practical Contex-
tualism, that can explain Assertion, Disagreement, and Retraction at the same
time. The proposal is not a radical departure from the intuitions behind the earlier
philosophical standard-contextualist accounts of [Hacking, 1967], [Teller, 1972], and
[DeRose, 19911, but it features three crucial additions. First, I assume a richer prag-
matic picture of language use where the truth value of an assertion may depend on the
practical goals of the interlocutors. Second, I define the epistemic modal base as the
intersection of relevant pieces of knowledge where relevant pieces are those which may
be obtained in time to affect the resolution of the current practical goal, but not later.
Third, I argue that Assertion is actually not such a hard problem as it is often taken
to be in the recent literature on epistemic modality, once parallels between epistemic
and non-epistemic assertions are taken into account. All these three additions may
be viewed as simply sharpening the earlier standard-contextualist accounts, though
the reader will notice that the amount of sharpening to do is considerable.
I will start with the general pragma'tic picture of discourse/inquiry (I make no
distinction between the two here). Practical agents participating in a conversation
do so to achieve some practical goal. Such goals may be more "conversation-internal"
(such as the resolution of an accepted Question Under Discussion, or QUD) or less
so (such as the goal to drink some water as soon as possible). Regardless of the
kind of current goal, whatever we say is being said with the current practical goal of
the conversation in mind. Just as speakers are normatively cooperative, their current
goal is normatively common (later we will specifically discuss cases when interlocutors
disagree with each other on the current goal).
The pursuit of each practical goal resolves in a commitment, and manifests itself
in a practical action that gets registered in the context because of the very fact
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it was undertaken." Such actions, just as goals themselves, may be more or less
"conversation-internal": both taking a public stance on some question and buying
airplane tickets may count. Those actions would often be undertaken by only some
of the interlocutors, with the goal determining who is supposed to perform them:
e.g., the goal of drinking some water would be relative to a particular person who
is thirsty, etc. Resolving a goal does not necessarily mean achieving it: a possible
resolution is a refusal to pursue it any further.
Once the commitment is made and the resolving action is undertaken, the goal
loses its relevance. Each goal has an associated set of practical constraints determining
when exactly the commitment needs to be made. We can call that set of constraints
the boundaries of an investigation. If the agents could reach the goal right away, they
would not have been wasting time talking. They talk in order to find out which way
they should commit: they investigate the options. An investigation of the practical
options associated with the practical goal thus has a naturally corresponding QUD: a
partition of the set of possible worlds into several classes in each of which a different
practical action is undertaken.
Imagine you are in a grocery store, and need to choose which kind of sugar to
buy for cookies that you plan to start making in an hour. Your current investigation
is into the QUD Q which is a partition of the possible-world space into segments
where you buy a particular kind of sugar. (Note that there need not be any explicit
conversation taking place; a QUD is just a formal way of representing the object
of your inquiry.) Now, it would be nice if you choose the right kind of sugar, so
you consider a subordinated QUD R: 'Which kind of sugar would work best in my
cookies?' If you manage to resolve R, that would allow you to resolve Q optimally
and undertake the best possible practical action.
101n most cases, such actions would be publicly observable (e.g., the speaker may bring Stalnaker's
goat into the room), but they need not be. When in the process of reasoning someone makes a
decision to commit to a particular solution, that changes the context of the inquiry, even though
the decision may be not directly observable to anyone but the inquirer. The consequences of her
decision are observable, and we can attribute such "invisible" changes to other people much like we
can attribute beliefs to others based on their observable actions.
40
Now, you know there is a book in Harvard's Widener Library that can tell you
which exact kind of sugar works best. However, if you go to Harvard, read the book,
and then return to make your purchase, you will not be able to make the cookies when
you planned. So while you'd in principle like to resolve R and therefore Q optimally,
going to Widener would defeat the very purpose for which you considered R in the
first place. Your current practical goal defines certain boundaries: you need to make
the decision regarding sugar in the next couple of minutes, therefore you are only
interested in such information bearing on R that you can realistically obtain within
that couple of minutes. All other information is irrelevant for your investigation:
while it may bear on the QUD associated with your practical goal, it does not help
you to resolve it before you have to commit, undertaking an irrevocable action.
The cookies example illustrates the interplay between the current practical goal
and the local QUD structure of discourse/ inquiry (see [Roberts, 1996], [Roberts, 2012]
for the latter). On the local level, the conversation involves addressing interrelated
QUDs belonging to different levels, and that local-level development can be studied
in its own right (e.g., see [Djalali et al., 2011], [Rojas-Esponda, 2013]). The current
practical goal, on the other hand, is a part of the practical superstructure governing
the conversation's development. The QUD naturally associated with the current
investigation into the available practical options provides an interface between the
discourse local level and the practical super-level: the resolution of local QUDs will
normally bear upon the QUD associated with the current investigation. After all,
if local QUDs do not bear on the practical superstructure QUDs, there is not much
point in pursuing the local ones. In particular, in the cookies example, it only makes
sense to consider the local QUD R about which kind of sugar works best because one
needs to commit to buying a particular kind of sugar.
The general pragmatic picture I just sketched is an obvious descendant of [Stalnaker, 1984],
and a development of the model of the intentional structure of discourse in [Roberts, 1996]
and [Roberts, 20121. Two important additions I make to Roberts' model are as fol-
lows: first, I add the practical goal superstructure upon the more usual conversational
QUD structure; second, below I extend Roberts' notion of relevance (defined by her
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for discourse moves) to pieces of knowledge."
The thesis of Practical Contextualism is that the truth conditions of epistemic
modals are sensitive to the current practical goal and the investigation towards its
resolution. Namely, I argue that it is exactly the knowledge falling within the bound-
aries of the current investigation that forms the epistemic modal base. The sphere
of relevant knowledge in Practical Contextualism is thus determined by the practical
actions the agents in the context intend to make. The definitions below formalize this
thesis.
(13) Each context of discourse/inquiry has a current practical goal. That goal is
normatively common for the interlocutors, and the conversation normatively
progresses so that the goal may be resolved; namely, that the relevant inter-
locutors may commit to one of the alternative practical actions resolving the
goal.
(14) The alternative options resolving the current practical goal form the answers
to the associated QUD.
(15) The interlocutors' progress towards the resolution of a current practical goal
is an investigation. Each investigation has boundaries determined by the
practical constraints on the resolution of the practical goal: what cannot affect
the practical actions that would resolve the current goal falls outside of the
current investigation's boundaries.
(16) Proposition Ki is a piece of knowledge in context c in world w if that
proposition is true in w.
"Roberts distinguishes discourse goals, which are the goals to resolve one of the QUDs, and
domain goals, which are defined as all the other goals in the context. My current practical goal
constitutes, so to speak, a separate line on the discourse/inquiry scoreboard: a normatively shared
goal that directs the flow of the conversation. By definition, it is also one of Roberts' goals (it can
be either a discourse or a domain goal). The special status of the current practical goal is that it is
normatively the common understanding of the parties involved that sooner or later a commitment
should be made resolving the goal, and that it is the intention to make that commitment optimally
that drives the conversation.
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Piece of knowledge Ki is relevant in c at w iff:
1) obtaining Ki may affect the choice of the practical action resolving the
current goal in c, and
2) Ki may be obtained by the interlocutors in w within the boundaries
of the current investigation.
Thus the current investigation into which practical action to take defines a sphere
of relevant knowledge: only the knowledge which can be accessed in time to affect
the choice of a practical action resolving the goal is relevant for the undergoing dis-
course/inquiry. E.g., in the cookies example above, the knowledge from the book in
Widener cannot be accessed in time, and hence is irrelevant for the practical goal at
hand.
The epistemic modal base is defined as the intersection of all pieces of knowledge
which fall within the boundaries of the current investigation:
(17) PRACTICAL CONTEXTUALISM:
Epist.Modal.Base, evaluated in context of utterance c and at world w,
is the set {w' w' is an element of every piece of knowledge Ki
relevant in c at w for the current investigation}.
As a notational convention, Epist.Modal.Basec,w denotes the set Epist.Modal.Base
as evaluated at c and w. Thus c and w in Epist.Modal.Base,, are not actual vari-
ables of the logical form: they are just convenient reminders of what the evaluation
parameters on which Epist.Modal.Base depends are. We will sometimes abbreviate
Epist.Modal.Base,, as EMB,w.
How does Practical Contextualism 17 explain Assertion, Disagreement, and
Retraction? Consider 18, repeated here from 7:
(18) a. Sarah: Bill might be in Boston.
b. George: No, that's not true. I just saw him ten minutes ago here in
Berkeley.
c. Sarah: Oh. Then I guess I was wrong.
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Practical Contextualism cannot make predictions about any dialogue unless we
spell out what the assumed context is, and in particular what the constraints imposed
by the current investigation are. The practical goal behind 18 would normally be
construed as depending on where Bill is. For simplicity, we can assume that the
current goal is to find out Bill's spatial location. As for the limits of the investigation,
when people discuss a certain question, usually they take the knowledge they can
obtain during their discussion to be, to use the phrase from [Egan, 2007], within their
epistemic reach, so we will assume that the sphere of relevant knowledge includes at
least such knowledge.
The content of 18a in Practical Contextualism is then roughly this: 'No piece
of knowledge which can be obtained by Sarah and George within the timeframe of
several minutes rules out Bill being in Boston'. Using that meaning for 18a, we can
easily explain Disagreement and Retraction. When Sarah utters 18a, she would
sincerely believe, according to our proposal, that no piece of knowledge available to
her or George could rule out Bill being in Boston. However, that belief turns out
to be false, as George is in command of exactly such a piece. Therefore George
disagrees and provides to Sarah the information which shows that her sentence was
in fact false. That explains Disagreement. Sarah accepts George's argument, and
cancels her commitment to the claim she made. That explains Retraction. The
explanation of those two facts under Practical Contextualism is thus very close to
their explanation under Group Contextualism or Ability Contextualism.
The important part is how 17 handles Assertion. What right does Sarah have to
assert something like 18a if its truth value depends on pieces of knowledge she does
not have access to at the moment? I argue that there is nothing wrong with that
because ordinary non-epistemic assertions often depend on such inaccessible pieces
of knowledge just as well.
It will be useful to disentangle two different objections to standard contextualism
that are often fused together in the literature. One of the objections is valid, and
indeed dooms Group Contextualism. But the other one is not valid, and it is only
the invalid objection that applies to Practical Contextualism.
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(19) The valid objection: one normally is not warranted to make a claim about
the state of mind of a person of whose existence one is not even aware.
The invalid objection: one is never warranted to think one is as good an
authority as anyone on the subject under discussion. 12
The problem with the invalid objection is that asserting a non-epistemic, modal-
less claim already requires the speaker to assume that she is the best authority on
the subject. So if the objection were valid, we probably would not speak at all.
For the epistemic claim in 20, assume that the QUD is 'Where do elephants live
in the wild?', and also (rather unrealistically) that the current investigation is such
that the aggregated knowledge of all people in the world falls into the relevant sphere
of knowledge. (Recall that the aggregated knowledge of a group G is such that if any
single member of G knows that p, then p is in the aggregated knowledge.) Sentence
20 then should be interpreted as 21 on our account.
(20) There might be elephants living in the wild in Brazil.
(21) "The knowledge of all people in the world does not rule out that there are
elephants living in the wild in Brazil"
21 indeed seems to be a very strong thing to assert. How can one make a claim
about everyone's knowledge? But consider 22:
(22) There are no elephants living in the wild in Brazil.
22 is not less strong than 20. Suppose a professor who studied elephants all her
life asserts 22. Even though the professor knows a lot about elephants, there can
easily exist some elephant which was taken from a zoo and released somewhere in the
12 Cf. this formulation from [MacFarlane, 2010, p. 51 which fuses the two objections: "/Sarahl
certainly isn't warranted in thinking that nobody within earshot knows more about [BillI's whereabouts
than /shel is" (the names and pronouns are changed to match the names in 18; MacFarlane discusses
the same kind of dialogue.)
A slightly different version of the same objection is given in [Weatherson and Egan, 2011, p. 8-9]
under the name of the "argument from agreement".
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middle of the Amazon rainforest several months ago. Such an elephant would falsify
22, and it is obvious that the professor can never be absolutely sure there is no such
creature. Yet she can assert 22, and no one would normally challenge her authority
to do so.
Most non-modal statements we assert in our everyday lives can very easily happen
to be false, and even when we realize that such a possibility exists, it does not force
us to refrain from making them. To sincerely assert 22, we must have a high level of
confidence that our opinion about whether there are elephants in Brazil is as good
an opinion as there can be. But that does not preclude us from acknowledging the
possibility that we might be mistaken. In fact, if we were to refrain from asserting
things which we do not infallibly know, we would not have been able to talk much.
Bearing that in mind, let us return to 20 and 21. The truth conditions in 21 con-
cern an objective fact about the world: the aggregated knowledge of the humankind
either rules out that some elephants live in the wild in Brazil, or it doesn't. Of
course, the speaker cannot reasonably believe that she has access to all knowledge in
the world, and thus she cannot be absolutely certain what the truth of the matter
is in that case. But the professor asserting 22 also cannot be absolutely certain she
knows everything there is to know about each particular elephant. The two cases are
parallel.
It is enough for the following two conditions to hold for the speaker to believe she
knows that 21 is true:
(23) 1) The speaker believes that her knowledge does not rule out that elephants
live in Brazil.
2) The speaker believes nobody in the world is a better authority on the
question than her.
The first condition ensures that the speaker believes that her own pieces of knowl-
edge do not rule out the prejacent. If they did, then clearly the epistemic claim would
have been false. It is the second condition that is crucial: it ensures that the speaker
believes that no addition of further pieces of knowledge could significantly improve
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her knowledge on the matter. Of course, it would be crazy to deny that such belief
can easily turn out to be wrong. It is equally crazy for the professor who asserted 22
to deny that her belief that there are no elephants in the wild in Brazil could prove
wrong. But in both situations it can be normal to believe you know the state of affairs
as well as one could, while at the same time acknowledging the possibility that there
might be some crucial fact you are not aware of.
The kind of authority needed in order to assert an epistemic claim is the same kind
of authority speakers assume when they make regular non-modal claims. Consider
a professor giving a lecture; or a colleague of yours who just returned from lunch
and tells you whether it is raining; or somebody who just went to the Louvre, and is
asked where the classical part of the collection is. The professor, the colleague, and
the Louvre visitor would all normally consider themselves to be as good an authority
on their respective subjects as anybody could be. Depending on what their opinion
on the subject is, they can issue a non-modal or an epistemic claim.
If anything, it is often easier to be knowledgeable enough to assert an epistemic
claim than a non-epistemic claim, other things being equal. An epistemic claim like
20 may be made relative to a rather small sphere of knowledge, so that it is relatively
easy to be the best authority on what's in it. But the truth of a non-modal claim like
22 depends on all the relevant facts about the world.
I will finish this section by discussing why Practical Contextualism avoids the
particular problems we saw in Section 2.1.1 which falsified Group and Ability Con-
textualism. As for Group Contextualism, the problematic case we discussed was when
George, of whose existence Sarah is not aware, overhears her from the next table at a
coffee shop saying 18a. George jumps into the conversation volunteering the crucial
piece of information he has about Bill's whereabouts, and Sarah retracts her earlier
statement, so George's knowledge has to be included into the group knowledge -
but it is hard to see how Sarah can make claims about the knowledge of people she
doesn't even know exist.
Under Practical Contextualism, there is no problem with this case. The very fact
that George was nearby is enough for his evidence to count under Practical Contextu-
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alism: Sarah gets access to his knowledge within the established spatial and temporal
boundaries of the investigation, so it's relevant. This explains Disagreement and
Retraction. At the same time, Sarah's claim was not about George's state of mind at
all: it was about the sphere of knowledge she can get access to within a few minutes.
She turned out to be wrong about the knowledge that falls within that sphere, but
speakers asserting most statements risk being wrong in the same way, so no problem
with Assertion arises.
It is worth noting that Practical Contextualism does not say that any epistemic
statement automatically meets the assertion norm, so the explanation above does
not apply simply because we made assertions easy. Consider the case when Sarah
is talking to Mary in the presence of Ann, and she knows that Ann has more infor-
mation about Bill's whereabouts than she herself does. In this kind of situation, it
is inappropriate for Sarah to say Bill might be in Boston to Mary: the proper thing
would be to check with Ann, as her knowledge is within reach." Sarah's epistemic
claim would be inappropriate in this situation because it fails the norm of assertion.
Turning to Ability Contextualism in 12, the problem with it was that it predicted
that in many cases the truth value of an epistemic claim should coincide with the truth
value of its prejacent. This was so because Ability Contextualism did not put any
boundary outside of which no new knowledge may bear on the truth of an epistemic
claim. Practical Contextualism puts just such a limit: unless the current practical
goal allows for waiting indefinitely before committing to the choice of a practical
action, some future knowledge can only be ruled in up to a certain moment in time.
Let me briefly review the theory just introduced. It is built within the framework
of a particular pragmatic picture of discourse/ inquiry that features a current practical
goal guiding the inquiry. Only those pieces of knowledge that are obtainable in time
to influence the practical actions resolving the current goal are relevant for the current
practical purposes, and the epistemic modal base is determined as the intersection of
all such relevant pieces of knowledge. An epistemic claim may thus concern not only
13 This type of scenario is similar to the phenomenon of disagreement by ignorants, discovered by
[Dietz, 2008] and discussed below in Section 2.1.5.
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presently accessible, but also future knowledge and the knowledge of other people,
which raises the issue of whether any speaker should ever be warranted in asserting
epistemic claims. But when we compare the kind of assumed authority required for
asserting non-epistemic claims, it turns out that asserting epistemic claims does not
require any more, so there is no problem here.
Note that all three novel pieces of this theory are crucial. The pragmatic picture
based on current practical goals does not on its own predict that there should be
natural language expressions sensitive to exactly the knowledge relevant relative to
those goals. It is easy to imagine a language which would not have expressions like
that. Furthermore, our account of Assertion by itself does not explain all the puzzles.
In particular, if we combine the account for Assertion with Group Contextualism,
we predict that epistemic claims should only be justified when the speaker is the best
authority on the mental states of particular individuals, for some of which she might
not know that they exist. Similarly, if we combine the account for Assertion with
Ability Contextualism, we do not gain much either: the speaker who expects to learn
whether p, would know that the future version of herself is a better authority, so the
epistemic claim might p should be unassertable. Thus we need all three pieces to
account for the (dis)agreement puzzles which seemed to our predecessors to falsify
standard contextualism.
2.1.3 The role of context under Practical Contextualism
In this section, I will discuss several examples that illustrate what exact role the
context plays under Practical Contextualism, and how the current investigation de-
termined by the context affects the appropriateness and truth of epistemic claims. If
in the previous section we were mostly concerned with checking how the new account
deals with the previously discussed cases, here we will check its novel predictions.
It will be particularly important throughout this section how small changes in the
context affect the truth values of epistemic claims.
Consider the following scenario (a practical-action-oriented descendant of the can-
cer test scenarios of [DeRose, 1991]), where the doctor suspects Pat may have a ter-
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minal condition. If he does, he will die in a few days. Pat had some tests done which
may either confirm the doctor's fears, or rule out that Pat is going to die soon. The
doctor must have seen the test results by now.
Jen, Pat's daughter, will soon call the doctor and find out what the doctor knows,
but right now, she is talking to Megan, Pat's sister. Jen and Megan's goal is to figure
out whether Megan should fly in. They need to make a decision about it right now,
before Jen calls the doctor: if they decide Megan should fly in tomorrow, it may be
too late for her to book the tickets if they wait any longer. Jen says:
(24) Jen: (Look, just think about it.) Pat might die in a few days. (Book your
tickets for tomorrow already!)
Suppose the test results show that Pat is all right, and the doctor, having already
seen them, knows that. Does it make Jen's epistemic claim in 24 false in the context
of the conversation? No, it does not. Even though there exists knowledge which
settles the question of whether Pat has a terminal condition, that knowledge cannot
be obtained fast enough to help Jen and Megan decide whether to book the tickets
now.
The practical action at stake in this context is buying the tickets, with the al-
ternative options being roughly "buying the tickets right now" and "not buying the
tickets at all". Those alternatives naturally form the associated QUD Q. Jen's actual
epistemic claim in 24 addresses its sub-QUD R: 'What is Pat's health status?' While
both Jen and Megan are in general very interested in finding out the complete true
answer to R, right now they are more pressingly concerned with buying or not buy-
ing the tickets. So the only information relevant for their current investigation is the
information that arrives in time to affect their decision. In this particular context,
no new knowledge is obtained within the investigation's boundaries, and the present
knowledge does not rule out Pat's dying in a few days, so Jen's epistemic claim is
true.
Let's modify the context a little bit, adding the following continuation. Right after
Jen asserts the sentence Pat might die in a few days, Megan unexpectedly receives a
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text message from the doctor's office that says that the results of the test show Pat
is not in any immediate danger.
(25) Jen: Pat might die in a few days.
Megan: You know what? That's actually not so. I just got a text message
from the doctor's office. The results are good. Pat is going to live.
Even though neither Megan nor Jen could predict that the text message would
arrive, after they receive it, they will both accept that Jen's assertion was actually
false. What makes the new and unpredicted piece of knowledge to count is that it
arrives just in time to affect the practical action of buying the tickets.
Consider a yet different continuation of the same context, modeled after cases
discussed by [von Fintel and Gillies, 2008] under the label of "time lag". The basic
context is the same, and Jen makes the same assertion in 24. But there is no text
message, and Megan is convinced by Jen, buys the tickets, and flies in the next day.
When she arrives, it is already clear to everyone involved that Pat is not in any
immediate danger. But, as von Fintel and Gillies observe regarding a similar case,
it is "silly" to reject the assertion Jen made in 24 on the next day. Even though the
same sentence uttered then would be false, there is no reason to say that Jen spoke
falsely at the time of her assertion.
In our Practical Contextualism, that pattern of judgments is expected. On the
next day, the practical purpose which Jen's assertion was meant to fulfill is already
irrelevant. We have exceeded the bounds of the investigation which took place in
the context where her assertion was made. New knowledge that we receive after
the practical action was taken cannot retroactively affect the action. Therefore such
knowledge does not bear on the truth or falsity of our epistemic claim.
However, if we consider the same claim in 24 anew on the next day, with a different
practical goal, that seemingly same claim would be judged false. For instance, if a
neighbor were to say to Jen: "But Pat might die in a few days, didn't you say so
yourself yesterday?", Jen may very well answer something like: "I did, but that's
not true". Thus our judgements in the time lag cases depend on what we take the
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epistemic claim to be used for. If we take it to be used towards the resolution of
some past goal, then the relevant knowledge is that which was obtained before the
commitment for that goal. If we take the epistemic claim to be used for some present
goal of ours, then our present knowledge will normally bear on it.
In the next scenario, the interplay between different QUDs and different practical
goals is yet more complex. Sarah and George are looking for the keys, and the
following assertions are made:
(26) a. Sarah: Check on the fridge. The keys might be there.
b. George (after checking on the fridge): No, they're not.
The big practical goal in this context is to find the keys. However, it is not
the big practical goal that Sarah has in mind asserting 26a: what she wants to
achieve is getting George to check on the fridge. That smaller current practical goal
is subordinated to the big practical goal of finding the keys, as its successful resolution
will move the big investigation forward.
The reason Sarah wants to get George to check the fridge is that such checking will
resolve the QUD R 'Are the keys on the fridge?', which in turn bears on the QUD Q
'Where are the keys?' associated with the main practical goal of the overall inquiry.
Now, it only makes sense to check the fridge if R is still unresolved, and Sarah points
out that it indeed is by asserting 26a which addresses R. Thus R plays a double role
in this context: first, R is the QUD that Sarah wants to resolve by asking George
to check on the fridge, and second, Sarah addresses the same R to show it is still
unresolved in order to get George to do the checking.
As the purpose of Sarah's claim is to get George check the fridge, her claim is
only useful until the point at which it is determined whether George will do so. Thus
the current investigation of R in this context excludes whatever happens after George
commits to checking or not checking the fridge. Therefore whatever new knowledge
George obtains after checking is irrelevant for Sarah's claim, even though it resolves
R addressed by it.
As a different variant of the scenario, suppose that Mary is also present during
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the conversation, and she just checked on the fridge and found no keys there. Mary's
knowledge already resolves R, eliminating the need to check on the fridge, and thus
affecting whether George should. Her knowledge is relevant within the current inves-
tigation. Therefore Mary is predicted to be able to properly disagree with Sarah, and
that prediction is borne out.
Comparing the case without Mary to the case with Mary, we can see that whether
the same piece of knowledge 'There are no keys on the fridge' is relevant for the
epistemic claim is directly dependent on when that piece of knowledge is obtained. If
it is obtained after the practical action is taken, it is not relevant. If it is obtained in
time to affect the choice of practical action, then it is within the sphere of knowledge
relevant for the epistemic claim.
The boundaries of an investigation may be extremely wide in some cases, as the
following example shows. Suzan works at NASA in a lab that is trying to figure out
whether there are living bacteria on Mars. Being a specialist in that area, Suzan
knows that to get any significant results at all, her lab will have to work for at least
another decade. So when pressured to say whether there might be life on Mars, she
answers:
(27) Suzan: Might there be life on Mars? It is not possible to answer that question
yet.
In this context, nothing Suzan or anybody else knows right now rules out the
possibility that there is life on Mars, so the epistemic statement she declines to pass
a judgement on is quite mild. An average person in the street would hardly criticize
Suzan even if she endorsed it now and it turned out some 10 years later that in fact
there is no life on Mars after all. Nevertheless Suzan refrains from either endorsing or
rejecting the epistemic statement. She hopes that in a decade or so, there would be
more definitive data allowing her and her colleagues to commit to a particular public
stance on the question. She knows how little she knows at the moment, and chooses
not to be hasty.
The investigation in this case creates a particularly wide sphere of relevant knowl-
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edge - so wide that the speaker does not consider herself the best possible authority.
She expects that 10 years later, she herself or somebody else at that time will be a
much better authority on the subject than she is now, so she declines to evaluate the
truth value of the epistemic claim.
The sphere of relevant knowledge is so wide in this case because the practical action
itself to which the current investigation leads is very far in the future. If we modify
the context so that the practical action becomes much closer, Suzan is predicted to
become more willing to pass a judgement on the epistemic claim. Suppose Suzan is
called to testify before a commission that will determine funding levels for the Mars
lab for the next year, and she is asked whether there might be life on Mars. In
this situation, there is a good chance she will not refrain from either endorsing or
rejecting the epistemic statement: in this context, the practical actions depending on
the epistemic claim are quite close, and thus she may potentially consider herself the
best possible authority on the much smaller sphere of knowledge.
Finally, consider a scenario which on the face of it looks like it is the knowledge of a
particular person that is excluded: the Mastermind scenario by [von Fintel and Gillies, 2008).
(28) Mastermind: Pascal and Mordecai are playing Mastermind. Mordecai has
selected several pins of different colors, and is giving Pascal hints which should
help Pascal to figure out which pins Mordecai has.
At the moment, it is consistent with the hints given so far, but not entailed by
them, that there are two reds.
Mordecai: There might be two reds.
Given how the game is played, Mordecai knows full well whether there are two reds.
Suppose he knows there is only one red. That, however, does not make his assertion
in 28 improper. How come his own knowledge, clearly immediately available to him,
does not matter for the epistemic claim he asserts?
Even though the knowledge is available, it is irrelevant in the context. The big
practical goal of Mordecai and Pascal is to play Mastermind by its rules. The smaller
current practical goal behind Mordecai's assertion in 28 presumably is to either remind
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Pascal, or make it obvious to him, that a particular possibility is still not ruled out by
the public information in the game. If Pascal gets information about the hidden pins
from any other source that the hints as such, that would be cheating, and defeats
the purpose of the game. Therefore for the purposes of his exchange with Pascal,
Mordecai's own knowledge is off limits. It is only the public knowledge in the game
that is relevant.
Again, if we modify the scenario a little bit, the dependence of the interlocutors'
behavior on practical goals becomes apparent. If Eloise, who does not know the rules
of the game, enters the room and sees Mordecai's side of the board with the hidden
pins, she can very well disagree with Mordecai, saying that obviously there can't be
two reds as there is actually only one, and sincerely criticize him for being mean to
Pascal. What happens in such a case is that Eloise misconstrues the context so that
the sphere of relevant knowledge includes Mordecai's and her knowledge, and in that
context, Mordecai's epistemic claim is obviously false.
Using the notion of an investigation which determines the practical bounds of
the domain of relevant knowledge, we were able to explain all the cases of context
sensitivity above. The flexibility of our proposal may make its predictions similar
to those of other proposals in particular cases. For instance, in the Mars scenario
27, Ability Contextualism could explain why Suzan is hesitant to either accept or
reject the epistemic claim about life of Mars, and in the Mastermind scenario 28,
Group Contextualism could exclude Mordecai as an irrelevant knower. But neither
of them would be able to explain the changes in the truth conditions that go along
with changes of the context.
Across different contexts, the range of predictions our approach makes is wider
than that of either the simplistic Group and Ability Contextualism, or the more
sophisticated actual theories of [Hacking, 1967], [Teller, 1972], and [DeRose, 1991].
But within a given context, Practical Contextualism makes very narrow and inflexible
predictions. We have just seen in this section that those predictions turn out to agree
quite well with the actual judgments.1 4
14 As is well-known, overt constituents such as "as far as Ann knows" may affect the computation
55
2.1.4 Standard-contextualist cousins of our approach
Above, I noted that Practical Contextualism is in many respects not a radical depar-
ture from the earlier standard-contextualist proposals. In this section, I will compare
our new approach to its predecessors, discussing where it borrows, and where it de-
parts from them.
I will start with the version of standard contextualism proposed by [Hacking, 19671:
(29) [Hacking, 1967]: "It is possible that p"/"may p" means that p is not known
to be false in a certain community of speakers, nor would any practicable
investigations establish that it is false.' 5
Hacking does not elaborate on how exactly the relevant community of speakers is
to be selected. Letting into the modal base not only what is known at the moment,
but also the results of practicable investigations, Hacking allows future knowledge
to bear on the truth of an epistemic claim. By "practicable investigations" Hacking
means those which can be performed by (modern) humans. Hacking's example of
what would not be a practicable investigation is as follows: take a lottery which is
not rigged, so that everybody with a ticket in principle has a chance to win. Suppose
of the epistemic modal base. There are two natural questions to ask in this regard.
First, how should Practical Contextualism analyze such sentences in the first place? My inclination
is to say that the modifier "as far as Ann knows" signals that we are considering a mini-investigation
undertaken from Ann's personal perspective. Technically, we make sure such an investigation is
present in the context (that is, we accommodate it if need be), and temporarily make it the current
one for the purposes of evaluation of the modified clause.
Second, once we have an account of "as far as Ann knows", can we use covert constituents of that
sort to explain the context sensitivity of epistemic claims? The answer to that question is no. We
have seen in this section that the interpretation of an epistemic claim is heavily restricted by the
context. Introducing covert "as far as X knows", without a theory of how X is selected, will not
explain that dependence.
"
5The definition 29 is not a direct quote from Hacking. It is put together using what Hacking
says in his Sections 3 (the connection between possible and may), 5 (the reference to a community
of speakers), 6 (an explanation of what practicable means) and 10 (the base definition into which I
plugged the other parts).
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that the world is deterministic, and thus the past events fully determine who the
winner will actually be. Then Laplace's demon can easily determine the winner. Yet
that is hardly reason enough to say that for somebody who did not actually win it
was not even possible to do so. That is because Laplace's demon's investigation, while
conceivable, is not a practicable investigation.
Thus Hacking's notion does not coincide with our technical notion of an investi-
gation: Hacking considers only what can in principle be learned, while we consider
what can be learned in time for the new knowledge to affect our actions towards a
certain practical purpose.
In terms of our Section 2.1.1, Hacking's theory is a combination of Group and
Ability Contextualism. The arguments against Group Contextualism apply to Hack-
ing's proposal as well, unless we supplement it with an explanation we used in Section
2.1.2 regarding a distinction between making claims about other people's minds and
making claims assuming that one is the best authority on the subject. For the Ability
Contextualism component, the argument against Ability Contextualism we cited in
Section 2.1.1 also applies to Hacking's theory. In fact, that particular argument was
an adaptation of an argument formulated specifically against Hacking's theory by
[MacFarlane, 2011].
While our Practical Contextualism dodges those arguments, it is easy to see how
some of the intuitions behind Hacking's proposal are shared by our theory. First,
Hacking's treatment of epistemic claims is very "objectivist": such claims are taken to
be not about some single person's private information, but rather about how the world
is. Many linguistic accounts of epistemic modality are solipsistic, and [Teller, 1972]
and [DeRose, 1991], who aim to improve Hacking's proposal, stipulate solipsistic read-
ings at least for some instances of epistemics. But both Hacking's theory and ours do
not do that. Second, both Hacking's theory and our account allow future knowledge
to bear on epistemic claims. The difference between Hacking's theory and ours is
that the technical notion of an investigation in our Practical Contextualism puts very
specific limits on what future knowledge counts, whereas for Hacking, all tests which
can be performed by humans generate relevant future knowledge.
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[Teller, 19721 criticizes the Ability Contextualism component of Hacking's theory
on the grounds that it rules in too much information. His criticism can be illustrated
using our example repeated from 6:
(30) It has been decided who he will meet with but I don't know who it is. He
may see the dean. He may see the provost.
There clearly is a very simple "practicable investigation", surely possible for or-
dinary humans to perform, which can determine who he will see. If so, then one of
the two epistemic claims in 30 is predicted to be necessarily false. Yet the intuition
is that they can easily be both true. For Practical Contextualism, it is not a prob-
lem as long as the truth of the two claims cannot be determined before the relevant
moment, but for Hacking, who does not use such a cutoff point, such examples are
indeed problematic.
Having established that some "practicable investigations" in Hacking's sense rule
in too much information, Teller goes on to discuss whether it is possible to circum-
vent the problem by restricting the range of considered investigations to "appropriate
practicable investigations". He concludes that it is not possible, on the basis of the
following argument. If there is a lottery, an epistemic claim " The lottery may be
crooked" may be either true or false. Now, if one has serious reasons to think that
the lottery could be run by the Mafia, then a practicable investigation can be "ap-
propriate". But if one trusts the vendor, knows of nothing which would suggest that
the lottery is crooked, etc. etc., then the same investigation is hardly appropriate or
reasonable. But, Teller argues, it does not feel like the circumstances which deter-
mine appropriateness of that practicable investigation actually bear on the truth of
the epistemic claim about the lottery, contrary to expectation.
Instead of Hacking's 29, Teller proposes 31. The idea behind Teller's analysis is
that exchange of knowledge between the members of the community, and perhaps
acquisition of knowledge from reference manuals and such, is OK, but performing
new experiments is not. Thus only the aggregated common knowledge at the moment
when the epistemic claim is uttered counts, and no future knowledge does.
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(31) [Teller, 1972]'s D4, p. 310-311:
It is 'possible that p if and only if
a) p is not known to be false by any member of community C,
nor b) is there a member, t, of community C, such that if t were to know all
the propositions known to community C, then he could, on the strength of
his knowledge of these propositions as basis, data, or evidence, come to know
that p is false.
Regarding the issue of future knowledge, our account takes the middle ground
between Teller's and Hacking's. We do not rule in all future knowledge as Hacking
does. But we do not rule out all of it either, as Teller does. The discussion in
Section 2.1.3 above shows why our approach better fits the facts than the two extremes
proposed by Hacking and Teller: in 25, some future knowledge counts (contra Teller),
but not all of it (contra Hacking).
Turning to the Group Contextualism component of 31, Teller explicitly discusses
the fact that his definition is relativized to a specific community C. He notes what
he considers variation in truth-value judgements about epistemic claims, and at-
tributes that variation to the possibility to supply different communities, including
one-member communities, as the value for C. He does not, however, discuss how ex-
actly different contexts would influence the choice of that value (explicitly admitting
that his account is incomplete without that, and that the simple stipulation that C
is supplied by the context is "unhelpful").
There are two ways in which our account differs from Teller's on that issue. First,
Practical Contextualism never discriminates against specific sources of knowledge.
Instead, the context determines the modal base through limits on the practical avail-
ability of knowledge. Second, our account contains a precise characterization of how
the context determines the modal base, and in that sense it is a complete account of
epistemic modality, as opposed to Teller's incomplete account.
[DeRose, 1991] agrees with Teller's criticism of Hacking's proposal, but rejects
Teller's solution, aiming for a position in between the two. DeRose's reasons for
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rejecting Teller's theory are based on examples like 27: there are cases when it is
perfectly fine for the speaker to refuse to either endorse or reject an epistemic claim,
and at the same time be confident that after some time, she will actually be able to
pass a judgement. Unless some knowledge which genuinely belongs to the future is
ruled in, it seems impossible to explain such cases.
While Teller's account only allows contextual flexibility by virtue of changing the
relevant community C, DeRose argues that a different kind of flexibility is needed:
Flexibility of Relevant Epistemic Situations. It is the situation which determines
which "practicable investigations", or, more generally for DeRose, "relevant ways in
which one can come to know something", should bear on the truth value of an epis-
temic claim.
(32) [DeRose, 1991, p. 593-594]:
S's [=the speaker's - IY] assertion "it is possible that p" is true if and only if
(1) no member of the relevant community knows that p is false, and
(2) there is no relevant way by which members of the relevant community can
come to know that p is false.
Our Practical Contextualism is thus a direct development of DeRose's proposal. It
takes the general form of DeRose's account minus his reference to a relevant commu-
nity, and adds to it specific rules for how exactly the context determines the epistemic
modal base. I will illustrate how the two theories are related using as an example an
argument against DeRose's general account made in [von Fintel and Gillies, 2011a,
p. 112, fn. 9].
Consider the following case: Alex, looking for the keys together with Billy, asserts
The keys might be in the car. What Alex implies is that Billy should go and check
the car now. Checking the car is a clear way of learning whether the keys are there.
Moreover, it is contextually relevant, say von Fintel and Gillies, for it is precisely
Alex's intention to make Billy perform such checking that caused her to make that
epistemic assertion. Given that the inspection is contextually relevant, its results
should bear on the truth of the epistemic claim, the argument goes, and yet we do
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not feel that the truth of what Alex said depends on whether the keys are indeed
in the car. Therefore, von Fintel and Gillies conclude, DeRose's proposal cannot be
quite right.
I find it hard to read DeRose as suggesting that any salient way of learning
something should be counted as contextually relevant for the purpose of determining
the epistemic modal base. In particular, consider a pair of DeRose's examples that
involves test results in a sealed envelope which determine whether John has cancer.
The results are there, but we need to open the envelope to actually learn them.
DeRose observes that it is possible in such a situation both to endorse the claim
that John might have cancer (DeRose's case CTC-2A), and to refrain from either
endorsing or rejecting that claim (DeRose's CTC-2B). In both cases, the possibility
to learn the results from the envelope is salient. Yet only in one of them DeRose deems
it contextually relevant. Therefore mere salience of a way of learning something does
not automatically render it contextually relevant for DeRose. However, given that
DeRose does not spell out precisely how contextual relevance should be determined,
one could imagine ways of choosing the notion of contextual relevance which would
make von Fintel and Gillies's argument a valid objection.
Our Practical Contextualism adds to the general framework of DeRose's a precise
definition of contextual relevance, in effect removing that uncertainty. The resulting
theory readily explains von Fintel and Gillies's example as follows. The practical
action which Alex's epistemic claim was asserted to induce was Billy checking the
car. Whatever is learned after Billy's inspection of the car is learned later than the
practical action which the epistemic claim was intended to make happen. Therefore
the results of the inspection are outside of the sphere of relevant knowledge. What
Alex said was true, unless Alex or Billy could already exclude the possibility of the
keys being in the car before actually checking the car.
While our proposal does constitute a more spelled out variant of the general form
of DeRose's proposal, our way of spelling it out differs from DeRose's suggestions
about how to do that. DeRose employs direct discrimination of specific sources of
knowledge (as Teller does), and hopes to find constraints on such discrimination which
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would strengthen the predictions of his proposal. In contrast to that, we argued it is
the possible practical actions on which the assertion of an epistemic claim bears that
determine the boundaries of relevant knowledge, and rejected direct discrimination
of specific sources of knowledge.
To sum up our discussion of [Hacking, 1967], [Teller, 1972], and [DeRose, 1991],
our account is based on the same general principles those authors assume, and shares
many important intuitions with them. Where we part ways with those three theories
is in providing a specific account of how the context should determine the epistemic
modal base: first, we never exclude specific knowers, and second, we define relevance
through the notion of an investigation bounded by the need to take practical actions.
Tying the epistemic modal base to the current investigation in the context of utter-
ance, we make the predictions stricter within any particular context, and at the same
time seemingly more flexible across different contexts than Hacking's and Teller's
predictions were.
2.1.5 Practical Contextualism vs. CIA and CCCP
In this section I compare Practical Contextualism with two beyond-contextualism
accounts that have been put forward in order to account for Assertion, Disagree-
ment, and Retraction in 18, which standard contextualism allegedly could not do.
All three accounts can deal with the data in 18 reasonably well. However, Practical
Contextualism is simpler and more uniform in how it handles epistemic and non-
epistemic disagreements. Moreover, it directly predicts some phenomena for which
the two beyond-contextualism competitors need to say something extra.
Let us briefly review how Practical Contextualism accounts for 18:
(33) Practical-contextualist explanation for 18:
" Assertion: Sarah believes she knows 18a is true, but in fact it is false
(in this case, because of what George knows).
" Disagreement: George knows that 18a is false, so he points it out, and
provides the falsifying piece of knowledge to Sarah.
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. Retraction: Sarah realizes 18a was false, and retracts it.
The truth value of Sarah's assertion in 18a remains stable throughout the dialogue,
and furthermore, the conversational moves by Sarah and George concern one and
the same object - the content of Sarah's first assertion. Both types of beyond-
standard-contextualism approaches proposed in the literature reject one of those two
assumptions.
We start with relativism about epistemic modality (see [Egan et al., 2005], [Stephenson, 2007],
[MacFarlane, 2011], a.o.; cf. also [Lasersohn, 2005]). Relativism, also known as the
CIA account (because it involves evaluating sentences at Contexts of utterance,
Indices of evaluation, and contexts of Assessment), can provide an explanation of
18 that rejects the first property of the two we just mentioned: it can say that the
truth value of 18a does not remain the same throughout the dialogue. (All relativist
theories about epistemic modality currently on the market would say so; but adopt-
ing such explanation is not a logical consequence of adopting relativism. In the next
section, I will introduce a new variant of relativism that uses practical-contextualist
explanation for 18.)
Relativism introduces a new evaluation parameter to which contents may be sensi-
tive, a context of assessment, which is usually said to contain a center of assessment, or
a "judge". In the CIA world, the content of an assertion is a function from contexts of
assessment to propositions (or, in some variants, simply from judges to propositions).
In order to get a proposition from what was said, one needs to feed a specific context
of assessment to such a function. For most expressions, the function they denote
is constant anyway, so much of the standard semantics is conservatively preserved.
There are, however, a bunch of expressions sensitive to the context of assessment.
Relativism about epistemic modality says that epistemic modals are among them.
Namely, the epistemic modal base is defined as the knowledge of the judge of the
context of assessment.
Here is the explanation of the crucial properties of 18 according to CIA:
(34) Relativist explanation for 18:
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" Assertion: When Sarah asserts 18a, she is the judge, and 18a is true.
" Disagreement: George re-evaluates 18a with himself as the judge. Rel-
ative to George's knowledge, 18a is false, so he disagrees.
* Retraction: Sarah, upon learning new information, re-evaluates her
earlier claim in 18a. Relative to her new state of mind, it is false, so she
retracts it.
Under this relativist explanation, the content of what was asserted in 18a is stable
throughout the dialogue. But that content is a more complex object than a propo-
sition: it is a function from contexts of assessment, or judges, into propositions. So
even though the content of the assertion is stable, its truth value is not: the sentence
is true when Sarah asserts it, but it is false when George disagrees with it, and when
Sarah retracts it.
This contrasts with our standard-contextualist explanation. In our story, what
changes between 18a and 18c is Sarah's beliefs about the truth of 18a. The truth
value itself remains stable, but people may have different, possibly wrong and possibly
changing, convictions about it. In contrast to that, in the relativist explanation of
18, everyone has correct beliefs about the truth value of 18a at any particular time.
But the truth value itself varies depending on who is the judge.
However, for non-epistemic disagreement and retraction as in 35, relativism still
has to rely on the change of beliefs about the truth value of Sarah's initial claim.
(35) a. Sarah: There are elephants living in the wild in Brazil.
b. George: That is wrong. My friend Mary, who is a biologist, recently told
me all about where wild elephants live. There are none in Brazil.
c. Sarah: Oh. Then I guess I was wrong.
The content of 35a under relativism is a constant function from contexts of assess-
ment into propositions, and thus its truth value remains stable throughout the whole
dialogue in 35. Therefore a relativist cannot appeal to anything else to explain 35
but to a change in beliefs: first Sarah says something she believes to be true; George
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thinks it is false, and gives Sarah the piece of knowledge showing that; finally, Sarah
realizes she was wrong, and retracts. This explanation has exactly the same form as
the explanation of the epistemic disagreement in our Practical Contextualism, 33.
Thus Practical Contextualism uses the same mechanism involving change of beliefs
to account for both non-epistemic and epistemic disagreement, but the relativist
explanation of 18 stipulates a change of beliefs in non-epistemic cases, and a change
of truth values in epistemic cases, even though the surface effects in non-epistemic
and epistemic disagreement dialogues seem to be exactly the same.
Another phenomenon problematic for the relativist explanation of 18 and similar
cases is disagreement by ignorants, discovered by [Dietz, 2008116. Whenever the po-
tential disagreer is evidently a worse authority on the subject, disagreement becomes
improper:
(36) a. Sarah the Mathematician: I am a mathematician who knows a lot about
this conjecture. There cannot be a counterexample to it.
b. George the Ignorant: #You are wrong. I never studied even basic calculus,
so it is perfectly compatible with what I know that there is a counterex-
ample.
George's reply in 36 is inappropriate. The fact that he does not know one way
or the other does not give him the right to properly disagree with Sarah who clearly
knows more. This pattern is stable across different kinds of scenarios: if somebody
hearing an epistemic claim knows less than the person who asserted the claim, it is
16 Dietz uses examples of improper disagreement of this type to argue against relativism about
epistemic modality, and wants to maintain standard contextualism. But while his attack I adopt
without hesitation, the positive parts of our respective proposals are very different. For Dietz, 18a
is ambiguous between readings that roughly correspond to a solipsistic, a group, and an ability
readings, along the lines of 10, 11 and 12 respectively. He agrees that none of those readings can
explain Assertion, Disagreement, and Retraction at the same time, and argues that one should
not even try: according to him, those three features never hold together in the same context. His
account is thus very different from mine, as Practical Contextualism aims to explain those three at
the same time.
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inappropriate for them to express disagreement. In fact, if instead of George the Ig-
norant, a certain Bill the Specialized Mathematician replied to Sarah " You are wrong.
I've discovered a counterexample yesterday", his disagreement would be appropriate.' 7
That pattern is exactly what Practical Contextualism predicts. If the potential
disagreer is a worse authority on the subject than the speaker, he cannot reasonably
claim he knows more than her about what's in the sphere of relevant knowledge.
Therefore he cannot properly challenge the assertion made.
But under the relativist explanation, the phenomenon of disagreement by igno-
rants is completely unexpected. Accounting for it requires adding an ad hoc constraint
formulated specifically for such cases, as is done in [MacFarlane, 2011, Sec. 8.2].
Let's now turn to another beyond-standard-contextualism theory: the CCCP ac-
count of [von Fintel and Gillies, 2011al. (CCCP stands for Cloudy Contextualism
Cum Pluralism.) Unlike in CIA, there are no extra evaluation parameters in CCCP.
The main idea of the cloudy contextualist explanation of 18 is that an assertion some-
times introduces into the conversation more propositions than one. If so, then what
is targeted by disagreement and retraction may be a different proposition from the
one which was literally asserted.
In addition to that idea, the pluralism part of von Fintel and Gillies's account
says that not all disagreements should be treated equally. For instance, some dis-
agreements may simply target the prejacent of an epistemic claim rather than the
epistemic claim as a whole, in which case the problem of accounting for the disagree-
ment has nothing to do with epistemic modality.
Here is the CCCP explanation for 18, assuming it is the epistemic claim that is
targeted, and not just the prejacent of the epistemic claim:
(37) Cloudy-contextualist explanation of 18:
e Assertion: When Sarah utters 18a, she asserts a Solipsistic Contextu-
17 Unlike in the rest of the chapter, I use a negative existential in 36. The ignorant disagreeing with
a positive existential epistemic in such a scenario must be wrong about his own knowledge, while in
36, he can be innocent in that respect, having no false beliefs. Therefore 36 shows that the source
of the problem is improper disagreement rather than wrong beliefs about one's own knowledge.
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alism proposition along the lines of 10, and simultaneously "puts into
play" a Group Contextualism proposition relative to Sarah and George's
aggregated knowledge along the lines of 11. Since she does not literally
assert the Group Contextualism proposition, the norms for assertion do
not apply to it.
" Disagreement: Under normal circumstances, George cannot challenge
the Solipsistic Contextualism proposition that Sarah asserted. But he
knows that the Group Contextualism proposition Sarah put into play is
false. When he disagrees, it is with the put-into-play group proposition,
not with the literally asserted solipsistic proposition.
" Retraction: Sarah, after acquiring new knowledge from George, realizes
that the Group Contextualism proposition she put into play was false.
On these grounds, she retracts her earlier statement, even though what
she literally asserted was, and still is, true.
In the CCCP explanation, the truth value of Sarah's claim 18a does not change as
it does under the relativist explanations. Beliefs about the truth values of propositions
also do not change, unlike in Practical Contextualism. What changes instead is which
proposition is the object of asserting, disagreeing, and retracting.
An important argument seemingly in favor of von Fintel and Gillies's CCCP story
comes from the fact that Sarah may try to stick to her guns after receiving the new
piece of knowledge:
(38) a. Sarah: The keys might be on the fridge.
b. George: You are wrong. I already checked the fridge.
c. Sarah: No, what I said was true! The keys might have been there!
Under CCCP, 38 is said to feature Sarah refusing to switch from her literally
asserted proposition to the one she simply put into play, as suggested by George.
Under Practical Contextualism, the explanation for 38 is different. In our theory,
Sarah and George in 38 implicitly disagree about what the current practical goal
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is, and therefore what the boundaries of the current investigation are. Effectively,
they disagree about which exact context they are in. Sarah assumes the goal to be
something like stating her current state of knowledge on the subject. George assumes
the current goal to be finding the keys. The boundaries which Sarah's goal creates are
very narrow, and exclude George's knowledge. The epistemic claim indeed comes out
as true if the practical goal is so chosen, but we get the impression that Sarah is not
particularly interested in finding the keys. George, on the other hand, is genuinely
concerned with the search for the keys at the moment. Therefore the boundaries he
uses to evaluate Sarah's claim are wider, and include the knowledge he can transfer
to her right away. If the boundaries are set this way, Sarah's assertion comes out as
false.
Thus for von Fintel and Gillies, 38 is an instance of Sarah defending a solipsistic
proposition which only concerns her own state of mind, and for our account, the
root of the disagreement in 38 lies in the fact that Sarah and George have different
opinions as to what the practical goal of their dialogue is.
A slight modification of 38 further highlights the differences between CCCP and
Practical Contextualism. If Sarah's sticking to her guns is proper in 38 because she
can fall back to the solipsistic proposition, then it could in principle be proper for her
to stick to her guns in any context where her actual knowledge does not rule out the
keys being on the fridge. But in the following dialogue, Sarah's mental state is the
same as it was in 38, and yet her sticking to her guns becomes improper:
(39) a. George: I checked on the fridge. The keys are not there.
b. Sarah (2 minutes later, having forgotten what George told her): The keys
might be on the fridge.
c. George: You are wrong. I told you I checked there.
d. Sarah: No, what I said was true! The keys might have been there!
In 39, Sarah clearly is in the wrong: sticking to her guns is not really an option
here, even though it was in 38. That is predicted by Practical Contextualism: even
though Sarah forgot the crucial piece of knowledge George gave her, that piece was
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already made available to her, and thus falls within the sphere of relevant knowledge.
Therefore her statement is false.
Under CCCP, the explanation of 39 would have to be somewhat different. Kai
von Fintel (p.c.) suggests that forgotten knowledge may still with a good reason be
considered knowledge. After all, we can say "Come on, you know that!" even when
our addressee actually forgot the thing. If forgotten knowledge is still knowledge,
then the solipsistic proposition "It is compatible with Sarah's knowledge that the keys
are on the fridge" would be false in 39, though it was true in 38. Then the difference
between the two scenarios could be derived from whether the solipsistic reading of
the modal is true or not.
While this explanation does explain the observed facts, it needs to be augmented
by yet further explanations. For example, it is far from clear that the crucial premise
that forgotten prior knowledge counts as actual knowledge is universally valid. After
all, just as we can say "Come on, you know that!", our addressee may answer "Well,
maybe I knew it one day, but now I clearly don't". But if it is equivocal whether
forgotten knowledge counts as actual knowledge, it should be possible for Sarah to
stick to her guns in 39, at least under the right conditions. But that doesn't seem to
be the case.
Or consider a yet different scenario: all assertions are the same as in 39, but
between 39a and 39b, Claire enters the room, and both Sarah and George know that
Claire has no idea about where the keys are or how the search is going. One of the
propositions in the cloud introduced by 39b is then "It is compatible with Claire's
knowledge that the keys are on the fridge", and that proposition is true. If Sarah may
fall back to a single proposition in the cloud which she is justified to assert, it could
be the true proposition about Claire rather than the proposition about Sarah's own
knowledge. Then under the CCCP explanation we may expect the appearance of
Claire to improve Sarah's chances of successfully sticking to her guns. But it doesn't
seem to happen.
Of course, this does not necessarily doom Cloudy Contextualism. But the fact
that CCCP allows the speaker to choose which proposition from the cloud to fall back
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to makes the theory very permissive, which in turn makes it harder to explain the
cases when the speaker is clearly in the wrong. No such problems arise under the
practical-contextualist explanation.
To sum up, when we compare the treatment of epistemic disagreement in Prac-
tical Contextualism and in its beyond-standard contextualism competitors, namely
relativism of [MacFarlane, 2011] and others, and cloudy contextualism cum pluralism
of [von Fintel and Gillies, 2011a, we see that our theory not only successfully deals
with the disagreement data, but also explains phenomena such as disagreement by
ignorants and sticking to one's guns without any need for additional assumptions.
2.1.6 Practical Relativism
Consider the case of hidden eavesdropper. Sarah says to Mary: "Bill might be in
Boston", and Mary answers: "Oh yes, that's true!" In the meantime George, hidden
in the closet and intentionally eavesdropping, whispers to himself: "Ha-ha, that's false:
Bill is in San Francisco!" The question is, can both Mary's and Bill's assessment of the
truth of Sarah's statement be correct? If you think they cannot - because Sarah's
assertion is either true or false, period, but cannot be both - then you can figure
out which assessment you want to deem the right one, define the context of utterance
accordingly, and use Practical Contextualism for the truth conditions of the epistemic
claim.
But if we view their assessments on their own terms, relative to their own purposes,
it is also a sensible position to hold that both Mary and George are right. And in that
case, Practical Contextualism is not enough. Regardless of who is judging Sarah's
statement, and with what purposes, the context of utterance for her assertion by
definition remains the same: one utterance, one context of utterance. Our practical-
contextualist definition of Epist.Modal. Base in 17 is relative to context of utterance
c, and thus the epistemic modal base will be the same for Mary and for George. But
then their assessments cannot both be right.
(17) PRACTICAL CONTEXTUALISM:
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Epist.Modal.Base, evaluated in context of utterance c and at world w,
is the set {w'I w' is an element of every piece of knowledge Ki
relevant in c at w for the current investigation}.
I will not attempt to argue here for or against the position that the truth value
of an assertion may be relativized to the situation of assessment - I only note that
both positions on the question are sensible, and that personally I am inclined towards
the relativist, multiple-value position. For example, suppose I am conducting some
scientific study, and assert today: "X might be caused by Y". Suppose also that by
2pm tomorrow, I will have ruled out that Y causes X. I find it reasonable to say that
the very same assertion I make today was true for me when I asserted it, but false
for me tomorrow after 2pm. If we accept such multiplicity of truth values, we need
a slightly different definition for the epistemic modal base. But the change we need
to make in 17 is minimal: instead of making Epist.Modal.Base relativized to the
context of utterance, we make it relativized to the context of assessment, 40.
(40) PRACTICAL RELATIVISM:
Epist.Modal.Base, evaluated in context of assessment c and at world w,
is the set {w'I w' is an element of every piece of knowledge Ki
relevant in c at w for the current investigation}.
When an epistemic statement is assessed from the same context where it was
asserted, Practical Contextualism and Practical Relativism coincide. I assume that
it is a very common case: as discussed in Section 2.1.5 above, with the help of
disagreement by ignorants, it should not be very easy to switch to a different context
of assessment within a single conversation. But relativism as such does not require
that we allow for such rapid switches of assessment context, even though practicing
relativists employed them to explain puzzles about epistemic modality. I hope that I
have shown above that in most cases one does not need such switches in order to get
the truth conditions of an epistemic claim right, and that in fact it may even hurt to
allow them. But in some cases, there are indeed two distinct, and usually temporally
or spatially distant, situations from where the same assertion gets assessed. In such
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cases Practical Contextualism would declare one of them privileged, while Practical
Relativism is happy with treating the two equally.
In the rest of this chapter, I will continue to use Practical Contextualism as the
default variant of the theory. The purpose of the discussion of Practical Relativism
is to highlight that the practical approach to epistemic modality does not necessitate
contextualism, and that my critique of particular relativist explanations of as Asser-
tion, Disagreement and Retraction by no means serves as an argument against
relativism in its general form.
2.2 Epistemic modals under attitude verbs
Epistemics embedded under attitude verbs have been argued to be problematic for
standard contextualism as a whole (cf. [Weatherson and Egan, 20111, a.o.) There are
two possible ways for extending our theory to such contexts. One way is to preserve
some of standard contextualism's core, but make the epistemic modal base relative
to the attitude bearer in one way or another ([Hacquard, 2010] is one example of
that approach). If one chooses this path, one essentially has to build, in addition
to our theory for matrix epistemics, another theory for epistemics embedded under
attitudes. The second option is to try to maintain that even the truth values of epis-
temic modals under attitudes directly depend on the matrix investigation. In this
case, we have the very same theory for both matrix and embedded epistemics, but
the question here is whether we can account for the intuitions which made a number
of people, starting with [Antinucci and Parisi, 19711, to assume that embedded epis-
temics directly depend on the attitude holder's mental state, and not on the matrix
context. I will take this second, more restrictive route, and show that in fact the
resulting account fares quite well. For cases that have been taken to indicate depen-
dence of the epistemic modal on the local environment of the attitude, I will show
that adopting plain Practical Contextualism without any special fixes actually makes
quite harmless predictions, similar to those of other theories. In addition to that, I
will also show that in a number of cases we can observe dependence of the modal on
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the matrix context of the exact kind expected under Practical Contextualism, but
not under other current theories.
Before embarking on a detailed analysis, I would like to introduce two naturally
occurred examples motivating the idea that it is always the matrix context that fixes
the epistemic modal base of embedded epistemic modals. Consider the last sentence
by Mo, the main character of Alison Bechdel's comic-strip soap-opera series Dykes to
Watch Out For:
Y *E RK07f (YOOMS5 Vf M; AE FE GL K NQ OF ELJT OUT141H ICE
HWHow sUcH S ZOPI4D4C... HERE WC WVRL'T1jCRF 0BhMIeG
OE rru tLLs poNT AR&I GOING ASOOT OVF AImON cuwcs.M. wox*
1}'E INRAN CON- iwiTTLC COUW~TR CULUiRP. m~Z~i>W~9 RALWLS.
'sVF-S, RIGHTP TRYIG *T* QAW*eTINTPEOPLf. W1O MIGH
HAvE A I S,/
Figure 2-1: Extract from High Anxiety, @ Alison Bechdel, 1987
The example in Figure 2-1 clearly features epistemic might rather than meta-
physical or circumstantial might: what is at issue is not whether somebody has the
objective possibility to have AIDS, but rather whether them having AIDS cannot
be ruled out given some limited knowledge. Can we tell whether that knowledge
pertains to the epistemic situation of the people who are bombing abortion clinics
and the sort, or to the epistemic situation of Mo and her friends and interlocutors?
I argue it does not make sense to make such a distinction. What is relevant in this
case is the knowledge available for a particular practical purpose, namely choosing
whether to quarantine a person, and its limits are determined by the practical inten-
tions of who is going to make the decision. So in a sense it is more the knowledge of
"them" than of Mo. But Mo herself does not contrast that with her own knowledge.
She does not intend to say that those people who could be quarantined might not
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have AIDS. The context determines the relevant investigation, and even though the
agents who are directly responsible for it are not among the interlocutors, that is the
investigation that determines what knowledge is relevant. In other words, the matrix
context determines one single epistemic modal base, and there is no shift between the
epistemic modal base for the matrix and the embedded context.
Consider also 41, cited here from The Creation of Inequality by Kent Flannery and
Joyce Marcus (Harvard University Press, 2012), featuring epistemic could embedded
under attitude verb conclude.
(41) Some linguistic evidence for the Siberian origins of Native American people
seems to have survived. In 2008 Edward Vajda concluded that Ket, an
indigenous language of Siberia, could be linked to a Native American language
family called Na-Den6.
My approach to extending Practical Contextualism to attitude contexts suggests
the following analysis of 41. First, there is some investigation pertaining to the
matrix context, and whether Ket is related to Na-Den6 or not bears on it. Second,
the reported content of Vajda's conclusion is that for the practical purposes of that
investigation, it is possible that Ket is related to Na-Den6. This is stronger content
than what [Stephenson, 2007], [Yalcin, 2007] or [Hacquard, 2010] would assign to 41:
they would say that the content of the attitude attribution is about some body of
knowledge centered on Vajda's state of mind. Under their views, more work will
be required to explain why people take that attribution to bear upon the authors'
concerns in the matrix context.
The intuition that I want to draw from those two examples is that embedded
epistemics often quite transparently address an issue which is shared between the
matrix and the embedded context. It is the cases where it may at first seem that
only the local context matters which require attention in my theory. For theories of
epistemics under attitudes such as [Hacquard, 2010], on the other hand, the embedded
modal is always relative to the attitude bearer's state of mind. The connection
between the embedded epistemic and the matrix context then needs to be somehow
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explained. I do not claim it cannot be explained: on the contrary, I suspect that
some appeal to the pragmatic relevance of the statement made could more or less
do the trick. My point in this section is simply to explore the other logical option,
and to show that it is far from crazy to assume that the modal base of an embedded
epistemic always depends on the matrix context - in fact, it turns out to be quite
beneficial in some cases to say so.
2.2.1 Doxastic attitudes
The first kind of attitude verbs we will consider is doxastic attitudes like believe and
think. My goal for this type of attitudes is quite modest: I will demonstrate that,
first, adopting Practical Contextualism is harmless in the sense that our new theory
gets decent predictions for cases that motivated the earlier theories, and second, that
we can also see how the matrix context affects embedded epistemic claims in a way
expected under our account.
What does Practical Contextualism predict about sentences like 42?
(42) Mary thinks Bill might be in Boston.
In our theory, the set of worlds that the modal quantifies over, Epist.Modal.Base,
is defined relative to evaluation parameters c and w, see 17. Those two parameters
play different roles in our analysis of 42: context c ties the epistemic claim to the
current discourse/ inquiry, while evaluation world w connects it to the doxastic alter-
natives of the attitude bearer. Above we only considered matrix epistemic claims,
where the division of labor between c and w is much less evident, so now I will
spell out in some detail how exactly c and w contribute to the determination of
Epist. Modal.Base.
Context c is an evaluation parameter that cannot be shifted by sentence-internal
operators, and in our theory it is that non-shiftable parameter that determines the
practical boundaries of the investigation currently going on. The practical constraints
in c can be represented by an intensional entity: a function from worlds to spatio-
temporal spheres of relevant knowledge within them. Recall the terminal-health-
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condition scenario associated with 24. The practical actions in that scenario were
buying and not buying the tickets within the next several minutes. In different possi-
ble worlds, the knowledge accessible to Megan and Jen in the next several minutes may
differ. In some worlds, Megan receives a text message from the doctor immediately
after Jen asserts 24. In others, Megan doesn't. The boundaries of the investigation
from the actual context determine for each possible world what exact knowledge is
relevant in that world: the sphere is defined the same way in each world, but what
falls into it differs.
The shiftable parameter, world w, is plugged into the function from worlds to
spheres of knowledge. For each w, the function returns the pieces of knowledge Ki
that fall within the sphere in that particular w.
Thus context c determines intensionally what the epistemic modal base is, and
after we supply a specific possible world w, we can compute the actual set of worlds
that the modal quantifies over in w. In case of 42, the matrix context determines
what knowledge is in principle relevant within the current investigation. In each of
Mary's belief worlds w', the investigation selects a particular sphere of knowledge.
That sphere is then used to define the modal base, which may be different in different
belief worlds w'.
We can informally paraphrase 42 as 43 under Practical Contextualism, under-
scoring that in our theory an embedded epistemic claim is always about the current
investigation of the actual context:
(43) Informal paraphrase of 42 under Practical Contextualism:
"Mary thinks that for the purposes of our current investigation, Bill might be
in Boston"
More formally, the truth conditions that Practical Contextualism assigns to 42
are given in 44:
(44) Truth conditions for 42 under Practical Contextualism:
In each of Mary's belief worlds w', that Bill is in Boston is compatible with
every piece of knowledge Ki that 1) potentially affects, if obtained, the practical
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action resolving the current practical goal, and 2) can be obtained within the
boundaries of the current investigation.
The truth conditions in 44 are quite different from those assigned to 42 by other
theories on the market. The truth conditions that [Stephenson, 2007], see 45, and
[Hacquard, 2010], see 46, assign to 42 differ from each other (which will become
significant when we turn to other types of attitudes), but in both cases, it is only
the content of the belief state which matters for the truth of the ascription, and not
what is going on in the matrix context. Other theories sharing that feature include
[Antinucci and Parisi, 19711 and [Yalcin, 2007].
(45) Truth conditions for 42 under [Stephenson, 2007j:
In Mary's belief worlds, her knowledge is compatible with Bill being in Boston.
(46) Truth conditions for 42 under [Hacquard, 2010]:
Mary's beliefs are compatible with Bill being in Boston.
So for Hacquard and Stephenson it is only the attitude bearer's mental state that
is relevant for its truth, but for our theory, the context plays that role. The life-on-
Mars scenario we built for 27 and example 47 show that in fact it is good to predict the
dependence on the matrix context.18 Recall that in that context, Suzan is reluctant
to endorse or reject the claim that there might be life on Mars. At the same time, it is
clearly compatible with her knowledge that there is life on Mars (cf. 45), and in some
of her belief worlds, there is life on Mars (cf. 46). Thus Stephenson and Hacquard
predict 47 to be true. And yet intuitively it is false when Suzan explicitly refrains
from passing a judgement at the moment.
(47) Suzan believes that there might be life on Mars.
18A somewhat milder observation pointing in the same direction is made in
[von Fintel and Gillies, 2011b], who argue that one needs to allow for the knowledge of more
people than just the attitude holder to possibly bear on an embedded epistemic. In support of that,
they use the following example, modeled after [DeRose, 1991], which does not make any sense if
might is relative only to the attitude holder's knowledge: "I don't know whether John might have
cancer. The doctors know but they won't tell us until Monday."
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Practical Contextualism, in which the embedded modal is not directly dependent
on the attitude bearer's mental state, is not bound to make the wrong prediction that
47 is true. But what prediction does it actually make in the scenario we considered?
To determine that, we need to fix the practical goal behind 47 first. Our main goal
when we used 47 was to describe the scenario. A sub-goal of that goal is to report
Suzan's attitude towards life on Mars. We can easily argue that in doing that, we
empathize with her and "import" her investigation of that question into our context.
The imported investigation, while being a different particular, will have exactly the
same boundaries as Suzan's in all possible worlds, so it will pick the same knowledge
in her belief worlds.
It might seem that we have cheated as theorists when we allowed ourselves to
import Suzan's investigation. The following observation demonstrates we actually
did not. Imagine we are actually in the middle of our own investigation of the same
QUD, but with much narrower boundaries: we need to report our findings at an
important committee hearing in several hours. If one of us asserts 47 in this context,
we will judge it to be true: what would be relevant for us is whether Suzan's opinion
as a current expert on the topic already rules out life on Mars or not. In this context,
47 will be almost synonymous with "It is compatible with Suzan's knowledge that there
is life on Mars".9
Suzan's state of mind is the same in both scenarios, and the truth value of 47
depends on what we in our context choose to be the current investigation. Even
19As an anonymous reviewer notes, an important subcase is when the interlocutors believe they
know in which cell of the "imported" QUD they are, and thus in a sense have resolved it:
(i) You and I both know that there is no life on Mars, but Suzan thinks there might be.
In the context of (i), there are two QUDs in play: first, the QUD regarding life on Mars, which
the speaker believes she has settled; second, the QUD about what the speaker, the hearer and Suzan
think about the first QUD. The sentence directly addresses the latter, stating that the interlocutors
and Suzan disagree. In order for disagreement to make sense at all, both the reports about the
interlocutors and about Suzan need to address the same question, so the QUD relevant for the
epistemic report has to belong to the matrix context.
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when we import Suzan's investigation, it is our choice to do so, made in the matrix
context.
[Weatherson and Egan, 2011, p. 10] use an example similar to 48 to illustrate
what they take to be a failure of standard contextualism. They think 48 constitutes a
problem because the speaker's knowledge does not seem to affect the truth value of the
sentence, and they believe under standard contextualism it should. But in Practical
Contextualism it is actually not expected at all that the speaker's knowledge would
be relevant for 48.
(48) [Every student]i thinks she, might have failed the exam.
A natural choice of the practical goal behind 48 would have the following as-
sociated QUD: 'What do the students think about how they did on the exam?' The
speaker's knowledge is not relevant to that QUD whatsoever, but each individual stu-
dent's knowledge is. Given that the inquiry is about the students' present thoughts,
it is the knowledge they presently think they command that is relevant. If student
xi's self-ascribed knowledge does not rule out that she failed, then in her belief worlds
she might have failed, for the purposes of the matrix investigation. Thus no problem
arises.
The next example shows in more detail how importing investigations happens in
realistic dialogues. In this scenario, Sarah and George are observing their roommate
Bill, who is frantically taking everything out of the fridge. The following dialogue
occurs:
(49) a. Sarah: What is Bill doing?
b. George: He thinks the keys might be in the fridge.
20Another take on 48 would involve stipulating that the interlocutors import a number of investi-
gations from the students' heads, and then 48 involves quantification over those multiple imported
investigations. To do that successfully, we'd need to introduce finer theoretical apparatus, allowing
for several current investigations, and for quantification into them. But constructing a single current
investigation that concerns each of the students is enough to explain the example as well, as is shown
in the main text, so these complications seem to be unnecessary.
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The main practical goal here is to figure out why Bill is taking everything out of
the fridge. George apparently knows that Bill's bouletic state is such that he wants
to find the keys. It thus becomes useful for Sarah and George's big investigation to
figure out what Bill thinks about the keys. George's response presupposes that Bill's
investigation of that question has been imported into Sarah and George's context,
and resolves that accommodated investigation.
This explanation assumes that a lot of covert work is going on between Sarah's
question and George's reply. But most of it would have to be stipulated under any
theory. For instance, unless it is accommodated that Bill desires to find the keys,
George's statement would not advance the big inquiry. So it is not just the importing
of an investigation that happens covertly in this scenario.
On the level of QUDs, accommodation of sub-QUDs is a normal process. Speakers
assume that the hearers with sufficient knowledge of the discussed domain will be
able to accommodate new sub-QUDs very efficiently, and rely on that assumption
in their linguistic behavior (see [Djalali et al., 20111 for evidence). The only extra
thing which Practical Contextualism requires in order for our explanation to come
through is to assume that not only QUDs, but associated investigations as well can
be accommodated in a similar manner. This seems to be a natural assumption to
make in our general pragmatic framework.
I will finish this section with an example that [Stephenson, 2007] argues supports
her analysis in which the modal base of the embedded epistemic only depends on the
attitude bearer's mental state. The scenario in the Embedded Mastermind example
50 is just the same as in 28. Yet while speakers are OK with a matrix epistemic claim
by Mordecai in 28, they tend to reject a belief attribution of the very same epistemic
claim to the very same person. So it seems that with 28 and 50 we have a pattern
opposite to the one we had for 27 and 47: the truth value for the embedded modal
seems to be different from the one for the matrix modal in the same context.
(50) Embedded Mastermind (the setup of the context is the same as in 28):
Pascal and Mordecai are playing Mastermind. Mordecai has selected several
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pins of different colors, and is giving Pascal hints which should help Pascal to
figure out which pins Mordecai has.
At the moment, it is consistent with the hints so far that there are two reds,
but it is not entailed by the hints.
Mordecai believes there might be two reds.
Stephenson's and Hacquard's truth conditions as in 45 and 46, respectively, straight-
forwardly predict that the sentence in 50 should be false: in both, it is not the matrix
context, but only Mordecai's belief state that determines the modal base. How can we
reconcile that observation with what we saw earlier for 47, where the matrix context
does affect the truth value of the belief report?
I argue the problem with 50 is that the context as provided does not specify what
exactly the speaker wants to achieve with their statement. If the goal is to describe
what Mordecai believes to be actually the case regarding the pins, then of course the
sentence in 50 is false. But note that when Mordecai speaks in 28, he clearly does
not intend to report his own knowledge on the subject: he wants to provide to Pascal
some information about what possibilities are still not ruled out given the public
information in the game. Now, when we set up a richer context for the belief report
in 50 where the investigation behind the report concerns the public information and
not Mordecai's knowledge due to his being the player who chose the pins, the same
sentence is actually judged true by a number of speakers:
(51) Embedded Mastermind for Four Voices:
Pascal and Mordecai are still playing Mastermind, just as they did in 28 and
50, but this time, Eloise is also watching.
Mordecai: You know, there might be two reds.
Pascal: No, there can't be. You are just trying to deceive me.
A dispute ensues. Abelard enters the room.
Abelard: What is this all about?
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Eloise: Mordecai believes there still might be two red pins, but Pascal
thinks there can't be, and that Mordecai wants to deceive him so he could
win. I think Mordecai is sincere, though.
Some speakers still find Eloise's attribution of an epistemic belief in 51 rather false
than true. But the contrast between a matrix statement and a belief attribution of
(what seems to be) the same claim can be replicated without epistemic modals as well.
While 52 is accepted as a normal and truthful assertion in the Mastermind context,
53 sounds degraded in the same circumstances. Thus whatever makes speakers to
like 28 better than 50, it is hardly caused by the presence of the epistemic modal.
(52) Mordecai: There are either one or two reds.
(53) Mordecai believes there are either one or two reds.
Summing up, though I have presented some evidence that the matrix context
does affect the truth conditions of belief reports with epistemics in them, namely in
47 and 51, it should be stressed that by itself that does not falsify [Stephenson, 20071
and [Hacquard, 2010]: both can be extended to accommodate dependence on the
matrix context. All these theories need to do is to stipulate silent constituents in the
embedded clause as in 54 and 55. Now, stipulations like that have to to be supported
by some theory about how exactly silent constituents are selected (cf. fn. 14), but
perhaps such a theory might be formulated.
(54) Suzan believes that according to the humankind's knowledge 10 years from
now, there might be life on Mars.
(55) Mordecai believes that according to the current public information in the
game, there still might be two red pins.
Given that such adjustments are possible, it is hard to draw any definite conclu-
sions from doxastic attitude data at this point. On the one hand, Practical Contextu-
alism can account for cases the earlier theories accounted for, and makes some correct
2 1 Qf course, in case disjunction in 52 and 53 is analyzed as essentially epistemic, those examples
would not provide any additional support to my case.
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new predictions about dependence of embedded epistemics on the matrix context. But
on the other hand, there is no decisive evidence in favor of our standard-contextualist
theory either. As we will see shortly, data from some other types of attitudes turns
out to be much more conclusive.
2.2.2 Factive verbs: the case of know
Consider 56. It presupposes 5722, which is not dependent on Mary's knowledge or
beliefs. Under Practical Contextualism, that presupposition is derived right away,
and the same is true for the relativist account of [Stephenson, 2007]. But under
[Hacquard, 2010], it is not easy to derive 57 and not something like 58, which is
actually entailed and not presupposed by 56. In the rest of this section, I will spell
out the compositional semantics of the three theories considered to show why those
facts hold.
(56) Mary knows Bill might be in Boston.
(57) Presupposed by 56: Bill might be in Boston.
(58) Not presupposed by 56: According to Mary, Bill might be in Boston.
Under Practical Contextualism, the context of utterance determines the bound-
aries of the current investigation - the intension for the sphere of relevant knowledge.
The sentence 56 then attributes to Mary a belief that the sphere of knowledge does
not rule out Bill being in Boston, and presupposes that belief is actually true:2 3
22For simplicity, I assume that the only way in which knowing that p is different from believing
that p (in the actual world) is that with knowing, there is a presupposition that p is actually true.
That will be enough for our arguments to go through. As far as I can see, adding further constraints
on knowledge should not make those arguments invalid.
Similarly, I will not discuss the issue of presupposition projection, only using examples where the
factive verb is in the matrix clause.
231 use the following lambda notation for partial functions: Ax. [presupposition I assertion]. I
assume a functional application rule that simply passes down the matrix context and world evaluation
parameters. As was noted in fn. 4, on the left side of definitions I omit evaluation parameters that do
not appear on the right side, so that it were more obvious which parameters affect the interpretation.
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(59) [[that Bill might be in Bostonl]c = Av. 3u C EMB,, Boston(Bill)(u),
where EMB,, = Epist.Modal.Base,,
(60) [[know]]w = Ap(s,t).Axe. [ p(w) I Vw' E B(x)(w) : p(w') ]
(61) [[knows that Bill might be in Boston]]c'w =
Ax. [ Iu E EMB,, : Boston(Bill) (u)
|Vw' c B(x)(w) : 3w" EMBew : Boston(Bill)(w")]
The modal base in Practical Contextualism directly depends on the evaluation
world parameter. In the presupposition part of 61, the modal base is formed by
the knowledge falling within the boundaries of the investigation in the actual world
w. In the assertion part, the modal base is formed by the relevant knowledge in
the attitude bearer's doxastic alternatives w'. The presupposition is thus about the
actual situation, and the assertion, about Mary's beliefs, just as it should be.
In the relativist theory of [Stephenson, 2007], the same simple assumption that the
presupposition of 56 is the meaning of its embedded clause evaluated at the matrix
index also derives the right predictions:
(62) [[know] ]wspeaker = AP(e,st).Ax. [p(speaker)(w) | Vv c B(x)(w) : p(x)(v)]
(63) [[know that Bill might be in Boston]]w'sPeaker -
= Ax. [3w' E K(speaker)(w) : Boston(Bill)(w')
|Vv c B(x)(w) : 3u C K(x)(v) : Boston(Bill)(u)]
But not all analyses of epistemic modals under doxastic attitudes can be as
straightforwardly extended to know. For the theory of [Hacquard, 2010], no obvi-
ous extrapolation derives the right presupposition.
[Hacquard, 2010] (see also [Hacquard, 2006]) uses the following schema for mak-
ing the embedded modal directly dependent on the matrix subject's beliefs: the
embedded epistemic quantifies over the set of worlds CONTENT(e), where e is an
event variable that must be bound by the closest appropriate lambda-abstractor,
[Percus, 2000]-style. The syntactic structure of an attitude report, 64, ensures that e
is the believing event. Furthermore, the lexical entry for believe defines CONTENT(e)
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as the set of belief worlds of the belief bearer B(tx.Experiencer(e)(x))(w)), where w
is the evaluation world of the attitude verb, and we derive 65 for an epistemic belief
report.
(64) Asp [ Aei. [ [believe] [ell ] I that Bill might-ei be in Boston
(65) [[believe that Bill might be in Boston]] =
= Aei.Ax.Aw. Experiencer(el)(x) A belief (ei)(w) A
A ]w" C B(tx.Experiencer(e1)(x))(w)) : Boston (Bill)(w")
With know, this setup leads to wrong predictions. The event variable in the
presupposed "copy" of the embedded clause, being a Percus-style variable, gets bound
by the same lambda operator as in the assertion, resulting in the presupposition
entailed by the assertion along the lines of 58:24
(66) [[knows that Bill might be in Boston]] =
=Ael.Ax.Aw. [ Iv E B(tx.Experiencer(el)(x))(w)) : Boston(Bill)(v)
I Experiencer(ei)(x) A belief (ei)(w) A
A ]w" C B(tx.Experiencer(ei)(x))(w)) : Boston(Bill)(w")
2.2.3 Demonstrating attitudes
What is it that must have been shown by Sarah in order for 67 to be true?25
2 4Simply locating the presupposition outside of the scope of that lambda-operator would not help
unless one stipulates that event variables behave differently from variables over individuals under
know. Copies of individual variables in the assertion and presupposition have to be bound by the
same lambda operator:
(i) [Every father]j knows hisj daughter plays soccer.
(ii) Presupposed by (i): For every father x, the daughter of x plays soccer
(iii) Not presupposed by (i): For some y, the daughter of y plays soccer.
2 1t is particularly easy to interpret the example in 67 as containing a non-epistemic might. But
an epistemic reading of the example is also available, though it will normally be remarkably non-
Sarah-centered.
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(67) Sarah showed/ demonstrated that Bill might be in Boston.
The answer given by our Practical Contextualism is simple: she must have shown
that the proposition p = 'no piece of information relevant in the current context
rules out Bill being in Boston' holds in the actual world. I will assume the following
meaning for show, based on the notion of proof validity taken as primitive:26
(68) show(p)(x) is true in w iff for all w' compatible with x's valid proof in w,
p(w') holds.
Whatever valid proofs may be, they must only make use of reliable facts, which
means that any valid proof is implicitly dependent on the world in which it is made.
Combining 68 with the regular Practical Contextualism analysis of the epistemic
modal, we get the following:
(69) The meaning of 67, Practical Contextualism + 68:
For all possible worlds w' compatible with Sarah's valid proof made in w, the
proposition p = 'no piece of information relevant in the current context rules
out Bill being in Boston' holds in w'.
The meaning we just derived did not require us to do any extra work: we just
combined our meaning for show with the analysis of epistemic modality in Practical
Contextualism. Intuitively, 69 can quite possibly be the right meaning for 67: it says
that Sarah proved that the relevant knowledge does not exclude the possibility of
Bill being in Boston, and that seems to be pretty close to what 67, on the epistemic
meaning of might, conveys.
An important feature of our predicted meaning for 67 is that it involves showing
something positive: whether or not the sphere of relevant knowledge rules out a
certain proposition is a fact about the world. If Sarah showed that Bill might be
26I do not try to give a precise definition of what constitutes a valid proof. Such a definition
will have to take into account a vast number of factors. For instance, the particular kind of rigor
required of a mathematical proof may be of a different nature than the rigor involved in establishing
the ecological validity of an argument in biology.
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in Boston, we can learn from that something about how the world is that we didn't
know before.
That feature is not specific to showing contexts: an epistemic claim is always
something positive in our theory. What makes it particularly important for show and
its kin is that such verbs highlight a conceptual difference between our standard-
contextualist position and the position of the authors like [Hacquard, 20101 and
[Yalcin, 2007]. In Hacquard's and Yalcin's accounts epistemic modals do not introduce
a new level of modal embedding, but rather test (cf. [Veltman, 1996]) the presence
of a certain kind of world in a set of worlds introduced by a different operator. For
instance, in Hacquard's analysis of epistemic modals under doxastic attitudes, the
modal checks if there are p-worlds in a given belief state. We will now see that in a
theory of this type, it is hard to find a proper object of showing for examples like 67.
The epistemic modal base in [Hacquard, 20101 is provided by the CONTENT of
some event. We will consider two possibilities regarding what the content of a showing
event might be. First, let's combine the general framework of [Hacquard, 20101, the
meaning in 68, and the assumption that the CONTENT of a showing event is the set
of worlds compatible with the valid proof:
(70) The meaning of 67, under [Hacquard, 2010] + 68:
For some of the possible worlds w' compatible with Sarah's valid proof in w,
Bill is in Boston in w'.
Intuitively that amounts to the following: Sarah has built a valid proof which
restricts the range of epistemic options for what the actual world w could be, and in
some of those options, Bill is in Boston. The problem with these truth conditions is
that most valid proofs do not rule out that Bill is in Boston. For instance, a proof
that 2 + 2 = 4 hardly can. The truth conditions in 70 imply that 67 can be used to
describe such a proof, which cannot be right. The actual sentence has much stronger
truth conditions.2 7
27It should be noted that the strategy of modal resolutions that [Yalcin, 2008] uses for a similar
problem with doxastic attitudes will not help here. For reasons of space, I can only note that for
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Turning to another possibility, [Anand and Hacquard, 2009] list demonstrate as a
member of the class of what they call proffering attitudes, which also includes assume,
claim, convince, imply, presuppose, suggest. Working in the general framework of
[Hacquard, 2006] and [Hacquard, 2010], Anand and Hacquard argue that these verbs
describe discourse moves that propose changing the common ground.
[Anand and Hacquard, 2009] analyze the CONTENT of proffering events to be the
common ground proposed by the proffering act. Thus Sarah claimed that Bill might
be in Boston is true in their analysis iff Sarah made a claim whose aim was to arrive
at a common ground in which there are some worlds where Bill is in Boston (see
Anand and Hacquard's (43), and their Sections 3.3 and 3.4). Anand and Hacquard
do not explicitly analyze other verbs from their proffering class, but if we were to
extend their strategy to show/demonstrate, we would arrive at something like this:
(71) Extending [Anand and Hacquard, 2009] to verb show:
[[Sarah showed that Bill might be in Boston]] = Sarah constructed a valid
proof the goal of which was to turn the current common ground into a new
one where there are worlds in which Bill is in Boston.
What do the truth conditions in 71 predict about the behavior of 67 in different
contexts? Suppose the old common ground already contained worlds where Bill is in
Boston. Then the truth conditions in 71 are satisfied even if after Sarah's action it
simply remains the same. For instance, it suffices for Sarah to prove that 2+2 = 4 in
order for 67 to be declared true in this context. On the other hand, if the old common
ground did not contain a single world where Bill was in Boston, then arriving at a
new common ground would involve a process of re-introduction of some worlds into
the common ground. In that case, the truth of 71 would imply that some positive
change on the part of the agents has taken place, namely a non-trivial revision of
what they were taking for granted before Sarah's proof.
Yalcin's strategy to work in the proof case, it must be possible for a proposition like "Bill might be
in Boston" to be distinguished in the information state associated with the proof. But for Hacquard
and Yalcin, there is no such proposition, and one ends up collapsing Sarah showed that Bill is in
Boston and Sarah showed that Bill might be in Boston.
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Thus 71 has non-vacuous truth conditions only when the common ground ruled
out Bill being in Boston altogether before 71 was asserted. But this does not fit how
67 is actually used.
Thus if we analyze epistemics embedded under show as quantifying over a certain
set of worlds introduced by the verb rather than contributing an independent layer
of modal embedding, the truth conditions we derive for 67 end up being too weak.
In contrast to that, our theory of Practical Contextualism derives plausible truth
conditions for 67 without any additional work needed.
Finally, let us consider what the relativist theory of [Stephenson, 2007] predicts
regarding 67. In Stephenson's brand of relativism, the meaning of the that-clause is
not a proposition, but a function from judges to propositions, so the embedded clause
of 67 has the meaning in 72.
(72) [[that Bill might be in Boston]] = Aje.Av. 3u C K(j)(v) : Boston(Bill)(u)
What can it mean to "show" the function in 72? A judge-dependent version of our
semantics for show in 68 is given in 73, where who the judge 1 is is left unresolved:
(73) show(Ak.p(k))(x)(j) is true in w for judge j iff
x provided in w a valid proof that p(l) must obtain in w for some judge 1.
Together, 72 and 73 produce the following truth conditions for 67:
(74) x provided in w a valid proof that lu E K(l)(w):Boston(Bill)(u), for judge 1.
But the contents of the valid proof witnessing the truth of 67 are not about the
knowledge of any particular judge 1, be it the prover, the speaker, or somebody else.
To conclude the discussion of demonstrating attitudes, our Practical Contextu-
alism makes straightforward predictions about epistemic modals under such verbs
that agree with the judgements. But for the other theories currently on the market,
additional work will have to be done to figure out whether they can be extended to
account for epistemic modals in these contexts.
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2.2.4 Inquisitive attitudes
When one is wondering whether p, for some non-epistemic p, one wants to know
whether that p holds or not. But what is Sarah wondering about in 75?
(75) Sarah is wondering whether Bill might be in Boston.
Under our Practical Contextualism, the embedded clause denotes a simple propo-
sition about the sphere of relevant knowledge determined by the context of utter-
ance. Thus wondering about an epistemic p is not different from wondering about a
non-modal p under our standard-contextualist account: both modal and non-modal
embedded clauses describe how a certain aspect of the actual world could be, and are
thus proper objects of wondering.
But if we define the modal base in 75 as relative to the attitude bearer, applying
the strategy which [Hacquard, 20101 and [Stephenson, 20071 use for epistemics under
believe, the resulting semantics would make no sense: we will end up saying that 75 is
true when Sarah is wondering about her own state of mind. For both [Hacquard, 20101
and [Stephenson, 20071, a successful extension of their theories to 75 would require
finding a value, either of the modal's event variable or of the judge parameter, which
would generate a proposition that can be a proper object of Sarah's wonderings.
Thus in Practical Contextualism the analysis of matrix epistemic cases already
provides us with a suitable object for wondering, but Hacquard's and Stephenson's
theories have to say something different from what they say for matrix cases in order
to deal with 75.
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2.2.5 Suppositions and if-clauses
Consider epistemic might embedded under imperative suppose 28 or in a conditional
clause:
(76) Suppose Bill might be in Boston.
(77) If Bill might be in Boston, we should send a team there.
[Schnieder, 2010] and [Crabill, 2013] argue that bare epistemic modals cannot oc-
cur in such contexts. Regarding if-clauses, a similar point has been made in the
earlier literature, too; e.g., [Bybee et al., 1994, p. 208] discuss the sentence If he may
help me, I would finish sooner, and note that may in it "indicates permission rather
than epistemic possibility".
Our Practical Contextualism does not say that might should be forbidden in those
contexts. However, the usual meaning it assigns to the epistemic might is such that we
would not expect examples like 76 and 77 to be very frequent. For 76, that meaning
would be as follows:
(78) Adopt as true, for the purposes of this discussion, that the sphere of relevant
knowledge does not rule out Bill being in Boston.
How would a context where 78 would make sense look like? That should be a
context where after making the supposition about the sphere of knowledge, one would
draw certain conclusions from it. A natural environment for such activity would be
an exam. Suppose the addressee is taking an examination assessing her skills as a
28 Natural occurrences of sentences like (i), with suppose in the indicative rather than the im-
perative, are usually instances of a doxastic attitude ascription, and not of the ascription of a true
supposition, where a "true supposition" involves somebody entertaining its propositional argument
as true.
(i) # Sarah supposed that Bill might be in Boston.
Some uses of sentences like (i) do describe true suppositions, though, as in Mary supposed that x
equals y, and then proved that in that case, the lemma holds. Imperative uses of suppose, however,
seem to always involve true suppositions, so I will be using only imperatives in this section.
91
senior police investigator, and her task is to come up with an action plan to find Bill
as soon as possible spending the least possible amount of resources. In that context,
the following is OK, on the epistemic reading of might:
(79) Suppose Bill might be in Boston. What would you do, given that you have
teams already working in Worcester and Gloucester?
Similarly, the person taking the exam can start her answer to that problem with
the following:
(80) If Bill might be in Boston, then we need to cover that area, so I'll divide the
Gloucester team into two halves and send one of them to Boston.
Thus in contexts where Practical Contextualism predicts that we should find epis-
temic might, we indeed find it, and the meaning our theory assigns to it matches the
observed meaning.
[Yalcin, 20071 uses data from suppositions and if-clauses in an argument against
standard contextualism, of which our Practical Contextualism is a variant. Yalcin's
argument is based on the observation that the following examples seem abnormal:
(81) # Suppose that Bill might be in Boston and that Bill is not in Boston.
(82) # If Bill might be in Boston and Bill is not in Boston, ...
Yalcin's argument against standard contextualism goes as follows. In standard
contextualism, 'Bill might be in Boston' does not entail that Bill is in Boston, and
thus is logically compatible with 'Bill is not in Boston'. And yet, Yalcin argues,
those two are not co-supposable, 81, and cannot co-occur conjoined in an if-clause, 82.
Therefore, Yalcin concludes, there is something wrong with the standard-contextualist
analysis of epistemic modals, or for that matter with any analysis under which 'Bill
might be in Boston' and 'Bill is not in Boston' are logically compatible. Yalcin then
proposes an analysis where 'Bill might be in Boston' and 'Bill is not in Boston' are
not logically compatible.
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Let's see what Practical Contextualism has to say about 81 (it is easy to build
the case for 82 in parallel manner). Just as Yalcin argues regarding standard contex-
tualism in general, our theory does not deem 81 and 82 semantically defective. For
instance, the predicted meaning for 81 would be as follows:
(83) Adopt as true, for the purposes of this discussion, the following:
1. the sphere of relevant knowledge does not rule out Bill being in Boston;
2. furthermore, Bill is not in Boston.
That this meaning as such is not defective is shown by the fact that the following
paraphrase is OK:
(84) Suppose that Bill is actually not in Boston, but the available information does
not rule out his being there.
Let's find a context where the seemingly non-defective paraphrase in 84 is appro-
priate, and then check whether 81 is abnormal there. The exam setting we introduced
above is a suitable context to apply this test. Consider the following exam problem:
(85) Suppose that Bill is actually not in Boston, but the available information does
not rule out his being there.
What will be the costs incurred by the most efficient plan of action adopted
on the basis of information available at the moment, compared to the case
when no resources are spent on a search in Boston?
Now that we have a context where the paraphrase from 84 is OK, let's replace it
with a sentence analogous to 81, with might embedded under suppose:
(86) Suppose that Bill is actually not in Boston, but he might be there.
What will be the costs incurred by the most efficient plan of action adopted
on the basis of information available at the moment, compared to the case
when no resources are spent on a search in Boston?
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Given this context, the allegedly impossible combination of a supposition of might
p and -p becomes better than it was when uttered out of the blue. This is unexpected
under Yalcin's account: if the two are logically incompatible, then no speakers at all
should accept 86, contrary to fact.
What is not predicted by Practical Contextualism by itself is that some speakers
find 86 degraded compared to 85. Future research is needed to determine why exactly
that would be so, but for now, I can provide an educated guess.
An examination of actual examples with might embedded under the true sup-
positional suppose shows that epistemic might very rarely occurs in such examples.
Instead, we mostly see metaphysical might and "empty" might.29 Why would that be
29 It is hard to conduct a precise corpus study of the phenomenon due to the rarity of the construc-
tion. E.g., the British National Corpus of 100M words only contains about a hundred of instances
of might under suppose, and the absolute majority of those feature the doxastic suppose of the kind
discussed in fn. 28, not the true suppositional suppose. As the next best thing, I conducted a random
examination of several dozens of Google hits for the search phrases "let's suppose it/she/he/I/you
might", where the attitude is guaranteed to be suppositional. I found it hard to find any epistemic
examples, though there have been plenty of metaphysical might as in (i) and "empty" might as in
(ii).
(i) But let's suppose that all kinds of insulin MIGHT cause cancer (I don't believe it does, but
let's suppose it might...) So now I have to decide which road do I want to travel? Shall I go
down the road where my blood sugar is "rarely" above 125 mg/dl? Or shall I go down the
road where my blood sugar is "rarely" above 100 mg/dl, and according to somebody, perhaps
I have a higher risk of cancer?
(ii) Let's suppose you might be a person who needs a good car to get to and from work everyday,
but you don't like to pay the gasoline credit card bill every month. So you go out one morning
and take a sledge hammer to your car and smash it to pieces.
(i) is asserted within a dialogue about whether taking insulin may cause cancer in some people.
It is fairly clear from the discussion (cf. the last sentence of (i)) that what's at stake is only higher
risk of developing cancer, and not the necessity of it. Thus might in (i) concerns the property of
the actual situation, and the metaphysical analysis makes perfect sense. Furthermore, the speaker
clearly takes "Insulin causes cancer" to be false, which is incompatible with the epistemic reading,
so only the metaphysical reading is fine.
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relevant to the puzzle at hand? Analyzing an ambiguous construction, speakers tend
to choose the more frequent variant, and in the case when relative frequencies of dif-
ferent kinds of might under suppose are so strongly skewed towards the non-epistemic
variants, we can expect speakers to strongly prefer non-epistemic interpretations. But
for metaphysical might, propositions might p and -p are indeed logically incompat-
ible: if the world is such way that -,p, that entails -(might p). For "empty" might,
might p amounts (perhaps roughly) to p itself, and so is also incompatible with -'p.
Hence the speakers' unease with 86: even though under the intended epistemic inter-
pretation it is fine, and for some speakers that is quite enough to judge it well-formed
and semantically non-trivial, for other speakers the interference from the dominant
non-epistemic interpretations is very strong, and makes them feel bad about the ex-
ample. When roughly the same meaning is conveyed by an unambiguous construction
as in 85, no problem of this sort arises, hence 85 is judged to be better than 86.
Needless to say, more research is needed to either confirm or disprove this expla-
nation, but what it shows is that there may very well be a principled explanation
compatible with Practical Contextualism for why some speakers dislike 86 compared
to 85. But I cannot quite see how Yalcin's theory predicting logical incompatibility
of --p and epistemic might p would explain the fact that some speakers like 86.
2.2.6 Epistemics under attitudes: taking stock
In this section, we have reviewed the predictions of Practical Contextualism for epis-
temic modals embedded under several types of attitude verbs. Our theory derived
reasonable truth conditions for the types of cases discussed in the earlier literature,
and made novel and correct predictions regarding a number of cases not considered
In (ii), unless it was supposed after the first sentence that you do have a car, the second sen-
tence does not make sense. Therefore whatever might's contribution in (ii) may be, it does not
contribute a 0 to the assertion of the first sentence, hence we can somewhat sloppily call it "empty".
([Portner, 1997] analyzes a special may restricted to complements of several kinds of attitude verbs
with similar semantics, arguing that it contributes to the presuppositional part of the semantics,
though not to the assertion part.)
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before.
As for the other accounts proposed for epistemics embedded under attitude verbs,
in several contexts that we discussed extra work needs to be done to even find out if
those theories can be extended to account for the data. I do not have a proof that they
necessarily cannot, and for all we know, by the end of the day their extended versions
may fare better than Practical Contextualism. But at least for now, our standard-
contextualist account has as good a chance of being true as any other. Moreover,
if theories like those in [Hacquard, 20101 and [Stephenson, 2007] can be extended to
cover the types of attitude verbs we discussed in this section, their stories about
different kinds of contexts would have to be much less uniform than the story that
Practical Contextualism tells.
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have developed Practical Contextualism, a theory of epistemic
modality within the framework of standard contextualism, which achieves the fol-
lowing: 1) it accounts for the data from epistemic (dis)agreement dialogues which
have been claimed to falsify any possible standard-contextualist account; and 2) it
accounts for a wide range of data from epistemic modals embedded under attitude
verbs, in some cases more successfully than any of the current competitor accounts.
This serves as an existence proof that a reasonable standard-contextualist theory
with wide coverage can be constructed. The criticism of standard contextualism in
the recent years has led to the discovery of a number of important cases which any
theory of epistemic modality needs to account for in order to be considered plausible.
Our Practical Contextualism manages to explain those cases, and in addition to
that it also makes correct predictions about types of cases not considered before,
being particularly successful in its account of how slight differences in the context of
utterance may lead to differences in the truth values of epistemic claims. Whether
Practical Contextualism will turn out to be the correct theory of epistemic modality,
or even simply on the right track, studying its predictions forces us to enlarge the
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range of data which any subsequent theory of epistemics would have to account for.
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Chapter 3
The rise of may-under-hope
construction in Early Modern English
The present chapter has three aims.' The first aim, which organizes the overall
narrative of the chapter, is to account for the historical rise of the may-under-hope
construction as in 87.
(87) (1891) Dearest, I hope we may be on such terms twenty years hence.
(The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb,
from CLMEP [Denison et al., 1994])
'The paper on which the present chapter is based was presented at the ModalityAOttawa work-
shop in April 2012, and benefitted from the comments of the audiences at MIT and at Ottawa,
and from comments by Kai von Fintel. A version of the paper, [Yanovich, 2012], is under review
as a part of a volume edited by Ana Arregui, Maria Luisa Rivero and Andr6s Pablo Salanova, with
Oxford University Press. Kai von Fintel, Irene Heim and Sabine Iatridou have greatly helped me to
improve the present version in their capacity as my dissertation committee.
Working on the project, I have drawn on the data from the following corpora: the British National
Corpus [BNC, 2007], the Corpus of Late Modern English Prose (CLMEP) [Denison et al., 1994], the
Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA, available at http: //corpus. byu. edu/coca/),
the Corpus of American Soap Operas (CASO, available at http: //corpus2. byu. edu/soap/, the
York-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Early English Correspondence (PCEEC) [PCEEC, 2006], the York-
Toronto-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Old English Prose (YCOE) [Taylor et al., 2003]. The searches
in the parsed corpora PCEEC and YCOE were performed with the help of the search utility Cor-
pusSearch 2 written by Beth Randall at UPenn.
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The interesting feature of that construction is that may in it does not contribute
existential quantificational force: speakers perceive that the object of the reported
hope is to remain on such terms, not for it to be merely possible to remain on them.
Despite the archaic feel to the construction, it turns out to be a very recent innovation
that arose not earlier than the 16th century. I conjecture that its elevated flavor does
not stem from its old age, but rather was inherited from another construction, with the
inflectional subjunctive under hope, which the may-under-hope construction replaced,
according to my hypothesis.
The second aim of the chapter is purely descriptive. In order to understand the
rise of the particular construction in 87, we need to know how the modal system in
the complements of hoping attitudes functioned as a whole in the historical periods of
interest. I provide the description of that in this chapter, at times deviating from the
main narrative in order to do so. The rationale for that is that a complete description
of the modal system under verbs of hoping may then in future research be compared
to the modal system in other semantically defined contexts.
Finally, the third aim is to prove, in Section 3.4, a relatively uncontroversial fact:
in order to predict the empirical distributional profile of a given type of linguistic
expressions, it is sometimes insufficient to know the compositional semantic properties
of all expressions involved. In other words, there exist distributional facts that are
not reducible to semantic facts.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In Section 3.1, I provide the background
on the modern may-under-hope construction, highlighting the fact that it features a
lexical variant of the modal that is confined to a very particular syntactic context.
After briefly reviewing the formal semantics of hoping attitudes in Section 3.2, I note
in Section 3.3 that may under verbs of hoping was completely absent in Old English.
Section 3.4 describes the results of an analysis of the complements of attitude verbs of
hoping in the earliest section of the Parsed Corpus of Early English Correspondence
[PCEEC, 2006], which, among other things, shows that may was still marginal under
verbs of hoping well into the 16th century. Another conclusion that can be drawn
from a comparison between the data from the 15th and early 16th centuries and the
100
Present-Day English data is that the marginal status of may in this syntactic context
cannot be explained by semantic factors alone: some further constraint, not belonging
to the compositional semantics, must have been in place. In Section 3.5, I discuss the
data from the latest section of the PCEEC corpus, covering the period of 1630-1681.
By that time, the special variant of may under hope that we can see in 87 was already
in place. In Section 3.6, I put forward a hypothesis about how exactly may entered in
numbers into the complements of hoping attitudes. The core of the hypothesis is that
the driving force of the change was a preference for preserving the special elevated
category of hopes about good health that were earlier expressed with the inflectional
subjunctive, and the replacement of the disappearing subjunctive with may led to
the creation of a new semantic variant of the modal restricted to the context of hope
reports. Section 3.7 concludes the chapter.
3.1 may under hope: a syntactically restricted se-
mantic variant of a lexeme
The semantics of natural language is largely compositional, which explains how lan-
guage users may generate novel sentences and understand sentences they never heard
before. However, some constructions require the introduction of lexical meanings re-
stricted to certain syntactic contexts. Though on the technical level, we can introduce
for them meanings and syntactic restrictions that would result in a formally composi-
tional analysis, on the intuitive level such constructions are not compositional in the
strongest sense: in order to use them correctly, a language speaker needs to know the
construction itself; simply deducing the properties of its parts from other contexts in
the language is not sufficient for grasping the semantic import of the construction in
question.
One such construction in modern English is the may-under-hope construction,
exemplified in 87 above and here in 88:
(88) While investigators hope for a break in technology, they also hope there may
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be a crack in the kidnapper's conscience.
What the investigators 88 hope for is clearly not just the possibility of there being a
crack in the kidnapper's conscience: it is the actual crack. The meaning of possibility
normally conveyed by may is absent from this example. At the same time, speakers
perceive subtle difference, which might be attributed to style or register, between
sentences with may under hope such as in 87 and 88, and their counterparts with
will, as in 89 and 90. The examples with may feel to speakers elevated, more solemn,
more pronouncement-like, less ordinary.
(89) Dearest, I hope we will be on such terms twenty years hence.
(90) The investigators hope there will be a crack in the kidnapper's conscience.
Not having the usual existential semantics and adding the elevated feel to the
sentence go hand in hand for may under hope: there are examples where the modal
in that syntactic context has a perfectly regular meaning, and does not convey any
solemn flavor. For instance, 91 features regular deontic may that occurs in other
matrix and embedded contexts, and 92 arguably features something close to a regular
epistemic might (it may be a bit too much for the police to hope that the owners
would indeed recognize their belongings, but hoping that at least it's not impossible
for them to do so is perfectly rational).
(91) I do hope I may remain a member? (from [BNC, 20071)
(92) Serial numbers are missing from much of the electrical equipment but police
properties officers hope people might recognise their belongings.
(from [BNC, 20071)
[Portner, 1997] argues that may in examples like 87 and 88 is "mood-indicating".
To account for its special semantics, Portner introduces a separate lexical entry re-
stricted to a small range of syntactic contexts. Portner proposes that may as in 87 and
88 conveys the presupposition that its propositional argument is doxastically possible
for the hoper (that is, that the hoper believes the described situation to be possible),
and contributes nothing to the assertion. I do not endorse the presupposition that
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(from COCA)
Portner assigns to may,2 but I accept his claim that the modal in the construction
does not contribute anything directly to the assertive component. I assume that the
elevated flavor of may under hope should be analyzed as pertaining not to the narrow
compositional semantics, but rather as a special expressive marker that signals that
a particular register of the language is being used. That marker can be analyzed as
other expressives, cf., for example, [Potts, 2005].
Given the special nature of the may-under-hope construction, two natural ques-
tions arise. First, how could such a construction be created by language users in the
first place? Second, once created, how did it develop and how was it retained? I will
have nothing useful to say about the second question: I assume that the usual con-
siderations of inertia of use and faithful transfer of language to new speakers should
take care of that. As for the first question, I will propose a particular hypothesis that
explains the rise of may under hope and the elevated flavor it now conveys.
3.2 Semantics of hoping
Before we turn to historical data, it is useful to formally analyze the semantics of
hoping. What makes the attitude of hoping special is the way it relates beliefs and
desires (see [Anand and Hacquard, 2012] for both an overview of the literature and
an approach to the semantics of hoping close to the one described below). A number
2The reason I do not endorse Portner's presupposition is that there is no way to empirically test
for its presence: given the lexical semantics of hope, Portner's presupposition would have no effect.
Note that a non-modal complement of hope is presupposed to be doxastically possible for the subject
of hoping. E.g., if the speaker knows that Gillian believes she cannot win, she cannot utter (i) truly,
and (ii) is a contradiction. But if so, then the presupposition that Portner ascribes to may as in 87
and 88 simply doubles the presupposition triggered by hope. If may triggers no presupposition, the
end result would be the same as when it does.
(i) Gillian hopes she will win.
(ii) # Gillian knows she won't win, but she hopes she will.
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of tests suggest that a hope report conveys information both regarding the agent's
beliefs and the agent's desires. Namely, one can only hope that p if one A) considers
p possible; B) does not consider p necessary; and C) prefers p to its alternatives. A
and B form the belief part, and C forms the desire part of the attitude.
That a hope report conveys some measure of doxastic uncertainty about p (that
is, a combination of meaning components A and B above) is shown by the following
examples modeled after [Scheffler, 2008j:
(93) Mark: Is Peter coming today?
a. Bill: OKI hope he is.
b. Bill: * I want him to.
(94) It is raining. That's exactly what I {*hope1/OKwant}.
In 93b, the report of a desire for Peter to be coming today cannot serve as a direct
answer: simply expressing a preference for his coming does not help with resolving
the question of whether he is.3 The fact that hope is felicitous in 93a shows, according
to Scheffler, and to Anand and Hacquard, that a hope report may convey a belief
about its complement along with a preference for it.
The contrast in 94 shows that in the situation of epistemic certainty about p, hop-
ing for p is inappropriate. That want is OK in 94 demonstrates that there is nothing
wrong with wanting something that one knows to be actual. Therefore hope's inappro-
priateness in 94 must have something to do with the attitude's doxastic component.
If a hope report conveys that the agent considers p possible and at the same time
not-necessary, we expect exactly the pattern we see in 93 and 94.
What the examples in 93 and 94 show is that in addition to the preference compo-
nent similar to want's, hope also has a belief component in its semantics. The status
of both the meaning components seems to be that of assertion. Consider B's utterance
in 95. Being a felicitous answer to A's question, it must assert that Mary's doxastic
3 93b in this context would often implicate an answer to the question: a cooperative speaker who
knows whether Peter is coming would not use 93b, which can trigger an inference on the part of the
hearer.
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state allows both rain and its absence (that is, that her beliefs leave it open whether
it rains or not). At the same time, C's reply targets the preference component of B's
sentence: C argues that B's assertion cannot be true appealing to the structure of
Mary's preferences regarding the weather. This is as expected if B asserted both a
statement about Mary's beliefs and Mary's desires.
(95) A: Does Mary think it is raining?
B: Well, she certainly hopes so.
C: That cannot be true. Mary prefers sunny weather to rain.
Another source of evidence for the parity status of the doxastic (that is, belief)
and bouletic (that is, desire) components of the semantics of hope is the behavior of
adverbial modifiers: they may target either part of the meaning.
In 96 the degree modifier very much signals the strength of Ann's preference, and
has nothing to do with her beliefs:
(96) Ann hopes very much that Mary will be elected.
In 97 as well, the continuation favors interpreting the temporal adverbial still as
modifying the preference component: we do not know if Ann's opinion on Mary's
electoral chances changed, but the structure of her preferences has been adjusted re-
cently, as we learn from the second clause, which favors interpreting still as belonging
to the desire component.
(97) Ann still hopes that Mary will be elected, though she was really disappointed
by her position on the nuclear power plant.
But in 98, both the degree modifier a little bit and the temporal modifier still
attach to the doxastic component, not the desire component as in 97: a little bit
conveys that the likelihood of Mary's win is not that great according to Ann, and
still signals that Ann continues to consider Mary's win a live option.
(98) Ann still hopes a little bit that Mary will be elected, though she considers it
quite unlikely.
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I adopt the following lexical entry for hope, in line with [Anand and Hacquard, 2012].
If one wishes to have a preference semantics along the lines of [Villalta, 20081 for hope,
modifying 99 accordingly is straightforward.
(99) [[hope]]w = Ap.Ax. (Doxx(w) n p / 0) A (Doxx(w) n ,p # 0) A
A Vw' C Doxx(w): p-worlds most similar to w' are
more desirable for x in w than -,p-worlds most similar to w'
The only other class of attitudes that relates beliefs and desires in the same way
as attitudes of hoping do is the class of attitudes of fearing. The difference between
hoping that p and fearing that p is that in the latter case, one prefers p's alternatives
to p, not the other way round. But both for hoping and for fearing one has to consider
argument p possible and not-necessary. [Anand and Hacquard, 2012] call the natural
class of attitudes of hoping and fearing emotive doxastics.
In this paper, I will only discuss verbs of hoping, leaving verbs of fearing aside.
The reason for that is more practical than theoretical: in the Early Modern English
samples I used, verbs of hoping with finite complements outnumber verbs of fearing
more than 4 times in each historical section. There were too few examples with verbs
of fearing to perform meaningful analysis. In case there were significant differences
between the modal system under hoping and fearing attitudes, the scarcity of data
in my sample would not have allowed to distinguish that from random fluctuations.
3.3 Modals under verbs of hoping in Old English
Unfortunately, the existing literature does not provide precise dating for the appear-
ance of the may-under-hope construction. One reason for that is that verbs of hoping
are rarely discussed as a natural class rather than as a member of a much wider class
of preference attitudes. For instance, [Visser, 1973], a fundamental study of, among
other things, the distribution of modals in different syntactic contexts from early Old
4 More accurately, in line with Anand and Hacquard's informal analysis, but not with their tech-
nical implementation within the event semantics.
106
English to 20th-century English, does not single out may under verbs of hoping as a
special case:5
The use of may and might in clauses depending on such verbs as wish, de-
mand, desire, beseech, hope, pray, etc., and their allied nouns, is common
in all periods. [Visser, 1973, §1678]
However, the very first example of may/might under a hoping attitude that Visser
provides is from the early 15th century, which is quite late as far as "all periods" of
the recorded history of English go. This absence is not an accident due to Visser's
choice of examples: in Old English (OE), there is no indication whatsoever that may
(or, rather, its OE ancestor magan) was ever embedded under hoping attitude verbs.
[Ogawa, 1989] reviews the Old English distribution of modals in the complements
of six groups of attitude verbs which he collectively calls "dependent desires". The six
classes of Ogawa's include such groups as verbs of commanding or verbs of asking.
Ogawa shows that for different classes of attitudes he considers, the distribution of
modals is very different in Old English. Thus lumping all those attitudes together as
Visser does we are bound to lose important information.
Still, even though [Ogawa, 1989] divides attitude verbs into much smaller classes
than Visser, his classes are still not small enough for our purposes. The OE verbs
of hoping hopian and hyhtan are put by Ogawa into the same class with such verbs
as willan 'to will', wilnian 'to desire', wyscan 'to wish', geweorpan 'to agree', and
myntan 'to intend'. Fortunately, Ogawa also lists individually all examples in his
sample, which makes it possible to see what exactly he found for verbs of hoping.
The sample turns out to provide only a tiny overall number of examples, none of
them featuring may/magan:
The only modal verbs we see under verbs of hoping in Ogawa's sample are *motan
(> modern must), *sculan (> modern shall) and willan (> modern will). There is no
'It should be noted that on other occasions [Visser, 1973] does discuss verbs of hoping alone, or
verbs of hoping and fearing together, as a separate group worthy to be examined on its own. It is
just that he does not do so discussing may and might.
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Table 3.1: Modals under hopian and hyhtan in the sample of [Ogawa, 1989]
*motan *sculan willan total
OE poetry 3 0 0 3
Early OE prose 1 0 0 1
Late OE prose 1 1 2 4
Total 5 1 2 8
magan (> modern may), contrary to what [Visser, 1973] implies.6 It could be that
magan sometimes appeared in the complements of verbs of hoping in OE, but if so, we
have absolutely no indication of that, despite the considerable corpus of survived OE
texts. Furthermore, the prominent presence of *motan in these complements marks
a large difference between the OE usage and the Late Middle English and Early
Modern English usage, in which mote and must (< Old English *motan) are absent
from the complements of verbs of hoping. To conclude, the rise of the may-under-hope
construction clearly did not yet start in the Old English period.
3.4 Modals under verbs of hoping in the 15th cen-
tury
Searching for the moment when may embedded under hope was established, I ex-
amined a 411K-words dataset covering the period of years 1425-1520, drawn from
the Parsed Corpus of Early English Correspondence (PCEEC) [PCEEC, 2006].7 The
6I cross-checked Ogawa's counts against the 1,5-million-word York-Toronto-Helsinki Parsed Cor-
pus of Old English Prose (YCOE) [Taylor et al., 2003]. My search did not reveal any extra examples,
and in fact missed one which Ogawa found in Byrhtferth's Manual, as the part of that work where
Ogawa's example was situated was not included into YCOE.
7My 1425-1520 subcorpus consisted of the following collections (the approximate word count for
each is given in the parentheses): The Cely Letters (51K) [Hanham, 1975], Letters of Richard Fox
(11K) [Allen and Allen, 1929], The Marchall Letters (5K) [Kerinen et al., 1999], The Paston let-
ters (234K) [Davis, 71 6], Plumpton Correspondence (37K) [Stapleton, 1968], Rerum Britannicarum
(6K) [Gairdner, 61 3], The manuscripts of the Duke of Rutland (1K) [Lyte, 1888], Letters and Papers
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dataset forms the earliest section of this corpus of historical letters. PCEEC was cho-
sen for this study for three reasons: first, it exists in a parsed form which allows for
rapid and accurate searching, with the help of the CorpusSearch 2 utility written by
Beth Randall at UPenn; second, consisting of letters, PCEEC is uniform in terms of
genre and register to a larger degree than corpora intentionally featuring a selection of
texts of multiple genres; and third, early letters to a large extent represent functional
writing, and thus may be closer to the contemporary vernacular than texts of many
other genres.
It turned out that in the 15th century may was still practically absent from the
complements of hope attitudes. Moreover, so was can, despite the fact it frequently
occurs under hope in Present-Day English. Modal must, which was relatively com-
mon under hopian and hyhtan in Old English, was also absent. The 15th-century
distribution was thus markedly different both from the Old English one and from the
modern one.
Below in this section, I will first describe the distribution of modals, the unam-
biguous non-modal subjunctive, and other non-modal forms in the complements of
verbs of hoping in the 1425-1520 subcorpus of PCEEC. Second, I will show that the
absence of may in that sample is in fact surprising given the compositional semantics
of the modal at the time. Together, the facts described here will form the basis for
comparison with the mid-17th-century situation discussed in the next section.
In a pilot study using a 177K-words part of the 1425-1520 subcorpus (it contained
of John Shillingford, Mayor of Exeter (14K) [Moore, 1965], The signet letters of Henry V (15K)
[Fisher et al., 19841, The Stonor Letters (38K) [Kingsford, 1919] and [Kingsford, 1923].
In the collections as a whole, there are several letters written before 1425, but none of them
contains a hope report. At the other end of the period, the Plumpton Correspondence contains
several letters written after 1520, but as their usage does not seem to be different from that of the
earlier letters, and they belong to the same circle of authors and recipients as the earlier letters in
the collection, I chose to include them in the analysis. In those later letters included into the sample,
there were 2 examples with shall, 2 with will, 1 with would, and 5 non-modal examples, of which
3 feature a non-ambiguous subjunctive (two instances of the subjunctive are in formulaic wishes of
good health, and one is in a sentence conveying a non-performative hope regarding a certain future
situation).
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all letter collections from the actual sample except the Paston letters), I went over
all examples with verbs with a that-clause complement in order to determine the
precise membership in the class of verbs of hoping at the time. I concluded that
two verbs were used predominantly for expression of hopes in that period: hope and
trust. According to lexicographers (cf. hopen and trusten in [MED, 2002]), both of
them could express both the meaning of hoping and several other meanings, including
that of being confident. But in my data sample, where the context provides enough
support for disambiguation, both verbs denote a hoping attitude. E.g., in 100 the
wife of the recipient asks the author to recommend her to her husband in the letter,
and can hardly be confident that he received a lock she sent in her previous letter:
there was no communication between her and him from the moment she sent the lock.
However, a hope that he received it makes sense in the context.
(100) Syr, my masterys youre wyffe recomaund har harteley vnto you, sche en-
formyng you that sche sent a lettere vnto you the last weke be on Rechard
Cartar of Darbey, in the wyche lettere sche sent vnto you a lytell locke of
gould y-closed in the sayd lettere, the wyche sche trust to God ye haue
ressayved. CELY,223.142.3134
'Sir, my maistress your wife recommends her heartly to you, she informing
you that she sent a letter to you last week with Richard Carter of Darby, in
which letter she sent you a little golden lock enclosed in the said letter, which
she hopes to God you have received.'
In the analysis, I included all instances of hope and trust taking finite complement
clauses, with the understanding that in a few cases they might have been used to ex-
press a different attitude, for instance, that of being confident. Such cases, however,
must have been quite rare, and no crucial conclusions hinge on such cases. Analyzing
all instances of a given verb togehter rather than trying to divide them by the se-
mantics is common in the historical research on modals, see, e.g., [Visser, 1973] and
[Ogawa, 1989].
In 100 and other examples from PCEEC in what follows, the orthography is as in the
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corpus. For examples from the 1425-1520 subcorpus, I provide "translations". Their purpose
is not to be perfect sentences of Present-Day English, but rather to help the reader unfamiliar
with Late Middle English to understand the structure and the meaning of the original
examples, so I often preserve the not-so-modern constructions of the original. Tags such as
CELY,223.142.3134 are from PCEEC, and uniquely identify the passage within the corpus.
The structure of a tag is as follows: CELY denotes the letter collection (in this case, the
Cely letters); 223 is the page number in the print edition of the collection; 142 is the number
of the letter in the collection; and 3134 is the number of the syntactic tree representing the
example in the corpus, starting from the beginning of the collection.
3.4.1 Modals under verbs of hoping in the 15th century: an
overview
The overall distribution of modals and finite forms under hope and trust in the 1425-
1520 subcorpus is given in Table 3.4.1. Non-modal complements are counted in the
columns nm subj and nm other. The nm subj column counts the examples where
the embedded verb is unambiguously in the form of the inflectional subjunctive. The
nm other column counts both the examples of the unambiguous indicative and those
with ambiguous forms (as we will see, this grouping is justified by the different roles
these two groups play in the dataset).
may might can must shall should I will would nm subj nm other ALL
1.2% 0.4% 0.4% 0% 45.6% 10.2% 120.7% 4.9% 8.9% 11.8% 100% (N=246)
Table 3.2: Complements of verbs of hoping, 1425-1520, PCEEC
The main features of this distribution are: 1) virtual absence of may, might, can,
and mote/must; 2) predominance of shall (and should); 3) a relatively high proportion
of unambiguous non-modal subjunctives. At least the first two features are not trivial,
as we can see from a comparison with the distribution of modals under attitude verbs
of asking, cf. Table 3.4.1, cited from [Castle et al., 2012I.8
8ICastle et al., 2012] reports the results of an investigation into the modal system under verbs of
asking, namely beseech, desire, labor, pray and request, in the same 411K-words 1425-1520 subcor-
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may might can must shall should will would nm all ALL
17.4% 3.7% 0% 0.4% 0.3% 7.0% 27.2% 7.0% 37.0% 100% (N=702)
Table 3.3: Complements of verbs of asking, 1425-1520, PCEEC (from
[Castle et al., 2012])
Consider the absence of may and mote first. In Old English, the complements
of both verbs of hoping and verbs of asking frequently contained *motan > modern
must, [Ogawa, 1989]. In particular, for verbs of asking, *motan was very common
when the matrix subject had the same reference with the embedded subject, who
usually was the beneficiary of the request. In the 1425-1520 segment of PCEEC,
in that type of context with verbs of asking, we largely find may and might, which
must have replaced *motan at some point. But in contrast to that, under verbs of
hoping *motan, though relatively frequent here in OE, was not replaced by may in
our 15th-century subcorpus. The absence of may is thus a significant fact about the
particular context of hoping attitudes.
For the second feature of the distribution, while shall is the most frequent modal
under verbs of hoping in our sample, it's almost absent from the complements of
verbs of asking. Both the complements of verbs of hoping and verbs of asking denote
desirable states of affairs, so there is no semantic explanation of such a large numerical
difference that readily suggests itself.
To understand the actual distribution of modals under verbs of hoping, we need
to looks more closely at individual examples rather than at the broad distributional
profile alone. The rest of this section will describe the distribution of different modal
verbs and the non-modal subjunctive under verbs of hoping in the 1425-1520 sub-
corpus. I will not systematically compare what we find in this type of context with
the distribution of those forms elsewhere in the language. Eventually that should be
done, but in the present work I restrict myself to describing as fully as possible what
we observe in this particular context.
pus of PCEEC. The data on verbs of hoping reported here and the data on verbs of asking from
[Castle et al., 20121 are thus directly comparable.
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3.4.2 will and would
When verbs of hoping have will in their complement, the embedded clause predomi-
nantly (48 out of 51 instances) has 2nd person and 3rd person animate subjects. In
most cases (44 out of 51), whether the desired situation described in the complement
will actually happen, is under the control of the addressee (as in 101 and 102) or the
embedded subject (as in 103).
(101) and allsoo John Delowppys sayd vnto Gyesbryght that he wold make ower as
myche mony yn thys martt as schull content the hole som off yowre byllys,
trustyng that 3owre masterschyppys wyll doo them as grett plesser
yn tyme to come, etc. CELY,190.136.2977
'and also John Deloupes said to Gyesbright that he wants to make over as
much money at this mart as shall pay off the whole sum of your bills, hoping
that your mastership will do them the same great pleasure in the future, etc.'
(102) but I trvst 3e wyl be pacient. PASTONI,150.041.1045
'but I hope you will be patient.'
(103) and be the tyme my lord hathe herde me I trust to good he wylle be my
good lorde, ho have yow, my good modyr, and alle yowrs yn hys one fyfull
kepeyng, STONOR,I,121.022.340
'and by the time my lord has heard me, I hope to God that he will be my
good lord; who [=God] may have you, my good mother, and all yours, in his
one faithful keeping'
Some examples deviate from this pattern; e.g., in 104 the embedded subject is not
animate (though the addressee has the control over the desired situation), and in 105
the control over whether the desired outcome will obtain is definitely not in human
hands. Thus the distributional generalizations regarding will have exceptions.
(104) I trust, thou I be fer fro yow, that jis lytyll byll this cold whedere, and
my erand wull make me and shew me present.
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STONOR,II, 117.098.1718
'I hope that even though I am far from you, this little letter Land my errand
will make me, in this cold weather, present (by you), and show me so.'
(105) I pray you se a fayre weder or ye take youre passage for onny haste, for the
weche I tryste to God Wyll Maryon and 3e wyll se that weder and
wynde be fayre. CELY,33.029.567
'I pray you see fair weather before you take your passage in any haste, for
which I trust to God Will Marion and you will see that the weather and wind
are fair.'
would appears to mostly function as the regular past tense of will, occurring under
a past-tense matrix clause. In some examples it also appears to convey additional
politeness, as in 106, when an expression of hope is in fact an indirect form of request.
(106) And this considered in your wise discrecion, I trost, my lord, thow here pris-
onyng were of oderes labore ye wuld help here; PASTON,I,81.025.481
'And this having being considered at your wise discretion, I hope, my lord,
that though her prisoning could have been done by another, you would help
her.'
Overall, will and would function in the sample as significantly restricted forms,
signalling that the situation described in the embedded clause requires an animate
agent's will to happen.
3.4.3 shall and should
The most frequent modal in the complements of verbs of hoping, shall, seems to be
an almost unmarked option in this context. It appears with the 2nd and 3rd person
animate subjects (where will also appears), with 1st person and inanimate subjects,
and with expletive it and there.
(107) and yf it lyke yowe to com on Thursday at nyght, <...> I trusty to God bat
3e schall so speke to myn husbonde, PASTON,II,436.467.11971
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'and if you'd like to come on Thursday at night, ... I hope to God that you
would be able to speak that way with my husband,'
Sometimes in examples with shall it is clear that the addressee has little control
over the matter. 107 is one such case: from the larger context it is clear that it is the
addressee who really needs the author's husband to speak to him, not the other way
round. However, it is hard to say with certainty whether there are examples where
the embedded subject or the addressee are assumed to have the control: there are
examples which can be interpreted this way, but I did not find any which had to be.
For example, in 108 the addressee should most probably have control over whether
he does anything to satisfy his correspondent, but it is possible that the author is
concerned not so much with the addressee's willingness to do the work, but rather
with whether it would be in fact possible to obtain the desired outcome given the
circumstances.
(108) <...> Walsyngham, whych y trust to God by your help shall be corryged.
PASTON,II, 191.352.9514
'Walsingham, which I hope to God will be corrected with your help.'
I do not find the present evidence to be enough to decide whether shall in this
context specifically conveyed that the matters depend on the circumstances rather
than on the will of the embedded subject and the addressee, or was a neutral modal
conveying something close to pure future, perhaps with a certain kind of implicature
based on the fact that a more restricted option like will was not used. Needless to say,
the third option, namely that in the speech of some people shall marked dependence
on external circumstances, while in the speech of others it was something like a pure
future marker, also cannot be ruled out.
The form should, as was the case with would, mostly functions as the past tense
form of shall. In addition to its sequence-of-tense uses, 109, should is also used in
irrealis consequents of conditionals as in 110. Note that should in that example
occurs embedded under a present-tense attitude verb, and yet bears "counterfactual"
morphology.
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(109) ffor in trowth I hadde will hopid that your horsis shulde a ben here as
bis night; STONORII,11.047.773
'for in truth I had well hoped that your horses would have been here that
night'
(110) And if ye comaund me so for to do, I trist I shuld sey nothyng to my
ladys displesure, but to youre profyt; PASTONI,666.229.6881
'And if you command me to do so, I hope I would say nothing to my lady's
displeasure, but [at the same time] only to your profit.'
Interestingly, while deontic interpretations could be sensible in some of the exam-
ples, I did not find any instance of should in this type of context where a deontic
reading would be the only one possible, or even the best one.
3.4.4 Non-modal forms except the unambiguous subjunctive
Complements with will and shall in them describe future situations. However, hopes
targeted at the present or the past are also possible, and when such hopes are reported,
we see non-modal complements. The finite verb in such cases in our sample is either
in the unambiguous indicative form, 111, or a form ambiguous between the indicative
and the subjunctive, 112.
(111) but I hope and trust verrayly be matier of his informacion is vntrewe.
PASTON,I,5.003.37
'But I very much hope that the content of his news is untrue.'
(112) <...> like as I have writon to you in a letter sent ouer at Shorfftyde, the whech
I truste ye have receyued / CELY,229.143.3150
'<...> like as I have written to you in a letter sent over at Shorfftyde, which
I hope you have received'
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3.4.5 Unambiguous inflectional subjunctive
22 out of the 51 non-modal complements in the subcorpus feature a verb in an un-
ambiguously subjunctive form. 21 of those 22 contain the same form be, and the
remaining one contains have.9 This is not too different from other non-modal com-
plements: out of the 17 cases where we have the unambiguous indicative, 14 feature
forms of be. Overall, there are only 4 non-modal complements, out of 51, that fea-
ture a finite verb other than be, have or do. However, once we look closely at the
unambiguous subjunctive examples, it becomes apparent that in addition to the "lex-
ical poverty", many of them (namely, 15 out of 22) contain relatively formulaic, and
almost ceremonial, expression of hopes pertaining to good health and recovery from
illness, 113-115. (I intentionally omit the exact translation of the subjunctive form
in these examples, in order to not smuggle my analysis.)
(113) Ryght reuerent Syr and my specyall frende, I recomaund me vnto you, euermor
deseyryng to her of yowre wellfare, for yt hat be sayd vnto vs her that ye hath
be sore seke, but Y trust to Good ye be now amended.
CELY,62.048.1041
'Right reverend Sir and my special friend, I recommend myself to you, con-
stantly asking to here of your welfare, for it had been said to us that you have
been very sick, but I hope to God that you _ _ _ now amended.'
(114) And yf it lyke you ser to her of my helthe, at the makyng of thys sympyll
letter I was in good helthe of bode, blessyd be Jhesu as I troste Pat ye be,
or I wold be ryght sorye. CELY,222.141.3108
'And if you'd like, sir, to hear about my health, at the making of this simple
letter I was of good health of body, blessed by Jesus, just as I hope you
or I would be very sorry.'
9The corresponding indicative forms would have been are or is (or forms corresponding to
those), and hab/has for have. For a concise introduction into the Middle English morphology,
cf. [Fulk, 20121.
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(115) Right worshipfull, in my most hartyest maner I commend me to you and
likewise to my good Mistres your wife, trusting to Jesus that you and all
your children and famila be in good health. PLUMPTO,242.109.1795
'Right worshipful [sir], in my most heartiest manner I recommend myself to
you and also to my good maistress your wife, hoping to Jesus that you and
all your children and familia - in good health.'
The three examples above all come from beginnings of letters, which in general
follow fairly formulaic templates. It should be noted, though, that such expression of
hopes is not a necessary part of those templates. For instance, 113 is from a letter
by William Maryon to George Cely, and we can compare it to 11 other letters by
the same author to George Cely or Richard Cely Jr, from the same collection. All of
those letters start with a self-recommendation, and in three of them, a simple self-
recommendation is followed by the phrase about being constantly eager to hear about
the recipients welfare. But only the one letter cited in 113 reports specifically a hope
regarding the good health of the recipient. This fits well with the general choices
made by William Maryon in his letters: they usually consist of very brief descriptions
of important matters of business. Apparently, it is only when the author heard about
a serious illness of the recipient that he spared significantly more space and time on
something not directly related to business as such. Thus even though expression of
hopes about good health is formulaic to some extent, it is not a necessary or fixed
part of the contemporary letter template. Examples 114 and 115 further support this
conclusion: while both sentences belong to the initial block of their respective letters,
they show that the exact content of the reported hope may vary.
Furthermore, there are some cases where a hope about good health with an un-
ambiguous subjunctive appears in the main part of the letter, as in 116, which closes
a long account of the author's brother's illness that describes in detail several days
that the author spent with him.
(116) and thusse I hope he be sauffe. PASTONI,498.157.4864
'and thus I hope he _ - _ cured.'
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Not all examples with the unambiguous subjunctive belong to this good-health
group, but the subjunctive in those that do not seems to have had little semantic
import, as can be seen in 117.
(117) Syr, I wndyrstonde be yowr letter that aull the whowlschypys ar cwm to Calles
sauyng vij, qwherof ij be spent. I trwste to God that the Crystowyr of
Rayname be cwm to Calleys be thys. CELY,126.099.2220
'Sir, I learned from your letter that all the wool-ships have come to Calais
except for seven, whereof two are wrecked. I hope to God that the Christopher
of Rayname has come to Calais by [the time you receive] this.'
Once we consider the pattern of use of the subjunctive in the language as a whole,
this concentration in hopes about good health requires attention. English has been
losing the subjunctive gradually, and in the 15th century, it was still widely used
in many kinds of contexts. Just in the examples above, we can observe subjunctive
forms such as be fayre in the complement of se 'see' in 105, and lyke in the if-clause in
114). What is surprising about the subjunctive's distribution under verbs of hoping is
the unusual focussed nature of the distribution: rather than occurring under hoping
attitudes across the board, the subjunctive was concentrated in utterances with a
single narrow communicative function. Such restriction of a grammatical form to a
narrow set of semi-fossilized contexts is generally a sign that the form is fading away.
It is worth stressing just how narrow the subjunctive's special niche was in the
considered data: not all hopes which may be taken to be ceremonial or formulaic
are expressed with the subjunctive. For instance, hopes about the recipient's "good
speed" (i.e. success) are not less formulaic than hopes regarding good health, but
nevertheless they are not expressed with the subjunctive, cf. 118 with modal shall.
(118) And I praye God sende yow as goode speede in kat mater as I wolde ye hadde,
and as I hope ye shall have er thys letter come to yow;
PASTON,I,501.161.4937
'And I pray that God sends you such success in that matter as I would like
you to have, and as I hope that you will have [success] before this letter comes
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to you;'
Taking those facts together, we may conclude that in the language of our 1425-
1520 sample, the subjunctive is likely on its way out of the system of hope reports:
the single kind of example where the subjunctive is still well entrenched is hopes
regarding the addressee's good health.
3.4.6 may, might and can
Turning to may and can, there are only 4 examples with may/might, and 1 example
with can in our 1425-1520 subcorpus. Three of those five clearly exhibit a dynamic
modal flavor: in 119 with can and 120 with may, the meaning is close to that of
internal ability, and in 121 with might, to that of circumstantial possibility (the past
tense of might is due to the sequence of tense).
(119) Cosyn, I trust that ye and all the jentilmen of the shire which have
had knowleche of myn lordys seruauntys kan sey that her-to-for they have
not ben of that disposicion to be lavas of theyr tvngys whan they had moore
cause of booldnes than they have nowe. PASTON,II,445.474.12057
'Cousin, I hope that you and all the gentlemen of the shire that knew my
lord's servants can say that up to now they have not been of the disposition
to say too much (lit. be wasteful with their tongues) when they had more
cause for boldness than they have now.'
(120) And as I conceiue to my grete comfort and gladnesse, my saide brothre is
wele recouered and amended, thanked be God, and soo I truste he may
nowe spare you. Wherupon I haue writen vnto him, if he may soo doo, to
licence you to come ouer vnto me ayen; PASTON,II,439.470.12026
'And as I understand to my great comfort and gladness, my brother mentioned
above is well recovered and cured, God be thanked, and so I hope he can now
do without you. Given that, I have asked to him, if he can do so, to let you
come over to me again;'
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(121) And sire, I was with my lady of Southfolke at this day hopyng that I myght
have hade hyre at sume leysyre that I myght a spokyn to hyr ffor the
money, but trwly sche was very besy to make hyre redy, ffor sche is redyne to
Cauntyrbery as this same day, STONOR,II,14.049.830
'And sir, I was with my lady of Suffolk at this day, hoping that I could have
her at some leisure so that I could speak to her about the money, but actually
she was very busy to make her ready, as she was riding to Canterbury that
same day,'
The remaining two examples, in 122 and 123, are less clear, and allow for different
interpretations. On the one hand, they could be taken to exhibit a circumstantial
possibility meaning. On the other, in both cases the hope report is given in the
context of a request, and the content of the hope is essentially the situation which
the speaker asks the addressee to create. In direct requests where the beneficiary
is themselves the requester, may is commonly used in the embedded clause in our
subcorpus, as found by [Castle et al., 2012]. So it could be that the choice of the
modal in the hope reports in 122 and 123 is influenced by the pragmatic role of an
indirect request that the sentence plays. Finally, for the particular example in 122 it
can also be argued that may in it has the permission meaning.
(122) I beseche your good fadyrhod that yt wylle plese yov to speke with the Abbot
of Dorchester that I may have suche fe as Marmyun had with hym with every
thyng acordyng as he had: for I trust thorov your good fadyrhod that I
may have hyt. STONOR,I,140.031.514
'I beseech your good fatherhood that it will please you to ask the Abbot of
Dorchester that I have such a fee as Marmyun had with him, with everything
just as he had: for I hope that through your good fatherhood I
have it.'
(123) I pray your good maistership to send to the shirreve that my seid kynnesman
may ben easid <...> and I hope, if God vouchsaf that the mater may come
to reson, to sauf hym harmles, <...> PASTON,II,86.282.8122
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'I ask your good mastership to send to the sherif [and ask him that] that
kinsman of mine were let out [from jail] <...> and I hope, God permit, that
the matter can be set right, to save him harmless, <...>'
The range of meanings that may/might and can could have in hope reports in
our subcorpus is not surprising: those are all normal meanings for those modals at
the time. We can use as a quantitative benchmark the study of [Gotti et al., 2002],
who classified about a thousand uses of may in.M3 and E3 subcorpora of the Helsinki
historical corpus of English, with the M3 subcorpus featuring texts from the period
of 1350-1420 (and thus immediately preceding the period we are considering in this
section), and the E3 subcorpus containing texts from 1640 to 1710. [Gotti et al., 2002,
p. 941 analyze 19% of the 677 instances of may in their 1350-1420 subcorpus as
conveying internal ability, and 53% as conveying circumstantial possibility. For the
1640-1710 subcorpus, they give the ratios of 6% for internal ability, and 35% for
circumstantial possibility. Furthermore, the innovative meaning of deontic possibility,
or permission, is counted at 6%.
Extrapolating from [Gotti et al., 20021's data, we can conclude that in our sub-
corpus containing texts from 1425 to 1520, may's distributional profile in terms of
shares of particular modal flavors is very close to that of can in Present-Day English
(for the latter, see [Coates, 1983, p. 861).
Despite that semantic similarity, there is a vast discrepancy between the present-
day rates of the use of can under hope, and the use of may in our 1425-1520 sample.
For the present-day distribution, we can use the following estimates. Table 3.4.6 is
based on the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), covering 1990-
2012, with 450M words. The table provides the number of occurrences of strings
"hope", "hopes", "hoped" followed by the strings "can", "will", "'11", and "shall", within
a 5-word right window. Not all of those examples would feature a genuine modal em-
bedded under verb hope, but a brief examination shows that the sought constructions
are frequent enough among the results that we can use the obtained frequencies as
decent estimates.
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11 hope, hopes, hoped
can 2890
will 9348
'll 1690
shall 28
TOTAL 13956
Table 3.4: Estimates of can vs. future markers in COCA (1990-2012)
Table 3.4.6 provides the results of identical searches within the Corpus of Amer-
ican Soap Operas (CASO), covering 2000-2012, with 100M words. In that corpus,
consisting of scripted dialogues intended to imitate everyday speech, the prevalence
of can is even higher than in the multi-genre COCA.
hope, hopes, hoped
can 2505
will 1345
'll 1306
shall 3
TOTAL 13956
Table 3.5: Estimates of can vs. future markers in CASO (2001-2012)
If we now compare the present-day data with the similar data from the 15th
century provided in the same format, the difference becomes apparent:
PCEEC 1425-1520 COCA 1990-2012 CASO 2001-2012
can/may may: 2% can: 21% can: 49%
will, shall, 'll 98% 79% 51%
Table 3.6: 15-century may vs. present-day can under verbs of hoping
NB: The figures for COCA and CASO are estimates.
One might try to argue that perhaps the difference in usage between the two
periods is due to some difference in what kind of hopes were expressed by the speakers
of the time. But that does not seem to be likely, as a considerable number of examples
from our subcorpus that does not feature may or can may be rendered into Present-
Day English with can:
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(124) I tryste to God ye schall com home to London or Crystemese.
CELY,65.050.1088
'I hope you can come home to London before Christmas.'
(125) Iff she be my verry goode ladye, as she hathe seyde hertoffore bat she wolde
be, I hope bat she wolle speke wyth hym. PASTONI,453.142.4417
'If she is my very good lady, as she said before that she'd like to be, I hope
that she can speak with him.'
I am not arguing here that the Present-Day English renderings in 124 and 125
have exactly the same meanings as the 15-century examples: I do not think they
do. Yet in the discourse situation where the 15-century examples were used, my
renderings with can in 124 and 125 would serve the speaker's intentions reasonably
well. Yet we only see possibility modals under verbs of hoping very infrequently in
PCEEC 1425-1520. We cannot predict that fact from the compositional semantics
alone: some other factors must be at play as well:
(126) Insufficiency of the compositional semantics:
The absence of may from the complements of hoping in PCEEC 1425-1520 is
due to a non-semantic factor.
To sum up, there are two significant facts about may under verbs of hoping in
the 15th-century subcorpus of PCEEC: first, the modal is almost absent from that
context, and second, as a comparison with Present-Day English shows, the absence
of may cannot be explained merely on the basis of the range of its meanings and the
semantics of hoping attitudes. Some further extra-semantic factors must have caused
the modal's absence.
What can such factors be? It is possible that the force at play here is the simple
inertia of use. The grammar creates a wide space of possibilities for language users,
and we have no reason to believe that may was grammatically ruled out under verbs
of hoping - in fact, we do observe some such occurrences. But language users are not
required to exhaust all the possibilities provided by the grammar at the same rate. In
particular, it is conceivable that speakers would use frequently only those expressions
124
that are either heard frequently, or else are highly preferable due to some pragmatic
factors. But if a compositionally possible expression is neither, we can easily not
see it used very often. In the next section, however, we will see a synchronic slice
of Early Modern English where may became a relatively frequent modal under hope,
and after that, I will suggest what change could have led both to the increase of may's
frequency under hope, and to the creation of the may-under-hope construction with
elevated flavor and without the usual existential semantic contribution by the modal.
3.5 Modals under verbs of hoping in the 17th cen-
tury
In the data from a second subcorpus of [PCEEC, 2006] that I examined, covering the
period of 1630-1681, and containing about 356K words,10 the modal and non-modal
complements of verbs of hoping are distributed as follows:
may might can must shall should will would nm subj nm other ALL
7.5% 1.2% 0.9% 0% 12.1% 1.7% 47.0% 2.0% 0% 27.7% 100% (N=347)
Table 3.7: Complements of verbs of hoping, 1630-1681, PCEEC
Comparing the data in Table 3.5 to the 15-century data in Table 3.4.1, we can
note the following major changes: 1) in the second half of the 17th century the role of
the most frequent modal was taken over by will, while in the 15th century it belonged
l0The subcorpus included the following collections of [PCEEC, 20061: The Works of Sir Thomas
Browne, letters (21K) [Keynes, 1964], The Conway Letters (58K) [Marjorie Hope Nicolson, 1992],
The Correspondence of Thomas Corie (5K) [Hill, 1956], The Correspondence of Bishop Duppa
and Sir Isham (28K) [Isham, 1951], The Correspondence of Arthur Capel, Earl of Essex (25K)
[Pike, 1913], The Flemings in Oxford (40K) [Magrath, 1904], The Correspondence of the Family of
Haddock (6K) [Thompson, 1965], The letters of Andrew Marvell (11K) [H. M. Margoliouth, 1971],
The letters between Charles II and his sister Henrietta (8K) [Norrington, 1996], The Let-
ters of Dorothy Osborne to William Temple (71K) [Smith, 1959], The letters of Samuel
Pepys and his family circle (42K) [Heath, 1955], The Petty-Southwell correspondence (22K)
[Marquis of Lansdowne, 1967], (8K) [Thompson, 1875], The Tixall letters (12K) [Clifford, 1815].
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to shall; 2) the unambiguous inflectional subjunctive completely disappeared from
hope reports; and 3) may/might, unlike in the 15 century, were used in a significant
share of the complements of hoping attitudes.
3.5.1 will and shall
In the 15-century subcorpus, will was mostly restricted to 2nd person and 3rd person
animate subjects, but shall was close to being a default form, being used with all
kinds of subjects. In the 1630-1681 subcorpus, the situation is changed: shall is
mostly restricted to 1st person subjects (37 out of 42 instances), while will never
occurs with a 1st person subject. The two modals thus almost reach a complementary
distribution. Besides the restrictions on their subjects, there seems to be no significant
distributional restrictions put on either modal. For instance, 127 and 128 illustrate
that both shall and will may be used in hope reports that pragmatically serve as
requests, and 129 and 130 both feature hopes about circumstances which the speaker
has little control over.
(127) and I hope I shall heare of your health by the next Poste.
CONWAY,57.011.338
(128) I hope you will acquaint none but my sister with my wife's concernment,
CONWAY,153.029.935
(129) I hope when our Case of Clay is broaken by Naturall Death, Wee shall no
longer peep through its Craks and Cranyes, but then look round about us
freely, and see cleerely the things which wee now do but grope after.
PETTY,10.003.66
(130) But I hope all these rugged paths will best conduct me to my Journeyes end.
PETTY,88.046.1194
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3.5.2 Non-modal non-subjunctive forms
Non-modal non-subjunctive complements in the 1630-1681 subcorpus perform more
or less the same function as they did in the 15-century corpus: they are used when
the content of a hope is a past or present situation rather than a future one. 131 and
132 are representative examples.
(131) Sir - I wrot you the 24 th of December by my Lord Arlingtons special order,
and doe hope it came safe to you. CORIE,30.009.108
(132) but hearing that he getts the better of them in the House of Lords, I hope he
is in no great danger, CONWAY,447.087.2533
In rare cases, a present-tense non-modal form may be oriented towards the future,
as in 133 and 134, though a modal form should have been just as appropriate. It is
hard to see any semantic import of the use of a finite form instead of a modal in these
examples.
(133) I hope you find some Company with whom you may delight to Con-
vers; BROWNE,201.048.940
(134) Kind Unckle I rec-d y' letter and the 20' shillings yU sent me, my Tutor
likewise the ten pounds, for which I hope, y' expect noe other recompence
then dutifull obedience, and a gratefull mind, which I haue had, haue,
and will god willing retaine to the end. FLEMING,111.024.391
3.5.3 The absence of the subjunctive
The main difference between the non-modal complements of verbs of hoping in the
15th and the 17th subcorpora of PCEEC is the complete disappearance of the inflec-
tional subjunctive in the later one. While in the 15-century subcorpus 8.9% examples
featured an unambiguous subjunctive, in the 1630-1681 subcorpus there are no such
examples whatsoever.
Hopes about good health, in which the subjunctive was so frequent in the 15th
century, are still used in the 17th century. But with the disappearance of the sub-
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junctive, its role has been taken up by other, non-specialized forms. Thus some of
hopes about good health feature an indicative lexical verb, 135, while others, a modal,
136. As the forms used are no longer specialized for this context, hopes about health
do not form a distinguished category anymore. For instance, in 137 we see a hope
concerning the addressee's health and his chariot at the same time.
(135) Soe hopeing that you are all well and with my duty to your selfe, and my
loue to my brothers and sisters I rest S' Your dutifull Son, Henry Fleming.
FLEMING,266.101.1691
(136) and I hope in God that you will now recover your health
CONWAY,265.069.1965
(137) I hope your health and chariot too will be settled in that due proportion and
improvement as either you or Sir John Werden can covet.
PETTY,54.027.741
3.5.4 can
With only 3 occurrences out of the 347 complements of verbs of hoping in the sub-
corpus, can remains a very rare modal in this context. When it is used, it has the
expected meaning of internal ability or circumstantial possibility (those two may be
hard to distinguish, as, e.g., in 138 which could be construed as either).
(138) and therefore I am the more desirous to presse you to a constant correspon-
dance, as well because your letters will make a cheif part of my entertainment
there as because it will be an argument that I am retained in your memory,
in which I shold be loath to loose a place, if I may hope you can continue
your favour to one that so little knowes to meritt it, at so great a
distance. CONWAY,191.040.1209
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3.5.5 may
Unlike in the 15-century subcorpus where it was almost absent, may (together with
might) is used in 8.6% of cases in the 1630-1681 subcorpus." Semantically, examples
with may do not form a single "focused" group, exhibiting instead a wide range of
meanings for the modal. 139 illustrates the meaning of circumstantial possibility (and
features the past-tense form might apparently agreeing with the past-tense form could
from the higher clause). In 140, the modal can be interpreted as conveying either
circumstantial possibility or perhaps epistemic possibility. In 141, the modal might
have been a genuine deontic, or perhaps a less semanticized instance of may in an
indirect request having the form of a hope report.
(139) and in Earnest if I could hope it might ever bee in my power to serve
him I would promise somthing for my self; OSBORNE,76.034.1765
(140) I hope travayling and taking the fresh ayre and surceasing some time from my
studyes, may recruitt my spiritts so much and chauff the mass of my blood
that this coolness and obstructedness of my arme may be dissipated,
CONWAY,208.048.1446
(141) Dearest Unkle, I hope now I may venter to say something for myself.
TIXALL,59.022.406
Despite the difficulty of confidently assigning the modal to a single semantic cat-
egory in each of these examples and others like them in the sample, it should be
clear from 139-141 that in our 1630-1681 dataset may in the complements of verbs
of hoping can have a range of modal flavors. That range is mostly the same as the
range the modal is known to exhibit in the language as a whole at that time.
However, what is unexpected given the semantics of the modal in other contexts
is may's contribution in 10 examples (out of the total 30) that feature a precursor of
the Present-Day English construction in 87 and 88:
"[Visser, 1973, §1678] implies that may was once very frequent under hope, and then replaced in
later English by will and non-modal forms. Our data show that actually there was never a stage
when may was more frequent than will or non-modal forms.
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(142) But I hope in time your Ladiship may at least recover to that measure
of health you had before you went into Ireland. CONWAY,231.062.1811
(143) I hope y' our next interview may be with the greater ioy and comfort.
HADDOCK,1.001.6
Three of these examples, including 142, describe hopes regarding someone's good
health. The other seven, including 143, concern other subjects, but exhibit at least
some degree of ceremoniality/elevatedness: they not only report a hope, but seem to
do it in a solemn and relatively formal way. Determining whether a given hope report
belongs to that category or not involves a judgement call, and it should be stressed
that a different analyst may have marked more or less examples out of the sample
of 30 as belonging to this semantic group. But while my analysis of any individual
example may be questionable, I believe that the very existence of such a category of
cases in the data is hardly disputable.
3.6 Hypothesis: may replaced the subjunctive in el-
evated hopes about good health
Consider the following differences between the 15th and the 17th century distributions
of modals in the complements of hoping attitudes:
(144) Some of the changes in the complements of hoping attitudes:
15th century mid-17th century
may is almost absent may is prominent
the subjunctive is prominent the subjunctive is completely absent
the subjunctive is used in elevated may is used in elevated hopes, includ-
hopes about good health ing hopes about good health
I propose a hypothesis which takes the changes in 144 to be related to each other.
In short, I propose that may became prominent under verbs of hoping thanks to its
taking over the function that the subjunctive performed - that of signaling that an
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elevated hope about a serious matter is being expressed. A more detailed form of the
proposal is as follows:
(145) The good-health hypothesis for may under hope:
Stage 1. The subjunctive has almost disappeared from under verbs of hoping.
It is only retained in hopes about good health.
Stage 2. The subjunctive dies out completely in that context. However, the
speakers still perceive the need to use distinctive marking for the category
of hopes about good health formerly expressed with the subjunctive. They
choose may as the marker of an elevated, ceremonial hope about good health.
The distributional replacement is the primary change, and the lexical mean-
ing of the modal gets deduced by the speakers based on the meaning of the
construction as a whole (cf. "meaning equations" of [Eckardt, 2006]). The re-
constructed meaning for the modal in this syntactic context does not contain
existential quantification over worlds as the construction as a whole does not.
Stage 3. The elevated construction with non-quantificational may generalizes
its meaning from hopes about good health to all high-register hopes about
serious matters. At the same time, the rise of may under hope with special
semantics makes it easier for the speakers to use all semantic variants of may
in that syntactic context, leading to an across-the-board rise in prominence,
bringing about the distribution of the mid-17th century.
In the data, we observe directly Stage 1 and the end result of Stage 3. Stage 2
was not directly registered in the data we discussed above. Moreover, to cut a long
story (to be told below) short, at the moment there is no solid evidence either for
or against that stage's actual existence. Therefore 145 remains a hypothesis at this
point. In what follows, I will discuss why the individual components of the hypothesis
are plausible, and what kind of evidence is lacking in order to prove or disprove it.
First, consider the disappearance of the subjunctive. As English has been los-
ing distinctions between inflectional endings, the subjunctive was gradually fading
out from the language. The story of the loss of the subjunctive is complicated: it
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is not that certain inflectional forms disappeared from all syntactic contexts across
the board. Instead, the loss happened at different times for different syntactic envi-
ronments. For example, Old English used the subjunctive in matrix questions like
"Whether your mother be not the said Mary", but, as [Visser, 1973, §854] observes,
it has been losing its frequency throughout the Middle English period, and virtually
died out by the end of it, replaced by the indicative and by modal constructions with
shall. On the other hand, the subjunctive in matrix wishes and prayers, not restricted
to fossils like "Long live the kind", has still been used in the times of Shakespeare,
and even beyond, with a number of different verbs, cf. [Visser, 1973, 841], though
generally the function of the subjunctive in such wishes and prayers has been taken
over by may. The bottom line is, the subjunctive has been losing ground for many
centuries, and we currently have little understanding of why it was lost in a particular
syntactico-semantic context at that particular time." So while we do not know why
the subjunctive disappeared from under verbs of hoping between the 15th and the
mid-17th centuries, we can take its disappearance to be a fact that was likely caused
by some independent reason.
Second, why should the speakers of Early Modern English use may to replace the
disappearing subjunctive, especially given that it required them to construct a special
semantic variant for the modal? The partial answer for that is that English speakers
used may to replace the subjunctive many times, in different contexts. I will use
several examples described by [Visser, 1973] to illustrate:' 3
(146) may replacing the subjunctive in different contexts:
a. Matrix wishes and prayers
e The subjunctive: Old English through the 17th century, and in iso-
"For the subjunctive in Present-Day English, see the detailed description in [Chiba, 19871; in
particular, pp. 3-4 contain the most extensive list of modern verbs, adjectives and nouns that at
least sometimes allow subjunctive complements.
13One should be cautious using Visser's conclusions, as they come from the pre-corpus era when it
was prohibitively hard to test rigorously statements about the rise and disappearance of particular
forms, cf. fn. 11 above. Still, Visser's data serves as a useful first approximation.
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lated fossils after that, [Visser, 1973, §841]
* may: isolated examples in Middle English, well-established since the
16th century, [Visser, 1973, §1680]
b. Concessive clauses (without a concessive conjunction)
" The subjunctive: "with great frequency in all periods, with the ex-
ception of Present-Day English", [Visser, 1973, §884]
" may: starting in the 14th century, [Visser, 1973, §16661
c. Relative clauses "with final import" (e.g., "to find a salve which may her
life preserve")
" The subjunctive: common in Old English and Middle English, but no
examples after Shakespeare, [Visser, 1973, §876]
" may: examples throughout all the periods, including Early and Late
Modern English, [Visser, 1973, §1677]
As we can see from 146, it was not unusual for the fading out subjunctive to be
replaced by may. That replacement could happen at different times in the history
of the language, and at different pace in different contexts. Given that in a number
of contexts the subjunctive and may coexisted, performing the same function, and
hence presumably with similar semantics, for centuries, the affinity between the two
forms must have been evident to the speakers who, of course, often would not have
known about the history of non-current replacements. Summing up, it is not unusual
in itself that the speakers may have chosen may to replace the subjunctive in hope
reports.
Third, even though may could replace the subjunctive, so could other forms:
must, shall, and the indicative. So we need to explain why it was may that, by
hypothesis, took over the niche for expressing hopes about good health. Once we
recall the distribution of those other forms in the 15th century data we discussed,
the choice of may appears natural. As for shall and the indicative, they already were
very prominent, unmarked forms under verbs of hoping, and thus their expansion
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into hopes about good health would have erased the markedness of the construction.
If the speakers wanted to preserve that markedness, they had to choose a different
replacement form. may was a good choice precisely because it was very rare in the
context, and thus could easily serve as a marked form. As for must, though it could
replace the subjunctive in a few constructions, its successes in that belong to Late
Middle English at the latest. In fact, in matrix wishes must, having gained prominence
at the expense of the subjunctive in the Middle English period, has been being ousted
from the context by may since the 15th century, [Visser, 1973, §16921. Even more
strikingly, [Castle et al., 20121 report that in the 15th-century part of PCEEC, must
has virtually disappeared from the complements of verbs of asking, replaced by may,
even though must was frequent in that context earlier. In other words, out of may
and must as candidates for replacing the subjunctive, may was clearly the winner,
while must was a form that itself was on the retreat in such contexts.
Fourth, if may replaced the subjunctive distributionally, the speakers would have
had to both recover the semantics for the modal from the semantics of the whole
construction, as in an algebraic equation one solves for the x (using the metaphor
by [Eckardt, 20061). The creation of a new semantic variant may then be explained:
the non-quantificational meaning of may didn't have to be obtained through direct
transformation of its quantificational meaning, which then allowed the modal to enter
the new context. Indeed, if the acquisition of the non-quantificational meaning were
the driving force behind may entering hope reports, we would not expect the modal
to enter only into that type of contexts. There are plenty of places in the language
into which you can insert an almost truth-conditionally empty item. On the other
hand, if the primary element of the change was a change in surface distributions
with may replacing the subjunctive specifically under verbs of hoping, we do not
necessarily expect the new meaning to expand beyond that. Newly created lexical
items may often expand their distribution, of course, but in order for them to do
that, there must be some factor favoring them over the older forms of expression. In
the case of a nearly empty item entering a particularly restricted type of contexts,
it is apparently not so easy to have factors favoring its expansion. Summing up, the
134
good-health hypothesis laid out in 145 explains why the highly irregular variant of
may we observe under hope could have arisen.
It should be stressed that our proposal explains well the following synchronic fact
of Present-Day English. When [Portner, 1997] discussed non-quantificational may,
he argues that non-quantificational may in matrix wishes and under attitude verbs
such as pray and hope have different semantics. If such special variants are created
when the speakers solve semantic equations for the context-specific meaning of may,
such differences are expected. But if not, we need a separate account of why the
regular may could give rise to different non-productive non-quantificational variants
in different linguistic contexts.
Finally, the modern elevated flavor of the may-under-hope construction, under our
hypothesis, is directly inherited from the subjunctive that the non-quantificational
variant of may replaced.
The strong points of our "good-health hypothesis" are thus as follows: it explains
several changes in the complements of hoping attitudes as related to each other rather
than coincidental; the replacement of the subjunctive by may is a plausible develop-
ment, as the same replacement occurred in other contexts as well, and as the two
forms would likely be in synchronic variation in some contexts at the time of change
within hope reports; under the hypothesis, it is explained how a special semantic
variant of may was created, and why the construction has solemn, elevated flavor in
the present-day use.
But there is one big weak point to the hypothesis as well: we do not have imme-
diate evidence that the special variant of may directly replaced the subjunctive in
hopes about good health. There is no evidence against such a development either,
but a direct confirmation would be desired in order to declare the hypothesis proven
rigorously.
The best possible type of evidence would be to find specific individuals who ear-
lier in their lives used the subjunctive, but then switched to using may in hopes
about good health. The next best thing would be finding a family or another
tightly-knit circle of authors which show the same progression from the subjunctive
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to may across generations, with younger authors switching to the innovative form.
(Cf. [Raumolin-Brunberg, 2005] for an example of how one may find such kind of
evidence.)
Unfortunately, the data in [PCEEC, 2006] do not seem to include either of those.
In the early part of the corpus that formed our 1425-1520 sample, I did not find
any instances of may used in a good-health hope. Of course, the change may have
happened later, but an examination of may under verbs of hoping in the slightly later
letters from the 16th century in the corpus did not provide me with such examples
either: a subcorpus of letter collections from the second quarter of the 16th century
(210K words) only featured one instance of may. The next temporal slice of PCEEC
covering the 2nd half of the 16th century (387K words) had 11 instances of may, but
none of them was in a hope report regarding good health. If anything, the propo-
sitional content of those hope reports featured situations beneficial for the authors
and their circles in a greater or equal measure than for the recipient, so the kind
of may used in them might be closer to may under verbs of asking rather than to
the subjunctive of the hopes about good health, so it is not obvious that those data
disprove the hypothesis.
The fact that the data from PCEEC are not helpful may have extra-linguistic
reasons: the 1425-1520 material and the later 16-century material may be not di-
rectly comparable. The earlier letter collections mostly belong to families and family
circles of reasonably, but not spectacularly well-off individuals, such as local gentry
or prominent merchants. But a considerable portion of texts in which we find may
under verbs of hoping in the late 16th-century part of the corpus belong to a very
different social environment: 5 out of 11 are from the correspondence of queens, kings,
and their close kin. Perhaps examining a larger array of texts, and thus increasing
the number of hope reports considered, may give us a more accurate picture of the
early stages of the rise of may in this context. Unfortunately, there are not very
many letter collections survived from the relevant time period, so it might be hard to
enlarge the size of the sample without considering other text types. And using texts
of different types might lead to new problems, as the text type and genre may affect
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the language used.
Yet another uncertainty concerns the dialectal status of the group of good-health
hopes: while they appear in the letters of several different authors (rather than of
a single person), the bulk of the 15th-century examples come from just two letter
collections, each associated with a single family and its circle. Using just PCEEC, we
cannot tell how representative the usage of those two collections was.
Once we consider those and other uncertainties which our data do not resolve, it
is easy to see that there are very many possible sequences of events that could have
happened. In some of those possible scenarios, the good-health hypothesis is verified,
in others, falsified. For instance, suppose that the subjunctive was largely restricted
to hopes about good health only in certain dialectal areas, and furthermore, that in
those areas may indeed replaced the subjunctive. The question then is whether the
literary language inherited the may-underhope construction from those dialects, or
rather it was lost, and the present-day construction has another source. A rough list
of issues for future research may be compiled:
" What was the geographical /social range of the good-health hope construction
with the inflectional subjunctive?
" Was the good-health subjunctive directly replaced by may in any variety of
Early Modern English?
" Were the first instances of non-quantificational may under verbs of hoping from
the good-health-hope group or not, in any variety of Early Modern English?
Those questions are much more specific than any questions about the develop-
ment of may under verbs of hoping that we could have formulated a priori, without
examining the actual data.
3.7 Conclusion
The present chapter aimed to achieve three different goals. On the purely descriptive
level, it describes the modal system in the complements of verbs of hoping in two sub-
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corpora of [PCEEC, 2006], one covering roughly 1425-1520, and another, 1630-1681.
This description may then be compared to similar descriptions of the modal system in
other syntactic or semantic contexts. As the results from [Castle et al., 2012] show,
different attitude contexts may feature very different distributional profiles of modals,
and the eventual goal would be to explain where exactly those differences stem from.
In particular, one will need to determine which of the differences across contexts may
be explained on the basis of the synchronic semantics and syntax alone, and which
require appealing to some usage-based, frequency-sensitive explanations.
Second, I have shown through a comparison between the 15th-century data and
present-day data on modals under verbs of hoping that the empirical distribution of
a group of items sometimes cannot be explained on the basis of semantic facts alone.
The example I use to show this is the near-absence of may from hope reports in the 15-
century. There are no semantic constraints against such usage: the semantics of may
at the time was very close to the present-day semantics of can, and yet in Present-Day
English, can is common under hoping attitudes, while in the 15th century, may was
almost absent from that context. Furthermore, as may was not completely banned
from that context, there is no reason to think there existed any syntactic rule against
the combination.
Finally, I put forward a new hypothesis about how may under verbs of hoping
could have grown prominent and developed the special lexical variant featured in
modern examples such as 87 and 88. The proposed good-health hypothesis ties the
rise of may to the loss of the inflectional subjunctive in the context, and explains
the creation of the non-productive non-quantificational variant of may restricted to
hope reports as the result of a semantic analysis that speakers performed on the
whole construction with may that preserved the interpretational import of the earlier
construction with the subjunctive.
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Chapter 4
Variable-force modals in Old and
Middle English
The ancestor of the Present-Day English (PDE) necessity modal must, Old English
(OE) modal *motan, was not a necessity modal.' Historical linguists commonly
describe OE *motan and Middle English (ME) *moten as ambiguous between a pos-
sibility and a necessity reading: when they try to identify which modal force OE
*motan/ME *moten has in individual examples in the historical texts, they conclude
that the possibility reading fits, but the necessity one doesn't, or vice versa. Possi-
bility is believed to have been predominant in Early Old English, and necessity, to
have become predominant at some point during the Middle English period. It is only
by the late 15th-early 16th century that ME *moten/Early Modern English must
becomes a pure necessity modal that it is today.2
'The star in *motan and *moten indicates that the form cited is reconstructed rather than
directly observed: there are no instances of the infinitive of the modal in either OE or ME.
The orthography of OE and ME shows significant variation, and I use the following convention
throughout the paper. When referring to OE and ME lexemes, I use the primary dictionary form
from [Bosworth and Toller, 1898] and [MED, 2002], respectively. However, when citing a particular
form from a specific example, I use the same orthography as in the example. Thus in the main text
I write weork for the lexeme, but wyrne when referring to the instance of that same word in 153.
2The project reported in this chapter has benefitted from discussions with Cleo Condoravdi,
Antonette diPaolo Healey, Daniel Donoghue, Regine Eckardt, Kai von Fintel, Olga Fischer, Mar-
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I propose a different account of the semantic evolution of *motan/ *moten/must.
On the basis of a primary analysis of Early OE *motan in the Alfredian prose, I
argue that around the late 9th century it was an unambiguous modal with a meaning
different from either that of pure possibility or that of pure necessity. Instead, it
was an instance of what may be descriptively called variable-force modality. Due
to the lack of a perfect correlate in modern English, both possibility and necessity
modals may be used to render *motan in modern translations, creating the impression
of ambiguity where there is none in the source language. A similar phenomenon
exists in several languages of the North-American Pacific Northwest, where recent
fieldwork uncovered variable-force modals with analogous behavior in St'at'imcets
([Rullmann et al., 20081), Gitksan ([Peterson, 20101) and Nez Perce ([Deal, 20111).
The meaning I propose for Early OE *motan, however, is different from any of those
proposed for the Pacific Northwest modals: I argue that in the Alfredian prose, a
statement of the form motan(p) 1) asserted that situation p is an open possibility,
and 2) presupposed that if p is an open possibility, then that possibility will get
actualized.
Primary analysis of ME *moten in the so-called 'AB language' shows that in the
Early Middle English period, the situation changes: in Ancrene Wisse (2nd quarter
of the 13th century), *moten is often used as a pure-necessity modal, though non-
necessity uses also occur. Unlike the unambiguous Early OE *motan, Early ME
*moten cannot be assigned a single meaning. Its main pure-necessity readings are
tin Hackl, Irene Heim, Sabine Iatridou, Ian MacDougall, Lisa Matthewson, Paul Portner, Katrina
Przyjemski, Donca Steriade, Sali Tagliamonte, and Elizabeth Traugott. Earlier stages of this work
were presented at University of Ottawa, Georgetown University, Rutgers University, NYU, at the
workshop on Systematic Semantic Change at UT Austin, and at SALT at UC Santa Cruz. Needless
to say, the work enormously benefitted from the comments made there.
Without the York-Toronto-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Old English prose (YCOE) and the
Penn Parsed Corpus of Early Middle English (PPCEME), it would have become close to im-
possible to create the samples used in this chapter. The extensive commentary to Boethius in
[Godden and Irvine, 20091 was of great help in identifying the correspondences between the Latin
original and the OE translation for that book.
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those of circumstantial necessity and of moral necessity. Non-pure-necessity uses
occur in wishes and in permission/open-possibility statements. Those types of uses
differ too much to be covered by a single uniform meaning, so the ME *moten can only
be analyzed as genuinely ambiguous between 0 (possibility) and El (necessity). As
the different readings are distinguished from each other by a number of features other
than the modal force, it remains possible for the addressee to recover the intended
meaning.
While both Early OE *motan and Early ME *moten may be rendered by possi-
bility and necessity modals of Present-Day English, in the former case it is due to
inadequate resources of the target language, and in the latter, to genuine ambiguity
in Middle English. The findings about Early OE *motan and Early ME *moten thus
add two diachronically connected datapoints to the typology of variable-force modals.
Early OE features a true, unambiguous variable-force modal. Early ME features a
modal synchronically ambiguous between pure-necessity and non-necessity readings.
Moreover, a system of the first kind may develop into a system of the second kind
over time.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.1 briefly reviews the literature
on the semantics of OE *motan and ME *moten. Section 4.2 describes the distribu-
tion of Early OE *motan in the Alfredian prose, and argues that the modal in the
language of those texts asserted the openness of a possibility, and presupposed that
if that possibility were given a chance to actualize, it would. That presupposition
is then shown to create the variable-force effect observed for Alfredian *motan. Sec-
tion 4.3 compares Alfredian variable-force *motan with the variable-force modals of
the Pacific Northwest, and concludes that empirically, the Alfredian OE modal was
a different creature. Section 4.4 shows that in Early Middle English, *moten, the
direct descendant of OE *motan, was ambiguous between necessity and non-necessity
meanings. Section 4.5 concludes.
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4.1 Earlier accounts of the semantics of Old English
*motan and Middle English *moten
The Oxford English Dictionary [OED, 20021 lists OE *rnotan under motevi with
"possibility or permission" as the first meaning, and "necessity or obligation" as the
second one. For both meanings, the earliest OED examples are from Beowulf, one of
the earliest Old English texts of substantial length: 3
(147) Listed under OED sense 1, "expressing possibility or permission":
Gif he us geunnan wile, bait we hine swa godne gretan moton.
if he us grant will that we him so good greet mot.PRS.PL
'If he will grant to us that we moton greet him, the good one.'
(148) Listed under OED sense 2, "expressing necessity or obligation":
(Beo:347)
Londrihtes mot bare magburge monna oghwylc idel
of.landright mot.PRS.IND.3SG of.that kin of.men each idle
hweorfan.
wander
'Every man of that kin mot wander without the rights of the rightful resi-
dents.'
(Beo:2886)
It is easy to see what logic is behind the characterization of 147 as an example
where *motan conveys possibility, and of 148 as one where it conveys necessity. If we
substitute moton in 147 with modern 0-modal may or can, the example makes sense,
but if we use have to or must, the result does not sound very natural to the modern
ears:
3I aim to minimize by-morpheme glosses, and to use wordforms of modern English whenever
possible. For modals other than *motan I provide the modern descendant of the modal in the
gloss, even though in many cases the modern modal is no longer capable of expressing the meaning
conveyed by the OE ancestor. In translations, I aim to keep the structure of the sentence close to
that of the original example, at the expense of naturalness from the point of view of Present-Day
English. I leave *motan untranslated, in order not to smuggle my analysis into the translations.
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(149) a. OK 'If he will grant to us that we may/can greet him'
b. * 'If he will grant to us that we must/have to greet him'
But if we apply the same substitutions to mot in 148, the pattern is the opposite,
150: the passage from which this sentence is taken describes a disastrous situation
after the death of Beowulf, with many terrible things for "that kin" which just became
inevitable. In that context, simply being able to wander without rights is clearly not
what the speaker is talking about.
(150) a. * 'Every man of that kin may/can wander without the rights of the
rightful residents.'
b. OK 'Every man of that kin must/has to wander without the rights of the
rightful residents.'
Thus viewed from the perspective of the modern English modal system, the
meanings of *motan in 147 and 148 appear irreconcilably different, and the modal,
ambiguous between 0 and E. This position is shared by the historical dictionar-
ies of English other than the OED. For example, the standard Old English dictio-
nary [Bosworth and Toller, 1898]' lists "to be allowed, may, mote" as sense I for OE
*motan, and "to be obliged, must" as sense II. (A smaller number of examples is
listed under sense II than under sense I both in the original dictionary and in its
supplement [Toller, 1921].) The Middle English Dictionary [MED, 2002] lists a wide
range of both possibility and necessity senses for ME *moten, but the number of
necessity examples recorded in [MED, 2002] for this later period is greater that that
of possibility examples. Moreover, there are very few possibility examples from the
15th century recorded in [MED, 2002].
The near-consensus view on the semantics of OE *motan and ME *moten is thus
as follows: 1) in OE, *motan was predominantly a possibility modal; 2) at some
point it started to have necessity uses as well (most researchers argue that it already
4 The modern Dictionary of Old English [DOE, 2007], which is to replace
[Bosworth and Toller, 1898 as the new standard dictionary, is currently in progress, and the
entry on *motan was not in the works yet at the time of preparation of this chapter.
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happens in the earliest OE texts, cf. the position of [OED, 20021 on 148); 3) since
around the 10th century, the percentage of necessity uses grew slowly but steadily,
so that by the end of the Middle English period in the 15th century, possibility uses
became very marginal, and disappeared completely in the 16th century.
The above description in terms of the relative frequency of possibility vs. neces-
sity readings presupposes that each instance of the modal belongs to one of the two
categories. For instance, [Ono, 1958] studies the ratio of possibility to necessity uses
of *motan starting from Beowulf through Ancrene Wisse to Chaucer and Malory. In
Beowulf, Ono finds 31 instance of possibility *motan, 1 instance of necessity *motan,
namely 148, and one "doubtful" use for which Ono could not decide which interpreta-
tion makes better sense. 13th-century Ancrene Wisse is the earliest text considered
by Ono where, according to him, necessity uses become more numerous than possi-
bility uses. In late 14th-century Chaucer, Ono finds the necessity meaning in 84%
of all instances of ME *moten, and in late 15th-century The Tale of King Arthur by
Malory, he finds no possibility uses at all.
[Tellier, 1962] paints a very similar picture. Having examined the poetry of Be-
owulf, Andreas, Judith and Elene, and the prose of roughly the first half of king
Alfred's Cura Pastoralis, Tellier argues that in Early OE the sense of necessity for
*motan is "rarissime et exceptionnel par rapport au sens de pouvoir". Tellier de-
scribes the primary meaning of *motan in this period as that of possibility created by
"circumstances, fate, or divine grace". Tracking the further development of *motan,
Tellier argues that in the 10th century, the modal "develops an ambiguity", with the
necessity sense becoming "well attested". For the (late entries of the) Peterborough
Chronicle (the 12th cent.), Tellier argues that the majority of uses are still possibility
ones, but in Ancrene Wisse (the 13th cent.), the possibility sense "se fixe dans des
propositions oi6 cette signification ne risque pas d'etre ambigue." The two types of
contexts in Ancrene Wisse where there is no such risk, according to Tellier, are com-
plements of verbs of asking, and prayers to God. Regarding the language of Chaucer's
Canterbury Tales, Tellier argues that the possibility sense of *moten is similarly re-
stricted to several particular environments, namely to matrix wishes, complements
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of verbs of asking, and the collocation mot as wel. Finally, in Malory's 15-century
works, Tellier does not find any examples of *moten conveying possibility, just as the
extensive study of Malory's language by [Visser, 1946] did not.
Most other studies either address the semantics of *motan during a shorter period
(e.g., [Solo, 1977] or [Goossens, 1987]), or contain more general descriptions of the se-
mantic evolution of *motan/ *moten (e.g., [Visser, 1973, §1689, 1693], [Warner, 1993,
Ch. 7], [Traugott and Dasher, 2002, Ch. 3]). All of them generally support the picture
sketched above. That is not to say that there are no disagreements, be they about the
interpretation of individual examples or about the precise timing of particular devel-
opments. For instance, [Solo, 1977] argues, against the more popular position, that
before year 1000, the sense of necessity/obligation for *motan is hardly attested. But
on the whole, there is a wide consensus about the general lines of the development.
What is important for the argument I am going to make, however, is that there
are numerous statements in the literature that suggest a more nuanced semantics
for the modal than that of pure necessity or pure possibility. A more complex view
is explicitly and extensively advocated for by [Standop, 1957], who proposes that in
addition to the meaning of possibility, and perhaps that of necessity,5 OE *motan
also had a third meaning, which he paraphrases as "mir ist verg6nnt, mir wird zuteil"
(p. 69), "mir est bestimmt" (p. 75), "mir ist zugemessen" (p. 169) ("it is granted
to me, it is bestowed upon me", "it is determined for me", "it is measured out for
me"). Standop argues that the meanings of possibility and necessity in the case of
*motan both developed from that initial general meaning which combined possibility
and necessity into an "Einheit", where "Rechte und Pflichten" ("rights and duties")
coincide. Other informal characterizations of Standop's third meaning for *motan
include: "expression of human dependence (Ausdruck menschlicher Abhangigkeit)"
(Standop's p. 68), "it is destined (beschieden)" (pp. 70, 78), "what is measured out
5It is hard to interpret Standop's position on the presence of the necessity sense in OE. On the
one hand, he says on pp. 169-170 that OE *motan lacked the meaning of pure, abstract necessity.
On the other, on pp. 75-76 he calls the meaning of abstract necessity "rare" rather than completely
absent, and provides an example where motan "ist fast normales miissen".
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(gescrifan) by fate (wyrd)" (p. 77). Standop argues that even though "no dictionary
gives [iti", his third meaning "falls into one's eyes" as soon as one notices how the
distribution of *motan differs from that of any other modal (p. 68). Standop writes
that "die Belege sind so zahlreich - vor allem weil viele nach unserer Deutung in
neuem Licht erscheinen -, daE man nur recht wahllos einige Beispiele herausgreifen
kann"6 , [Standop, 1957, p. 701.
Some of the later scholars also acknowledge the complexity of the meaning that
OE *motan conveyed. [Visser, 1973, p. 17941, citing Standop, mentions paraphrases
for *motan such as "Fate has allotted to me to do this" (Standop's third meaning) and
"Fate has granted me the freedom to do this" (the possibility/ permission meaning),
and writes that "all these shades of meaning may have been present in Old English
mote". [Warner, 1993, p. 1601 briefly suggests that Standop's meaning could still
have been present in the Alfredian-prose Gregory's Dialogues, translated into OE by
Wmrferth in the late 9th/early 10th cent., and in Wulfstan's Homilies from the early
11th century.7 [Solo, 19771, not mentioning Standop's work, writes in the conclusion
of his paper: "In none of these instances, except, perhaps, in very late Old English
prose, does the verb [i.e. *motan - IY signify necessity or obligation in and of itself,
although the contexts in which it appears at times imply necessity or duty as well as
permission [emphasis the present author's]".
In my analysis of *motan in the Alfredian prose, I will capture those intuitions
formally by assigning to the modal a "variable-force" meaning that asserts openness
of a possibility, and at the same time presupposes that if that possibility gets a
chance to be actualized, it will. My proposal will differ from the proposals from
the historical literature cited above in two respects: first, I restrict its scope to a
particular, relatively narrow time period, and to a particular genre of texts; second,
for that time period and for the corpus of texts considered, I argue that rather than
having a range of different available readings, *motan was an unambiguous modal.
6
"Examples are so numerous - mainly because our interpretation sheds new light on many -
that one can quite indiscriminately pick out some."
7However, for the particular example from Wulfstan that is provided by Warner, Standop's
meaning is hardly appropriate.
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4.2 Alfredian *motan as a variable-force modal
My conclusion that Early OE' *motan was an unambiguous variable-force modal
with a particular semantics is based on the examination of all 72 instances of *motan
in three Early OE books: the prose OE translations of Gregory's Cura Pastoralis
(CP), Boethius's Consolatio Philosophice (Bo), and Augustine's Soliloquies (Sol),
with supplemental material drawn from early Anglo-Saxon laws. All three books
in the main sample are translations from Latin, but made with such freedom that
they may be considered independent texts. Those texts form a part of the corpus of
"Alfredian prose", after king Alfred the Great who in the late 9th century initiated an
impressive program of translation from Latin into vernacular. The three books are
as good a shot at a dialectally and temporally consistent dataset as possible: Bo and
Sol were most likely translated into Old English by the same person; moreover, the
translators of Alfredian books, presumably, would come from relatively close circles.
There are some differences in the usage of Bo and Sol on the one hand, and CP on the
other, but I did not detect any difference regarding the use of *motan. Appendix A
features the Old English examples from the sample, their philological translations,
and the original Latin passages for CP and Bo.
4.2.1 Motivating examples
Examples in 151-157 illustrate the pattern common for all instances of *motan in the
selected Alfredian books Bo, Sol and CP: the context surrounding the examples is
always such that if it is possible for the argument situation of the modal to actualize,
it is assumed in the context that it will inevitably do so.
Specifically, in 151, if it becomes possible for the person involved to live on, they
will, of course, continue to live.
8Throughout the chapter, I use the term "Early OE" to refer to the early OE prose. This differs
from common usage wherein Early OE refers only to the early poetry, and the Alfredian prose is
considered to belong to late, or at least middle OE rather than to early OE.
147
(151) Ac se se 6e unwaorlice 6one wuda hiew6, & sua his freond
but that that which unwarily that wood hews, and so his friend
ofslieh6, him bi6 nidoearf 6aet he fleo to 6ara 6reora
slays, to.him is necessary that he flee.SUBJ to those.GEN three.GEN
burga anre, 6mt on sumere 6ara weor~e genered, 6at he
city.GEN one.DAT that in some of.those become.SUBJ saved, that he
mote libban;
motan.PRS.SUBJ live
'But he who unwarily hews wood and by that slays his friend, it is necessary
for him that he flee to one of those three cities, so that he be saved in one of
them, so that he mote live.' (CP:21.167.15)
In 152, it is assumed that given the possibility, people would indeed do what they
want, and then be judged according to what they chose to do.
(152) He sealde swi6e foste gife and swibe faeste am mid bamre gife alcum
he gave very firm gift and very firm law with that gift every.DAT
menn [o6j his ende. bamt is se frydom b1mt 6e mon mot
man.DAT until his end. that is the freedom that the man motan.PRS.IND
don bmt he wile, and bmt is sio me beet [he] gilt olcum be his
do what he wants.to and that is the law that he pays to.each by his
gewyrhtum, mgber ge on bisse worulde ge on bare toweardan, swa god
works, both and in this world and in that future.one, or good
swa yfel swa6er he de6.
or evil whichever he does
'He [=God] gave to every man until his end a very firm gift and a very firm
law with that gift. The gift is the freedom that the man mot do what he
wants to, and that law is the law that God pays to each man according to his
works, both in this world and in the future world, be it good or evil that he
does.' (Bo:41.142.11)
In 153, if God makes it possible for the speaker to see them, then obviously the
speaker would use that chance.
(153) and gedo me bos wyrone bat ic be mote geseon.
and make me that.GEN worthy that I you motan.PRS.SUBJ see
'and make me worthy of it that I mote see you.' (Sol:1.55.23)
In 154, the soul in question, having been removed from the earthly things, really
does not have much choice but to make use of the heavenly things:
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(154) Heo forseoh6 bonne ealle bas eorblican bing
she despises then all these earthly things and rejoices that.GEN that
heo mot brucan baes heofonlican [sio6an] heo bi abrogden
she motan.PRS.IND make.use that heavenly since she is removed
from bam eorblican.
from that earthly
'At that time she [=a soul] despises all these earthly things and rejoices that
she mot make use of the heavenly things after she is removed from the earthly
ones.' (Bo: 18.45.28)
In 155, if the addressee grants the speaker permission, then the speaker clearly
would follow up by actually investigating the addressee's degree of resolve.
(155) Mot ic nu cunnian hwon bin faostraodnesse baet ic banon
motan.PRS.IND I now test a.little your resolution that I thence
ongiton maege hwonan ic bin tilian scyle and hu?
learn can whence I you tend.to shall and how
'Mot I now test your resolution a little so that I could learn from what side
I should be curing you and how?' (Bo:5.12.12)
In a different rhetorical construction in 156, the speaker expects that if the ad-
dressee is granted an opportunity to determine what is more worthy of punishment,
they would actually do that, so the speaker uses an irrealis conditional to indirectly
ask for the addressee's opinion.
(156) Gif bu nu deman mostest, hwaoberne woldest bu deman
if you now judge motan.PST which.of.two would you judge
wites wyrbran, be [bone be bone unscyldgan] witnode,
of.punishment worthier the that.ACC which the innocent tormented
be 6one be bot wite bolode.
the that.ACC which that torment suffered
'If you mostest pass a judgement, which would you find worthier of pun-
ishment: the one who tormented the innocent, or the one who suffered the
torment?' (Bo:38.122.28)
In 157, we first learn that a particular group of people is always weeping, and then
we are told how this happens: they weep, and after that they make it possible for
them to weep again. As we now know from the beginning of the passage that they
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and fagenab baes baet
are always weeping, it follows that each subsequent weeping is not just possible, but
in fact actually happening.
(157) Hwmt, se 6onne ne rec6 hweoer he clamne sie, [oe ne sie], se
why! that then not care whether he clean is.SUBJ or not is.SUBJ the
8e mfter Soare hreowsunga hine ryhtlice & clanlice nyle
that after their repentance him rightly & cleanly not.wants.to
gehealdan: ealne weg hi hi 6wea5, & ne beo6 hie naofre clane,
keep all way they them wash & not are they never clean
8eah hi ealneg wepen; ealneg hi wepa6, & aofter aem wope hi
though they always weep; always they weep & after the weeping they
gewyrcea6 6aBt hi moton eft wepan.
obtain that they motan.PRES again weep
'Why, he who does not care whether he is clean or not, he who does not
want to hold himself in proper ways and clean: always they are washing, and
they are never clean, even though they are always weeping; always they are
weeping, and after the weeping they make it so that they moton weep again.'
(CP:54.421.14)
The examples above represent a wide range of syntactic environments in which
*motan occurs in Early OE: a purpose clause in 151 and 157; a complement clause
of noun freodom 'freedom' in 152, of adjective weork 'worthy' in 153, and of verb
fwgnian 'to rejoice' in 154; a matrix question in 155; the antecedent of a conditional
in 156. Despite the syntactic differences, for all of them it is in the common ground
that the argument situation of the modal will be actualized if such a possibility opens.
On one extreme, in 157 this conditional statement is true in the context because the
preceding sentence directly asserts its consequent (they are always weeping). On the
other extreme, in 155 the assumption is accepted in the common ground because of the
general rules of conversation, which are not explicitly discussed anywhere in the text
(the speaker only asks whether a given speech act by her is possible if she intends to
perform it). But in most cases, it is the world knowledge together with the linguistic
context of the modal that support the assumption of inevitable actualization.
The remarkable fact is that not just 151-157, but all instances of *motan in the
Alfredian sample occur in contexts that support the assumption.It is not quite how
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a modal ambiguous between possibility and necessity should behave, contrary to
the standard analysis of *motan in the literature. If we restrict ourselves to mere
paraphrasing of Old English examples using modern English modals, we could find
that not all substitutions sound natural, and be tempted to conclude that we are
dealing with an ambiguous modal (cf. our discussion of the examples from Beowulf in
147 and 148.) E.g., must or have to are not natural substitutes for mot in 152, while
can is contextually inappropriate in 157. But if we view the OE examples in their
own right, trying to explicate their semantics in detail instead of trying out different
substitutes, we can see each example conveys both the message of an open possibility
and that of inevitability. In fact, modern philologist translators may disagree as to
how to render a particular example with *motan: for example, in 158 Henry Sweet
renders *motan using necessity modal have to, while H.W. Norman chooses possibility
might. Both translations of 158, however, convey a very similar message. So in a sense,
it does not matter much which modal translates *motan in this example.
(158) a. (CP:9.57.19) Hu mmg he 6onne beon butan gitsunge, 6onne he
how can he then be without avarice when he
sceal ymb monigra monna are 6encan, gif he nolde 6a 6a
had.to about many men's property think if he would.not when
he moste ymb his anes?
he motan.SG.PAST.SUBJ about his only
b. Translation by /Sweet, 18711:
"How can he be without covetousness when he has to consult the interests
of many, if formerly he would not avoid it when he had to consult his own
interests alone?"
c. Translation by H. W. Norman, printed in /Giles et al., 1858!:
"How can he be without covetousness when he must think about many
men's sustenance, if he would not when he might think about his own
alone?"
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4.2.2 Variable-force analysis of *motan: informal and formal
versions
I argue that Alfredian *motan was not ambiguous between possibility and necessity,
but had a "third-type", variable-force meaning which can be imprecisely rendered by
either. I will first lay out the proposal, and then discuss how it compares to other
plausible accounts of the data. Informally, the meaning for *motan that I propose is
as follows:
(159) Variable-force analysis of *motan (informal, preliminary): motan(p)
asserts that p is an open possibility and presupposes that if p is given a chance
to be actualized, it will.
The crucial part of the meaning in 159 is not the assertion, but the presupposition.
Because of the presupposition, *motan may only be used in a very limited set of
contexts where the actual future is taken to be predetermined one way or the other,
though before the assertion is made, the context may provide no information which
way it will turn out. One example of a context set that supports the presupposition
is given in 160: it contains worlds that will develop into p-worlds, and those that will
develop into -p-worlds. What is notably absent from the context set are worlds where
it is not predetermined whether p or -'p will actualize. In such a context, asserting that
it is possible for the current world to develop into a p-world symmetrically entails a
necessity assertion saying that it is necessary for it to develop so. If the presupposition
is met, possibility and necessity collapse together, and no scalar relation emerges
between the two.
(160) Context set supporting the presupposition of motan(p):
WI W2 W3
W1 : P W12 : P W13 :P W21 : -P W22 :-P W2 3 :-P w31 : P ' 3 2  W33 'p
1, 1" "4, 9" *
Context set after the assertion of motan(p) is accepted:
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WII W2 W3
W11: P W12 : P Wis : P W21 :-P W22 : 1P W23 : ,P W31 : P W32 -P W33 :-P
"1, 1" "4, 5" *
Given such semantics, we expect that neither possibility or necessity modals of
modern English would be perfect translation correlates of *motan. In particular,
*motan does not belong to a scale of modal strength as modern English modals
do. If we say can(p), that triggers the implicature that -must(p). But under my
analysis of *motan, no such implicatures were to arise in Alfredian Old English: when
the presupposition creating the variable-force effect was met, there was no longer a
distinction between possibility and necessity claims.
Thus analyzed, *motan is a part of the class of variable-force modals together
with several others recently described by semantic-fieldwork studies on several lan-
guages of the North-American Pacific Northwest. All modals in the class share the
same feature: they are not ambiguous between possibility and necessity within the
language, but are translated by the speakers into modern English sometimes as pos-
sibility, other times as necessity modals. This surface similarity does not imply un-
derlying semantic identity, and the label variable-force modality is purely descriptive.
In fact, the variable-force modals of St'At'imcets ([Rullmann et al., 2008]), Gitksan
([Peterson, 20101, [Matthewson, 2013]) and Nez Perce (IDeal, 2011]) all have different
distributions, and have received several different analyses in the literature. The dis-
tribution of Alfredian *motan is different yet, and therefore the analysis for it that is
formulated to fit the Old English data is very different from the previous variable-force
analyses in the literature. I will compare both the distributions of and the analyses
for other variable-force modals and *motan in the next section, having first discussed
the Old English data in their own right.
Let me now turn to a formal rendering of 159. I will deal with the presupposition
first, and with the assertion second. The presupposition of inevitability of the (yet
unknown) outcome is captured using the metaphysical accessibility relation Rm,. For
153
a world wi, Rmet returns a set of the metaphysical alternatives of w1 . Those meta-
physical alternatives are defined as the worlds which share with w1 all of its history
up to the time of evaluation (in this and many other details of the semantics, I use
the formalization proposed by [Condoravdi, 2002]). A proposition p is metaphysically
necessary relative to w, if all ways in which w, may develop in the future would make
p true. Similarly, p is metaphysically possible at w, iff some of wi's continuations are
p-worlds. (Note that metaphysical possibilities and necessities are sensitive to the
world of evaluation.) In the informal definition in 159, by "p gets a chance to actual-
ize", I intend to say that p is a metaphysical possibility, and by "p will actualize", I
mean that p is a metaphysical necessity. Thus the collapse of 0 and E which the pre-
supposition is meant to derive is specifically the collapse of metaphysical possibility
and necessity (as opposed to, for example, a collapse of permission and obligation.)
In symbols, the informal version of the presupposition is Op -+ Ep.9
Circumstantial and metaphysical modality are generally hard to distinguish (cf. [Abusch, 2012
for an argument that what [Condoravdi, 2002] treats as metaphysical modality should be
given a circumstantial analysis). In a variant analysis, one can also use the realistic circum-
stantial accessibility relation instead of the metaphysical one. Given a world wi, a realistic
circumstantial accessibility relation returns such worlds w' where a subset of the facts that
take place in w, also take place; thus w itself is one of the returned worlds w', and the rela-
tion is reflexive. Note that a realistic modal is realistic with regard to the local evaluation
world, not to the global world of the context of utterance.
The formal version of the presupposition needs to be more complex than just
Op -+ Eip, though. Most propositions p would be true at one time in the future from
the evaluation moment, and false at another time. If we make the presuppositional
semantics insensitive to time, then each world could be both a p and a -p world.
This is not how the intuition represented in the diagram in 160 works: the intuition
is that if a world is a p-world, it cannot then be a -,p-world, and vice versa. Now, if
we consider again the examples in 151-158 above, we can note the following pattern.
9I was able to settle on this particular variant of the analysis, featuring the metaphysical accessi-
bility relation within the presupposition of *niotan, thanks to a discussion with Katrina Przyjemski.
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If p is an eventive proposition, as in 153 or 155, then each world will either feature
a p-event at some point or not, so p would divide all worlds into two classes without
us specifying the exact time period when it would happen; one can make a case that
only a certain bounded period after the evaluation time is relevant for the statement
made, but there is not much reason to encode that boundedness into the semantics.
But with stative p-s, things are different: if we look at stative 151 or 158, we can see
that the time frame relevant for the argument situation of the modal (the situation
of going on living in 151, and of looking after one's own profit in 158) is the moment
of evaluation plus the immediately following time period. Now, a person x living at
the time of evaluation and for some time after will eventually die, so if p is live(x),
both p and -'p will be true at different time periods in the same world. But if we
only consider the moment of evaluation plus a time interval following it, each world
will be classified as either a p-world or a -,p-world. So if we define the semantics
so that the truth of a stative p is checked at a time interval starting at the time
of evaluation, we derive that all metaphysical alternatives of a given world will be
divided into two classes. Then the presupposition of motan(p) would say that for
each w', its metaphysical alternatives belong to only one of those two classes, either
all being p or all being -,p. Formally, I use the framework of [Condoravdi, 2002] to
express the presupposition:
(161) [[motanr]]w'(p) presupposes that
(]w': Rmet(w, w', t)A AT(p, w', [t, oc) )) - (Vw': Rmet(w, w', t) -+ AT(p, w', [t,oc) )),
where p is a property of events;
Rmet(W, w', t) holds iff w and w' are identical up until time t;
and the interpretation of AT(p, w', [t, oc)) depends on whether p is stative
or eventive: for a stative p, AT(p, w', [t, oc) ) holds iff there is a p-event the
running time of which intersects with [t, oc), and moreover, includes t10 ; and
'OThis is where my semantics differs from the one given by [Condoravdi, 2002, p. 70, (19)]. In
Condoravdi's semantics, there is no requirement that t is included into a stative event's running
time. So for an epistemic sentence like Mary might be in London, Condoravdi derives a meaning
that is true if it's compatible with the relevant knowledge that Mary will be in London at some
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for an eventive p, AT(p, w', [t, oc)) iff there is a p-event whose running time
is included into [t, x0) .
Let us now turn to the assertion of motan(p). If the presupposition of *motan
is about metaphysical possibility collapsed with metaphysical necessity (or, if one
prefers that, realistic-circumstantial 0 collapsed with realistic-circumstantial El), for
the assertion it is harder to establish the exact modal flavor it has. The two candidates
are circumstantial/ metaphysical, and deontic modal flavors. Some examples, from
the modern point of view at least, seem to favor a deontic interpretation: e.g., 155
may be interpreted as featuring a request for permission, and a deontic analysis
would not be inappropriate in other examples such as 151 or 156. Other examples,
however, would hardly be compatible with a deontic interpretation (for instance, 157),
while favoring circumstantial/ metaphysical readings. But in the Alfredian sample
considered I did not find examples which would be only compatible with one of
the two analyses." The data do not allow to determine whether Alfredian *motan
made deontic, metaphysical, circumstantial assertive contributions, or a combination
thereof.
point in the future. With my definition of AT, Mary might be in London can only be true if it's not
ruled out by evidence that Mary is in London now. I conjecture that it is a better semantics across
the board, if one allows for silent temporal arguments supplied by the context which may sometimes
shift t to some relevant moment. For example, if we had been talking about a workshop to be held
in London next June, Mary might be in London could effectively mean Mary might be in London at
the time of the workshop.
Regardless of how that is resolved for modern English, there is no evidence of such forward-shifting
for stative arguments of *motan in Alfredian OE. At the same time the assumption of t-inclusion is
crucial for deriving that metaphysical necessity that p entails metaphysical impossibility that -,p.
"The case of 155, one of the examples that favor the deontic interpretation the most, illustrates
the difficulty well. From the modern-English point of view, it may feel natural to find the deontic
flavor in that question. But Alfredian mot in 155 is a rendering of Latin pateris, with the primary
sense "to be open". The Latin word may also convey "to be accessible, attainable, allowable", but
the deontic flavor is secondary to the metaphysical/circumstantial one. Of course, it does not rule
out that the Old English translator had in mind specifically a deontic interpretation for the modal.
But the correspondence with Latin makes that less likely.
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For concreteness, I assume as the baseline analysis that the assertion of motan(p)
was a metaphysical possibility, 162. Combined with the metaphysical assertion as in
162, the variable-force presupposition in 161 entails that p will happen, and moreover
that p was inevitable - a reading matching the informal analysis in 159.
(162) [[motan]]w t (p) asserts that sw': Rmet (w, w', t) A AT(p, w', [t, o)),
Rmet(W, w', t) holds iff w and w' are identical up until time t.
But what if *motan's assertion was circumstantial or deontic? The interplay
between the assertion and the presupposition does not crash as long as we adopt some
natural additional assumptions. The circumstantial case only requires us to assume
that *motan would only use realistic accessibility relations, namely, those which are
based on a subset of facts about the evaluation world. Such realistic circumstantial
Rcircs, viewed as sets of ordered pairs, would always be supersets of the metaphysical
Rmet, and therefore OcircP would always entail metp. So if *motan's presupposition
that ormetP OmetP is met, and OcircP is asserted, it follows that Dmetp, or, in words,
that p is inevitable. For the deontic case, we need a different assumption to connect
the assertion to the presupposition, namely, that the permission asserted by *motan
may only be a permission for doing something that is metaphysically possible. If that
much is granted, we again derive the inevitability inference from a deontic assertion.
Note that while the assumptions for the circumstantial and deontic case may seem ad
hoc, they are introduced in order to capture the observed empirical pattern: in the
post-context after the assertion is accepted, motan(p) does convey that p is inevitable.
So adding such assumptions is essentially a fine-tuning of possible theoretical analyses
so that they fit the data.
One important feature of the presuppositional analysis proposed is that it predicts
that *motan occurring with clausemate negation will always convey impossibility, re-
gardless of the relative scope of the modal and the negation marker. This is intended:
the about twenty of such examples in my sample all have that meaning, demonstrated
in 163, and there are reasons to think that it was the general pattern in OE." More-
12 [Goossens, 19871 finds two examples in his sample, out of 25 negative ones, which according to
him exhibit the "not necessary" rather than "impossible" reading. However, the single example that
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over, this pattern of interaction with negation seems to hold across *motan's cognates
in other early Germanic: [Breitbaerth, 2011J, studying the relative scope of modals
and negation in Old Saxon (=Old Low German), finds that all 16 examples in her
corpus convey impossibility, just as our Alfredian OE examples.
(163) Eala hu yfele me do6 manege woruldmenn mid boaim boat ic ne
alas how evil me do many world-men so that I NEG
mot wealdan minra agenra [beawal.
motan.prs.3sg follow my own customs
'Alas, how evilly I am treated by many worldly people, so that I mot not (=it
is impossible for me to) follow my own customs.' (Bo:7.17.23)
The reason our semantics makes the prediction that *motan with negation must
convey impossibility is simple: if the variable-force presupposition is met, having
Goossens cites in the paper should be interpreted as conveying impossibility. It is a passage from
Ylfric's Catholic Homilies provided in (i), and in isolation one may take it to convey that "it is not
necessary now to follow the old law". But what 1Elfric means is rather that following the old law is
not what actually happens, or should happen. The passage continues as in (ii), talking about lamb
sacrifice, which was not supposed to be offered by Christians at Elfric's time.
(i) 'Cristian men now moton not hold in flesh (lichamlice) the old law, but it behooves them
to know what it signifies spiritually (gastlice).' (ECHom-II,15:151.38.3347-8)
(ii) 'That innocent lamb which the old Israel slew (in sacrifice), spiritually signified the meaning
of the passions of Christ, the one who, being innocent, for our redemption poured out his
holy blood.' (ECHom-II,15:151.38.3349)
In general, a large part of Elfric's writings involves explaining to the audience that many Old Tes-
tament commandments should not be followed up literally, but instead should be taken as metaphors
related to the life of Christ. His message is thus often not just that some Old Testament pronounce-
ments may be relaxed, but rather that it is wrong to follow them literally. For example, IElfric
writes on the importance of celibacy for priests, and explains that even though under Moses's law,
bishops begot children and had to do that because bishops had to come from the same line of de-
scent, at the current moment there is no reason for priests to not hold celibacy, etc. etc. So a
closer look at both the local and the global context suggest the impossibility interpretation, con-
trary to [Goossens, 1987]. Given that, the existence of another example with the "not necessary"
interpretation in his sample is also doubtful.
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one possible future where p does not happen (0 > -) is the same as having p not
happening in all possible futures (-, > 0). Recall that the assertion part of *motan's
meaning either consists of metaphysical 0, or is circumstantial and deontic and entails
metaphysical 0 (as we just discussed above). If that 0 takes narrow scope, we get
the impossibility, or , > 0, reading right away. If 0 takes wide scope, we get the
0 > , reading entailing the stronger -, > 0 reading in the context, thanks to the
variable-force presupposition.
Two obvious connections of the proposed modal semantics to the semantics of
other modal expressions suggest themselves." First, the presupposition of possibility-
necessity collapse in 161 is similar to actuality entailments observed in many languages
for ability modals bearing past or perfect morphology. In both cases, a possibility
assertion is accompanied by a necessity statement conveyed in one way or another.
Moreover, in both cases, one can argue that the necessity is entailed in the post-
context of a modal statement because of the presence of a conditional presupposition
in the pre-context: for *motan, I have argued above for the presupposition Ometp -+
ELmetp, while for the actuality entailments, one may say that they arise because it is
presupposed that x could do p, then x necessarily would. I leave it to future research
to determine how far the analogy may be taken: that requires a detailed analysis of
actuality entailments which falls outside of the scope of the present paper.
The second connection is to the fine-grained semantics of ability claims. "Mary
can hit the bull's eye" may be paraphrased roughly like "Whenever Mary tries to hit
the bull's eye, she will succeed". This has the form of a necessity statement rather
than a pure possibility statement, and different analyses of ability modals capture
that intuition by combining possibility and necessity within the definition for the
modal. As [Portner, 2009] puts is, all such approaches "are alike in combining some
sort of existential quantification, corresponding to the idea that the agent chooses
an action, and some sort of universal quantification, corresponding to the idea that
the action guarantees a certain outcome". I refer the reader to Portner's discussion
of ability modals for a brief overview and references. Again, there is a non-trivial
"I owe the clarification of those two connections to discussions with Paul Portner and Irene Heim.
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connection between the inevitability conveyed by *motan and the inevitability to
achieve a certain goal that arises in ability cases - and again, I leave exploring the
connection to future research.
4.2.3 Variable-force analysis versus its competitors
I will now turn to a comparison between the presuppositional variable-force theory
of *motan and its natural alternatives. I will discuss four of them: a theory that
analyzes Alfredian *motan as an unambiguous necessity modal; one that analyzes
it as an unambiguous possibility modal; one that takes *motan to be ambiguous
between 0 and Fl; and the theory of "periphrastic subjunctive", sometimes invoked
for a number of Old and Middle English modals. There are arguments in the literature
regarding the choice between those four analyses, with the ambiguity analysis being
the one that fits the data most. Here, I will describe my reasons for thinking the
present presuppositional analysis is better for Alfredian *motan than any of those
four. At the same time I will try to demonstrate that those other analyses have at
least some degree of plausibility, and thus deserve one's attention even if they are to
be rejected in the end.
The uniform necessity analysis, saying that motan(p) always asserted that p is
necessary, is the weakest of those four alternative analyses, and I am not aware of
any researcher actually adopting it. In 164, the negation in the upper clause provides
a very clear test case falsifying this theory. Had *motan been a pure necessity modal
in 164, the second part of the sentence would have only asserted that God allows it
that the meditated sins are not carried out. Yet the first half of 164 strongly suggests
that God in fact makes it so that the sins are not committed at all. The uniform
necessity analysis thus fails to explain the example. 14
14Note that treating gepafian as a Neg-raising predicate would not save the necessity theory: in the
non-Neg-raised form of a Neg-raised sentence (whatever its relation to it - e.g., be it an inference
or a syntactically related sentence), negation takes wide scope in the lower clause, cf. "I don't think
you have to do that". We thus predict that if 164 were a case of Neg-raising, the necessity analysis
of *motan would yield "God permits that it is not that they have to carry out their sins", which is
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(164) For6amm oft se mildheortaa Dryhten swi6e hredlice 6a gebohtan
Because often the mild-hearted Lord very quickly the premeditated
synna awega6wihb, bonne he him ne gebafab bamt hi hi
sins away-cleanses, so.that he to.them not permit that they them
ourhtion moten.
carry.out motan.PRS
QK'Because the merciful Lord often washes premeditated sins away quickly,
so that as a result he does not allow them that they moten (~may) carry
those sins out.' (CP:53.419.1)
* '...God does not allow them that they have to carry those sins out.'
A uniform possibility analysis is harder to discard, which led [Solo, 1977] to ac-
tually endorse it for Early OE, including the Alfredian prose (cf. also the choices
made by [Godden and Irvine, 2009] in their translation of Bo: they only use possibil-
ity translations throughout the whole text). The traditional arguments against the
possibility analysis involve pointing out that certain examples, such as 148 and 157,
partially repeated here, do not seem to convey pure possibility.
(148) 'Every man of that kin mot wander without the rights of the rightful resi-
dents.' (Beo:2886)
(157) '< ... > always they are weeping, and after the weeping they make it so that
they moton weep again.' (CP:54.421.14)
We can add several more arguments to that, based specifically on the data from
our Alfredian sample (as opposed to the corpus of Early Old English as a whole).
None of the arguments to follow has absolute force on its own. They merely show
that our presuppositional variable-force analysis is more coherent and more likely to
be true than the analysis that says Alfredian *motan always conveyed pure possibility,
and since they all point in the same direction, those arguments reinforce each other.
First, *motan is a fairly rare modal in Alfredian OE. There are about 70 instances
of it in CP, Bo and Sol. This should be compared with the about 1000 instances of
magan (> modern may), the modal of choice for ability and circumstantial possibility
not an appropriate meaning for the example.
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at the time, and with the about 700 instances of *sculan, which could express deontic
necessity, circumstantial necessity, and arguably some kind of a futurate meaning. If
*motan were a modal carrying a very specific presupposition that would rarely be
met, this difference in frequency is expected. If, however, it was a plain possibility
modal, the numbers are harder to explain.
Of course, it is possible to argue that *motan was so rare because it was only
capable of expressing a very limited range of modal flavors. But as I discussed above,
it is actually quite hard to show beyond any doubt that *motan was restricted to only
a subpart of the fairly large field of modal meanings encompassing metaphysical, cir-
cumstantial and deontic modality. As a more plausible objection, it is conceivable
that a given modal's rarity is just an accident of usage, caused by the structure of
variation within the relevant sociolinguistic variable within the community. For ex-
ample, in modern English vernaculars deontic must is dying out, and is only retained
in a small share of examples (cf. [Tagliamonte and D'Arcy, 20071, a.o.), but that does
not necessarily mean that must is not a regular deontic semantically. So there do
exist ways to explain the rarity of *motan under the assumption it always conveyed
possibility in Alfredian OE. But a specific argument to that end would have to be
put forward, whereas in our presuppositional theory of *motan, an explanation of its
rarity is already present.
The second argument favoring the presuppositional analysis over the possibility
one involves the absence of scalar relations between *motan and other modals. In
modern English, possibility and necessity modals form dual pairs. E.g., in " You may
take this exam. In fact, you have to", necessity modal have to in the second clause
strengthens the assertion made with possibility modal may in the first. This and
other scalar patterns are made possible by the fact that the necessity modal involved
is strictly stronger than the possibility modal.
In Alfredian OE, we easily find cases where possibility magan enters into such
relationships with necessity *sculan. For example, 165 is an instance of the scalar
pattern "Not only can(p), but also have.to(p)":
(165) hi beo6 swa gebwaora baette no bat an bamt hi magon geferan beon, ac by
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fur6or bmt heora fur6um nan buton o6rum beon ne mang, ac a sceal maet
wiberwearde gemetgian.
'they (=fire and water, and sea and land) are so harmonious that not only
can they be companions, but moreover that none of them can be without
each other, but they always have to on the contrary restrain each other.'
No such examples where *sculan would strengthen *motan are present in our
Alfredian sample. Now, this is not exactly a killer argument: as I noted above, magan
is one order of magnitude more frequent than *motan, so it could in principle be that
the absence of scalar patterns with *motan is a sheer accident. But other things
being equal, a theory for which that fact is not an accident is to be preferred, and our
variable-force theory of *motan is one such: if *motan indeed had the variable-force
meaning described in 161 and 162, it would not be on the same scale with any other
modals, so it would not give rise to any scalar patterns (see the scheme in 166). This
is exactly what we see in the data.
(166) Alfredian Old English:
ability circ.+mct. future deontic
I eirc.+-imet. /deontie
O magan magan - non-modal O + collapse presup. motan
l - sculan 0/sculan sculan
Yet another argument comes from historical and typological observations. Suppose
for a moment that *motan was indeed a regular possibility modal. We know plenty of
regular possibility modals in a wide range of languages with long recorded histories.
Yet the only documented case of a possibility modal turning into a necessity modal
several centuries later is the case of *motan and its cognates in other Germanic. All
those modal words, stemming from the same Proto-Germanic lexeme, followed very
similar semantic change trajectories, from distributions resembling that of Old English
*motan in the earlier recorded sources to pure necessity modals such as German
miissen or Dutch moeten. This suggests that there was something very special in
the Proto-Germanic word that gave rise to all those modern Germanic cognates. If
Alfredian *motan was an unambiguous variable-force modal, we can immediately see
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what that special thing could be: it is expected that variable-force modals would
follow different paths of semantic change than regular possibility modals. But if
*motan itself was a regular possibility modal, then it is not clear at all why it took a
path of change not registered for other Os.
Taken together, those arguments, I believe, provide sufficient support for the pre-
suppositional variable-force theory of *motan over the theory that says it was an
unambiguous possibility modal. Most of those arguments carry over to a comparison
between our variable-force theory and the theory that analyzes *motan as ambiguous
between possibility and necessity - the most common theory in the current historical
literature.
The ambiguity theory is a response to the existence of examples like 148 and
157 which are hard to explain assuming that *motan was a 0 in Early OE. In an
important sense, the ambiguity theory is a theory of last resort: the claim that
*motan was ambiguous between 0 and LI was never accompanied in the literature
by an argument regarding how exactly such ambiguity may have functioned in the
language for several centuries, and how the speakers could disambiguate between the
O and n readings.
The ambiguity theory by itself cannot answer the arguments we just put forward
against the possibility theory. It does not explain why *motan was a rare modal. It
does not explain why *motan did not enter into scalar relations with other modals.
It does not explain the peculiar semantic-change path that the modal took. In other
words, most non-trivial facts about the distribution of the modal seem pure accidents
on the ambiguity view. But perhaps the most important argument against the am-
biguity theory for Alfredian *motan comes from a comparison between Alfredian OE
and Early Middle English. I will argue below in Section 4.4 that in Early Middle
English, *moten < *motan was a modal genuinely ambiguous between 0 and F-1. We
will see, to a reasonable extent, how that ambiguity functioned, and what helped the
speakers to disambiguate a particular instance of the modal. But importantly, the
features of a genuinely ambiguous modal that characterize the Early Middle English
distribution of *moten cannot be found for Alfredian OE *motan. Comparing Alfre-
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dian modal with its truly ambiguous descendant, we will be able to see the difference.
Let us finally consider a different kind of theory for *motan. Under the "pe-
riphrastic subjunctive" theory, sometimes invoked for the class of OE modals as a
whole, those modals, at least in some instances, do not bear any semantic content,
but instead take on the role that the inflectional subjunctive played earlier.' 5 (The
motivation for formulating such theories in the first place is the fact that in many
contexts, modal constructions did indeed replace the earlier inflectional subjunctive
as it was lost. The history of one such replacement was discussed above in Chapter
3.)
(167) Periphrastic-subjunctive *motan: motan(p) means simply p, but signals
that the clause appears in an irrealis context.
[Ogawa, 1989] extensively argues against this sort of analysis for OE modals in
general, demonstrating that they had clearly defined distributions which at least in
some cases call for semantic explanations. In line with Ogawa's arguments, we can see
in our Alfredian sample that *motan appears with inflectional subjunctive markings
in environments favoring them (e.g., in 151 and 153, *motan has unambiguous 6
subjunctive morphology), so whatever function the modal had, it could not have
been exactly the same as the function of the inflectional subjunctive.
But the biggest problem with the periphrastic subjunctive theory is that by itself,
it is even less predictive than the 0-D ambiguity theory. If we say that *motan is
'
5 For modern English, an example of a "periphrastic subjunctive" is should in sentences such as
It is essential that we should hire her, on one of its readings.
1 6One might argue that the form moten (as in 164) is an unambiguous subjunctive present plural
form, while moton (as in 157) is the corresponding indicative form. However, without a detailed
investigation of the patterns of vowel reduction in the particular manuscript where the forms come
from, one should exercise caution in taking the spelling of those endings at its face value: the levelling
of the on-en endings seems to have been more rapid during the OE period in preterite-presents than
in other verbs, see [Kitson, 1992, p. 661; cf. also [Mitchell, 1985, §22] on the "confusion" between
en/on in general. In contrast to that, the difference between mot and mote is a reliable indicator
of a morphological difference, as the distinction between the zero and e endings survived into the
Middle English period.
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meaningless, we cannot explain its restricted distribution. To do so, we need to say a
lot more about where exactly it can appear, and the more we will be saying, the less
the resulting theory would look like a plain story of the form "*motan replaced the
inflectional subjunctive".
Summing up, none of the arguments for the presuppositional variable-force theory
of *motan is decisive on its own. But they all point in the same direction, and thus
taken together, make it very probable that my variable-force theory, or something
fairly close to it, is true for Alfredian Old English."
"One more theory that deserves some attention would be along the following lines: *motan in
Alfredian OE was not a genuine modal, but rather a sentential modifier that marked its argument
situation as good or desirable. I know of two reasons for why this theory should be taken seriously,
though neither of them applies directly to the Alfredian sample that I use as my primary source
in this work. First, as fOgawa, 1989, Ch. 4.51 shows, *motan was used under verbs of asking and
requesting to mark situations where the requester and the beneficiary of the request (usually the
embedded subject) were the same person. If *motan could convey the meaning of desirability, that
feature of its distribution would follow. Second, in the laws of Alfred and Ine, representing earlier
and more formulaic OE prose than the Alfredian translations I discuss in the main text, *motan,
*sculan and the inflectional subjunctive are used almost interchangeably, but at the same time the
argument situations of *motan always involve something beneficial for the subject (e.g., "to swear
(one's innocence)"), and never involve bad things like "to pay a fine" or "to forfeit one's property".
Again, if *motan conveyed the desirability of its argument situation for the subject, that is exactly
what we can expect.
However, for Alfredian OE translations, it is clear that such an analysis fails. Many examples
of *motan in CP, Bo and Sol indeed involve something good, such as continuing to live in 151 or
seeing God in 153. But there are also examples where the argument situation is clearly undesirable
for the subject, such as weeping as in 157. The example 148 can also hardly be taken to feature a
desirable argument situation.
It could be that the desirability of p was something that motan(p) conveyed at some point or in
some dialect. In Chapter 3, we have seen how the inflectional subjunctive under verbs of hoping was
used to convey a particular kind of well wishes, and in Chapter 5, we will see that the mid-19th-
century futurate have to construction always involved argument situations that were undesirable or
required strenuous effort. It is hard to distinguish between the cases when such a pattern was created
by the lexical semantics and when it was a feature of the construction's actual usage, but on the
level of descriptive generalizations such phenomena of associating (un)desirability with the argument
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4.3 Variable-force modality in Old English vs. in St'it'imcets,
Gitksan, and Nez Perce
It is well-known that some constructions in natural languages may be underdeter-
mined between possibility and necessity, like the "have something to say" construction
([Fischer, 1994, Sec. 3.2]) or German modal infinitives ([van der Auwera and Plungian, 1998,
Sec. 3.3]). However, recent semantic fieldwork on St'dt'imcets, Gitksan, and Nez Perce
has uncovered a group of modals which seems to feature a different kind of "indeter-
minacy" between possibility and necessity: while those modals may be rendered into
languages like Modern English with both possibility and necessity modals, depending
on the context, there seems to be no lexical ambiguity or vagueness involved. In
this section, I will review the data and analyses formulated for various variable-force
modals of St'dt'imcets, Gitksan, and Nez Perce, and discuss how they compare to the
Alfredian OE data, and to my presuppositional variable-force analysis.
4.3.1 Variable force in Alfredian OE and the Pacific North-
west: the empirical picture
Schematically, the shape of the modal system in the three Pacific Northwest languages
where variable-force modals have been described can be represented as follows, along-
side the same for Alfredian OE:
(168) Alfredian Old English:
ability circ.+met. future deontic
circ. +met. /deontic
0 magan magan - non-modal
E - sculan 0 or sculan sculan 0 + collapse presup. motan
(169) St'at'imcets ([Rullmann et al., 2008])
situation seem to be quite common. But for Alfredian-prose *motan specifically, desirability of the
argument situation would have been at most a tendency, and perhaps not even that.
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deontic future various epistemic
ka kelh k'a; ku7; -an'
Consultants select 0 paraphrases for variable-force modals more often
(170) Gitksan ([Peterson, 2010], [Matthewson, 2013])
circ. deontic epist.
O da'akhlxw anook
ima('a); gat
l sgi
Consultants select 0 paraphrases for variable-force modals more often
(171) Nez Perce ([Deal, 2011])
cire. and deontic
S o'qa
Even though the diagrams above provide, by necessity, very limited information,
that is already enough to see that the shapes of modal systems with variable-force
modals may vary significantly between languages. In St'at'imcets, all modal expres-
sions are apparently variable-force.18 In Gitksan, variable-force modals only occur in
the epistemic domain. In Nez Perce, the variable-force modal occupies the circum-
stantial/deontic meaning domain alone. But unlike in any of those, in Alfredian OE
variable-force modal *motan is in the same general domain of deontic-circumstantial-
metaphysical modality as non-variable force *sculan and magan.
If we look closer yet, the Alfredian variable-force pattern of behavior turns out to
be very different from those in St'dt'imcets and Gitksan. First, there is no inevitability
conveyed by the variable-force modals in the latter two. In St'a't'imcets 172, we see the
variable-force future marker kelh, which often corresponds to English simple future
will, but does not have to. In examples like 172, the argument situation of kelh is not
construed as inevitable, only as potentially possible in the future.
(172) [Rullmann et al., 2008, (19)1:
'
8 [Rullmann et al., 20081 are a bit more cautious about the epistemic markers ku7 and -an', but
the rest are unequivocally variable-force.
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ka-kwfs-a kelh ti k'6t'h-a
CIRC-fall-CIRC FUT DET rock-DET
'That stone might drop.'
Similarly for Gitksan ima, no inevitability is conveyed by the modal in the general
case:
(173) [Matthewson, 2013, (22)1:
Context: You hear pattering, and you're not entirely sure what it is.
yugw=imaa/ima'=hl wis
IMPF=EPIS=CN rain
'It might be raining.'
Another difference between Alfredian OE on the one hand and St'dt'imcets and
Gitksan on the other concerns the interaction between variable-force modals with
negation. As we discussed in the previous section, Alfredian *motan always conveys
impossibility when combined with local or non-local negation, cf. 163 and 164. But
in St'dt'imcets and Gitksan, variable-force modals do give rise to "not necessary"
readings.
(174) (163) 'Alas, how evilly I am treated by many worldly people, so that I mot
not (=it is impossible for me to) follow my own customs.' (Bo:7.17.23)
(164) 'Because the merciful Lord often washes premeditated sins away quickly, so
that as a result he does not allow them that they moten (~may) carry those
sins out.' (CP:53.419.1)
In St'at'imcets, at least the evidential epistemic k'a shows both "necessarily not"
and "possibly not" readings in different examples, [Rullmann et al., 2008, Sec. 3.6],
and variable-force modals kelh and ka show at least "possibly not" readings not avail-
able for Alfredian *motan). As for Gitksan, the variable-force reportative evidential
kat scopes uniformly above its clausemate negation, [Peterson, 2010, pp. 66-8, 149-
50], producing readings like "I heard -,p", and never "I didn't hear that p". At the
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same time, only "possibly not" readings are provided by Peterson and Matthewson
for inferential epistemic ima, [Peterson, 2010, pp. 45], [Matthewson, 2013, Sec. 3.1].
So again the pattern of interaction with negation is different from that of Alfredian
*motan, for which we find only "not possible" readings.
The differences between Alfredian OE and St'at'imcets and Gitksan thus concern
not only the kind of accessibility relations used by variable-force modals in each lan-
guage, but also in whether the modals always convey inevitability (Alfredian *motan
does, while St'a't'imcets and Gitksan variable-force modals don't), and how they in-
teract with negation (Alfredian *motan always gives rise to the impossibility reading,
while in St'6t'imcets and Gitksan "possibly not"/ "not necessary" readings are also
attested, and sometimes are the only attested ones for a given modal.)
The variable-force modal o'qa of Nez Perce, described by [Deal, 2011], is much
closer to Alfredian *motan, though not identical to it. First, o'qa may use accessibility
relations from the same general domain of circumstantial-deontic(-metaphysical) as
*motan. Second, o'qa always gives rise to impossibility meanings when combined
with clausemate negation. But there is a very important difference: inevitability is
not conveyed by Nez Perce o'qa, as the sentence in 175 shows. No such examples
were found in my Alfredian OE sample (N=72).
(175) [Deal, 2011, ex. (7)]:
picpic ha-'ac-o'qa met'u w6et'u ha-'ac-o'.
cat 3SUBJ-enter-mod but not 3sUBJ-enter-PROSP
'The cat could go in, but it won't go in.'
Another distributional difference concerns the behavior of Alfredian OE and Nez
Perce variable-force modals in the antecedents of conditionals. As we have seen in
example 158, Alfredian *motan shows neutralization between 0 and E] in a conditional
antecedent. In contrast to that, [Deal, 2011] provides several examples from Nez
Perce with o'qa in the antecedent of a conditional for which her consultants accept a
possibility paraphrase, but firmly reject a necessity paraphrase, cf. 176. That shows
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that in Nez Perce, there is no collapse between possibility and necessity when o'qa is
used, unlike in Old English 158.
(176) [Deal, 2011, ex. (59)]:
c'alawi 'aac-o'qa, kaa 'aac-o'.
if enter-MOD then enter-PROSP
OK 'If I can go in, I will go in.'
* 'If I have to go in, I will go in.'
Summing up, Alfredian *motan is empirically very different from the variable-force
modals of St'dt'imcets and Gitksan, and is somewhat similar to, but not identical
with, the variable-force modal o'qa of Nez Perce. But in none of the three Pacific
Northwest languages does a variable-force modal convey a sense of inevitability as
Alfredian *motan does.
4.3.2 Variable force in Alfredian OE and the Pacific North-
west: comparison of theories
My presuppositional analysis for *motan does not carry over to the Pacific Northwest
variable-force modals: it would derive the inevitability effect which is not observed
for them. In the other direction, earlier analyses do not carry over to Old English
either. The five analyses of the variable-force effect proposed in the literature, for
different languages, are as in 177:
(177) a. R with narrowing [Rullmann et al., 2008], for St'dt'imcets
b. 0 with widening [Peterson, 2010], for Gitksan 19
19Both [Rullmann et al., 2008] and [Peterson, 20101 attribute the rise of the variable-force effect
to special mechanisms manipulating the quantificational domain of the modal. But there is a crucial
theoretical difference between the two approaches. [Rullmann et al., 2008] use a special apparatus of
choice functions applied to sets of worlds to implement the narrowing, while [Peterson, 2010] proposes
to use the standard apparatus of conversational backgrounds by [Kratzer, 1981] for manipulations
with domains. As the result, Peterson's treatment of Gitksan's modals ends up being very similar
to Kratzer's treatment of German k6nnen, and his treatment of St'dt'imcets modals, to Kratzer's
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c. upper-end degree modal (~~"somewhat probable)"
[Kratzer, 2012, analysis I], for St'dt'imcets
d. modal with only 1 accessible world
[Kratzer, 2012, analysis III (for no language in particular)
e. regular 0 without a dual Fl [Deal, 20111, for Nez Perce
None of the first three analyses in 177, formulated for St'dt'imcets and Gitksan,
is designed to derive anything close to the inevitability effect and the pattern of
interaction with negation where the variable-force modal always giving rise to an
impossibility reading. But the "analysis II" of [Kratzer, 2012] and the analysis based
on the absence of a modal dual by [Deal, 2011] may account for an empirical pattern
closer to the one we see in Alfredian OE, and thus require attention.
The second variable-force analysis discussed by [Kratzer, 20121 is the following
suggestion, voiced without proposing that it is the right analysis for any language
in particular. Suppose a modal quantifies over a singleton set of worlds. In such a
case, there is no distinction between 0 and El any more: a collapse occurs. A modal
specified as one that only quantifies over singleton sets of worlds would be, using the
descriptive term, a variable-force modal. And in fact, [Stalnaker, 1981] proposes such
a collapse analysis for would in English counterfactual conditionals, independently
from any concerns about variable-force modals of the kind found in the languages of
the Pacific Northwest.
Our analysis has a lot in common with Kratzer's suggestion: under both of them,
possibility and necessity collapse in the set of worlds quantified over. As for the dif-
ferences, first, the way in which the collapse is imposed (namely the presupposition
proposed for *motan) is specific in my theory, and left unspecified in Kratzer's brief
suggestion. Second, there is no need to assume the quantified set is singleton under
my analysis, so in a sense the guiding intuition behind the proposal is slightly dif-
ferent: the possibility-necessity collapse occurs not just because it is impossible to
treatment of German miissen. But empirically German modals and the modals of Gitksan and
St'dt'imcets seem to be quite different. It is not clear how Peterson's system that uses the same
apparatus for both can accommodate that fact.
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distinguish the two in a singleton set of accessible worlds, but as something that needs
to be specifically imposed within the semantics. But modulo those differences, my
theory for Alfredian *motan may be viewed as a more elaborate version of Kratzer's
suggestion.
Finally, the analysis of the variable-force effect proposed for Nez Perce by [Deal, 20111
may in principle be applied to Alfredian *motan, but only if one grants several fur-
ther assumptions with no empirical basis for them in the Old English data. So on the
one hand, Deal's analysis applied to *motan cannot be outright falsified because of
the nature of historical data. On the other, the assumptions it requires one to make
are not independently supported by any evidence, so overall the proposed presup-
positional analysis of *motan is to be preferred, unless facts specifically supporting
Deal's analysis are uncovered.
Deal's analysis for Nez Perce variable-force modal o'qa makes crucial use of the
fact that Nez Perce lacks a modal that could have been o'qa's vanilla-necessity coun-
terpart. o'qa has deontic and circumstantial readings (in the same general modal
meaning domain as *motan). In upward-entailing contexts, it behaves similarly to
the Gitksan variable-force modals: it may be rendered by consultants into English
using both possibility and necessity modals, but possibility translations are gener-
ally preferred. However, in downward-entailing contexts (namely under negation, in
relative clauses modifying universally quantified noun phrases, and in antecedents of
conditionals - the three types of such contexts examined by [Deal, 2011]), o'qa ap-
pears to unambiguously convey possibility: consultants strongly reject sentences with
o 'qa as translations for English sentences with necessity modals in such contexts.
Deal explains this pattern as follows: o'qa's literal meaning is always that of
possibility, so it has roughly the same basic semantics as modern-English can or
may. The peculiar variable-force pattern observed in upward-entailing contexts, Deal
argues, is due to the absence of a stronger necessity dual for that regular possibility
modal. In English, the speaker would not use can when she can use a stronger have
to. But if her language does not have a modal with the semantics of have to, there
would be no reason for the speaker to not use can in upward-entailing contexts where
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English speakers would have used a necessity modal. The variable-force effect in such
contexts is thus just an epiphenomenon of the shape of the modal system of a given
language, and does not result from any special semantics for the variable-force modal
itself.
Unlike in Nez Perce, in Alfredian OE there is a modal that would have been a ne-
cessity dual for *motan: the deontic /circumstantial modal *sculan (>modern shall).
*sculan is the pure-necessity modal of choice both in deontic and circumstantial con-
texts: in 178 *sculan conveys the meaning of moral obligation, in a religious context,
while in 179 *sculan is a circumstantial modal: the context suggests a much stronger
force making the action inevitable than just the force of an obligation.
(178) Hu micle sui~or sculon we 6onne beon gehiersume &em 6e ure
how much more shall we then be obedient to.him who we.GEN
gosta Famder bio wib 6@om 6ot we moten libban on ecnesse!
spirits.GEN father is so that we motan.PRS.PL live on eternity
'Then how much more must we obey the father of our souls so that we moten
live eternally!' (CP:36.255.8)
(179) Preceding context: "Every person's inner thought desires two things, which
are the will and the power. If someone lacks one of those two, then he cannot
fulfill anything with just the other."
Forbam nan nyle onginnan bmat bamt he nele, buton
because none not.wants.to start that which he not.wants.to unless
[nede] scyle; and beah he eall wille, he ne maeg gif he
by.necessity shall and though he entirely wants.to, he not may if he
boas binges anweald naf6.
that.GEN thing.GEN power not.has
'Because nobody would start what they do not want to (start), unless they
have to by necessity; and when someone truly wants to (do that), they cannot
if they do not have power over that thing.' (Bo:36.106.13)
Now, I have noted above that it is hard to establish with certainty which modal
flavors the assertion of *rnotan may have had in Alfredian OE: it occurs in examples
that could be argued to exhibit a meaning from the general range of circumstantial,
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metaphysical and deontic, but it seems impossible to establish with absolute certainty
whether *motan definitely had each of those meanings. So if we really wanted to
stretch Deal's analysis to cover Alfredian *motan, we could stipulate that *motan
only had metaphysical readings, while *sculan had only circumstantial and deontic
readings, but never metaphysical ones. If so, then *motan would indeed have no
exact potential necessity dual, so we would have been able to apply Deal's account.
But there is no basis in the data for making such a claim: it would be just an ad hoc
assumption adopted specifically to make one particular theory work. Moreover, the
assumption that there was a complementary distribution between the modal flavors
of *sculan and *motan is problematic on both historical and typological grounds. On
the typological side, modals rarely have such clear-cut complementary distributions.
On the historical side, even when a modal does lack a particular modal flavor, it can
often acquire it in time in the case it already can express close modal meanings -
and circumstantial modality is close to metaphysical modality, and is known to give
rise to deontic readings in historical change. So the assumption we'd need to adopt
to make Deal's theory work, even if true at some point, should have become false
quite fast. That is not very probable given the fact that *motan's cognates in other
Germanic were special in similar ways, suggesting that the variable-force situation
was in place for a relatively long time. The same comparison with other Germanic,
as we already discussed, suggests that *motan had special semantics, not the regular
K semantics: otherwise, it would be strange that it is only that particular 0 and all
its relatives in other closely related languages underwent the change into a necessity
modal.
Finally, we have already discussed in this section that empirically, there are two
important differences between *motan and Nez Perce o'qa: first, o'qa does not convey
inevitability (cf. 175), and second, o'qa gives rise to regular possibility readings in
conditional antecedents (cf. 176), while Alfredian *motan shows the same 0-L1 collapse
effect in that context as in upward-entailing contexts (cf. 158). Given those two
differences, it does not look as if there are any benefits in adopting the analysis for
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Nez Perce to Alfredian GE.20
To conclude the comparison of data from and theories of the variable-force modals
of the Pacific Northwest and Alfredian *motan, first, the distribution of the Alfredian
modal is different than for any of the Pacific Northwest variable-force modals; second,
our presuppositional theory of *motan should not be applied to St'dt'imcets, Gitksan
or Nez Perce, as it would make wrong predictions; third, the earlier accounts of the
variable-force effect proposed in the literature do not apply to Old English either.
4.4 *moten in Early Middle English: a modal am-
biguous between necessity and possibility
Though Alfredian OE *motan can be rendered with either possibility or necessity
modern modals, there is no sign of ambiguity in the data, so the Old English modal
is a variable-force one: a non-ambiguous lexeme which is neither a 0 or a El. But
when we turn to Early Middle English *moten from the so-called 'AB language', a
dialect written in the West Midlands of England in the first half of the 13th century,
we find a very different picture. Some instances of *moten in 'AB language' are clear
necessity uses, while others feature possibility, or at least non-necessity. The Early
Middle English modal is thus truly ambiguous in the source language.
In this section, I will outline the general semantic distribution of *moten in two
texts from the 13th century: Seinte Margerete, a saint's life adapted from Latin,
written relatively early in the geographical area from which the 'AB language' dialect
comes from, and Ancrene Wisse, a manual for anchoresses touching upon both spiri-
tual and practical matters, written in the same area and in the same dialect several
decades later.21 There are clear differences in usage between the two texts, calling
20As of May 2013, Amy Rose Deal (p.c.) was not convinced that her analysis of Nez Perce cannot
be applied to Alfredian OE. I agree with her that it is not proven that it cannot, but I take the
evidence against it, when gathered together, to be decisive, given the standards of reasonable proof
accepted in historical linguistics.
2
'The editions used were [d'Ardenne, 19771 for Seinte Margerete, and [Millett, 2005] for Ancrene
Wisse. I checked my interpretation of the Middle English examples with the translation of Seinte
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for future research. (Fortunately, there is more material written in the same dialect,
so more data are in principle available for analysis.) Here I only provide a general
description of the data in the two texts: even this general description will be enough
to show an important difference between *motan and *moten in Alfredian OE and
AB-language Early ME.
In about half of the examples from Ancrene Wisse, *moten conveys the meaning
of circumstantial necessity. This type of use is illustrated in 180, for two instances of
*moten. For the first instance, owning a cow does not just create a possibility to think
about the cow's fodder: it necessitates such thinking. Furthermore, the conditional
antecedent in the second sentence in 180 talks about the case when the anchoress
really has no other practical options but to have a cow - after all, if she had such
options, then the preceding discussion about choosing not to have a cow would apply.
Thus in both instances, we have a normal necessity reading: there is no collapse of
possibility and necessity as in Alfredian OE, and no other kind of variable-force effect.
(180) (AW 8:90-9) "You should have no animal but one cat only. An anchoress who
has livestock seems more a housewife, as Martha was, she cannot easily be
Mary, Martha's sister, with her tranquillity of heart."
for benne mot ha benchen of be kues foddre <...>
for then moten.3sg she think of the cow's fodder
'For then she (=the anchoress) has to think of the cow's fodder <...>'
Nu benne, 3ef eani mot nedlunge habben hit, loki bet hit na
Now then if any moten.3sg necessarily have it, see that it.NOM no
mon ne eili ne ne hearmi
man.ACC not ail not not harm
'Now then if any (anchoress) absolutely has to have a cow, at least see to it
that the cow does not hurt or ail anyone.'
But even though circumstantial-D uses as in 180 are the most common for *moten
in Ancrene Wisse, the modal is also used in such ways which hardly allow a necessity
Margerete in [Savage and Watson, 19911 and the glosses for Ancrene Wisse in [Hasenfratz, 20001.
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interpretation. A particularly clear such case involves the use of *moten in prayers,
as in 181:
(181) I be wur~gunge, Iesu Crist, of bine tweof apostles, bet Ich mote oueral folhin
hare lare, bet Ich mote habben burh hare bonen be tweolf bohes be blowe6
of chearite, (AW 1:174-6)
'In honor, Jesus Christ, of your twelve apostles, may I everywhere follow their
teaching, may I have through their prayers the twelve branches that blossom
with love'
There may be different opinions regarding what exact meaning the modal in such
contexts has. But in Present-Day English, necessity modals cannot be used in such
contexts, and possibility may is used instead. Moreover, as *moten gradually turned
into an exclusively necessity modal in Late Middle and Early Modern English, it
was ousted from wishes (cf. §1692, §1680-1 of [Visser, 1973]). That fact shows that
whatever particular meaning the modal had in such constructions, it was crucial for
it to be able to have non-necessity semantics in order to appear in them.
So while in Alfredian OE, we had to do with an unambiguous variable-force modal,
in Early Middle English we see the same modal *moten expressing both necessity and
non-necessity meanings. If we only look at the translations into modern English, we
can see a superficially similar pattern: both possibility and necessity modern modals
may be used to render Alfredian *motan and AB-language *moten. But in the source
languages, the two modals behave very differently: the former is non-ambiguous, while
the latter one can express genuinely different meanings. We can tell the difference if
we note that Alfredian *motan may allow for both 0 and El renderings in the same
example without a substantial change in the intended message of the sentence, while
Early Middle English *moten in any particular example only allows for one or the
other: the two instances of the modal in 180 are both circumstantial-necessity ones,
while the two instances in 181 are both non-necessity.
How could such ambiguity exist in the language? Specifically, how could the
speakers and hearers properly identify the relevant reading, and how could such a
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situation of ambiguity arise historically?
For both questions, contexts are the key to the answer. For example, the "prayer-
meaning" of *moten seems to be tied to the linguistic context of a purpose clause. In
our Alfredian sample, 16 examples out of 72 occurred in purpose or result clauses. (It
is often impossible to distinguish between the two with certainty, as is often noted in
the literature on Old English syntax.) So on the surface, the use of strings including
a purpose-clause marker and modal *motan/ *moten persisted since Alfredian OE to
AB-language Early ME. What changed was the interpretation given to those strings:
in Ancrene Wisse, *moten in them is close to the special marker of a prayer. Yet in
the slightly earlier Seinte Margerete, it is not yet such a marker: in 182 mote is best
rendered by a genuine 0 modern modal, not with the formulaic may used in prayers,
despite the sentence being a part of an actual prayer. Thus persistent surface patterns
of usage may go along with semantic reanalysis (cf. [Eckardt, 2006]).
(182) & 3ef me hope of heale kt mi bone mote burh-burli be heouene. (SM:64.16)
'and give me the hope of salvation, so that my prayers could through-reach
to the heaven'
This shows that speakers may index a particular meaning not just to a given
word, but also to a word in a particular context. (In Chapters 3 and 5, we see other
examples of that pattern.) And from that, we can see how they could deal with
multiple ambiguity: if a given meaning is indexed to a word in a particular type
of context, then there exist contextual cues helping out with the disambiguation.
For example, encountering a purpose clause with *moten, a contemporary reader of
Ancrene Wisse would not necessarily want to recover the meaning of circumstantial
necessity for the modal, despite it being dominant at the time: the non-necessity
meaning indexed to that syntactic context would have been able to trump that.
So compositional semantics and usage-based factors can work together, helping the
speakers to use language both flexibly and efficiently.
Having learned that the Early Middle English descendant of Alfredian variable-
force *motan was an ambiguous modal with both necessity and non-necessity uses, we
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report the first known case where the semantic change trajectory of a variable-force
modal was observed. The semantic shift from the presuppositional variable-force
*motan to the dominant reading of circumstantial necessity for Early Middle En-
glish *moten is of an expected type under our analysis of Alfredian *motan. For
the circumstantial necessity meaning to arise from the presuppositional variable-force
meaning, it sufficed to reinterpret the presupposition of *motan as a component of
meaning belonging to the assertion (see [Schwenter and Waltereit, 2010] for a dis-
cussion of such processes), and slightly change the modal flavor in order to get a
circumstantial-necessity meaning.
The trajectory of change is thus from a true variable-force modal into a modal
ambiguous between D and non-E, and then into a regular l. This trajectory should
be cross-checked on wider Middle English material, as well as on *motan/ *moten's
cognates in other Germanic, but on its own merits the proposed semantic change path
is reasonable.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have proposed a new analysis of the semantics of *motan in Alfredian
Old English, arguing that it was a non-ambiguous variable-force modal. I derived the
variable-force effect from the presupposition 161 which forces possibility and necessity
collapse in the set of worlds quantified over by the modal. This type of variable-force
effect has not yet been observed, so Alfredian OE makes our typology of possible
variable-force modals richer. Apparently there exist very many ways to be a variable-
force modal: so far, the variable-force modals of St'dt'imcets, Gitksan, Nez Perce and
Alfredian Old English seem all to show important distributional differences.
Turning to Early Middle English, I argued above that *moten, unlike its ances-
tor *motan), was a modal ambiguous between several very different meanings, some
of them necessity, some others, non-necessity ones. First, this shows that having
modern-English correspondents with different modal force by itself does not make a
modal genuinely variable-force: Early Middle English *moten does correspond to both
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necessity and possibility modals in modern English, but it is truly ambiguous in the
source language. Second, since the ambiguous modal *moten is a direct descendant
of the variable-force Alfredian modal *motan, we learn that genuine variable-force
modals may in principle turn into ones that are ambiguous between necessity and
possibility. This is the first instance known to the author of demonstrating the di-
achronic semantic trajectory for a variable-force modal.
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Chapter 5
Beyond-polarity restrictions on the
scope of deontics
The aim of this chapter is to show that the current syntactic accounts of the scope
restrictions of deontic modals with respect to negation are not satisfactory, and to
suggest that some scope restrictions should be accounted for within the semantics and
pragmatics, via semantic-convention filters on scope configurations. The negative
part of my case comes from examining a wide range of deontics in terms of their
scope: I argue that the observed diversity makes a purely syntactic account highly
implausible. The positive part of my case is to demonstrate, using two case studies,
how a semantic-convention filter can arise during the diachronic development of a
modal, thus lending plausibility to my suggestion that some scope restrictions should
be accounted for semantically. 1
I start in Section 5.1 with a description of the recent attempt by [Iatridou and Zeijlstra, 2013]
to reduce the scopal restrictions of deontic modals to polarity-item properties. I show
that I&Z's theoretical machinery fails to rule out certain unattested scopal constru-
'The research reported in this chapter has benefitted from presentations at Ottawa University,
University of Connecticut, Stanford and UCLA. Discussions with Jonathan Bobaljik, Cleo Condo-
ravdi, Nathalie Dion, Kai von Fintel, Olga Fischer, Sabine Iatridou, Magdalena Kaufmann, Stefan
Kaufmann, Paul Kiparsky, Sven Lauer, Yael Sharvit, Sali Tagliamonte and Yakov Testelets have
helped the progress of the project enormously.
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als even in the languages they consider. I assume that I&Z's analysis of NPI and
PPI modals is correct, but for non-polarity modals their system cannot make enough
distinctions to account for the whole range of data.
In Section 5.2, I introduce data from Russian deontics that only underscore the
problem: despite all of them having similar surface syntax, Russian deontics show a
wide range of scopal behaviors. That further suggests that syntax may play no role
in how at least some constraints on scope work.
What the old and the new data indicate together is that we need more mechanisms
that can restrict the scope of modals. In Section 5.3, I argue that the kind of mech-
anism we need may take the form of a semantic convention filtering out particular
scope configurations, without the mediation of syntax.
In the remainder of the chapter, I show how we can support positing of semantic-
convention filters through diachronic arguments. In Sections 5.4 and 5.5, I consider
Russian stoit 'should', taking wide scope, and English deontic have to, taking narrow
scope with respect to clausemate negation, and show how those restrictions arose
historically caused by a combination of semantic and pragmatic factors, with no need
for assuming syntactic mediation.
Section 5.6 concludes, outlining the emerging general framework for analyzing
fixed scope of modals: 1) the "narrow" grammar provides language users with ways
to compute a large variety of scopal construals, and with mechanisms such as polar-
ity licensing that rule out some of them; 2) semantics and pragmatics may feature
conventionalized restrictions that rule out some of the syntactically well-formed con-
struals.
5.1 Deontics and clausemate negation: the state of
the art
Deontic modals often have restricted scope with respect to clausemate negation. Pos-
sibility deontics (that is, permission modals) seem to universally scope under negation,
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see [van der Auwera, 2001, Sec. 5.6, 5.71, but necessity deontics (obligation modals)
show a range of different behaviors. I have nothing to say about the scope restrictions
of permission deontics, and set them aside for the purposes of this chapter. From this
point on, only obligation deontics will be discussed. [Iatridou and Zeijlstra, 20131
distinguish three types of such modals, given in 183:
(183) I&Z's three polarity types of deontics:
1. PPI modals: as other PPIs, need to be licensed by being in a non-
downward-entailing (DE) context
Examples: must, should, Dutch moeten, Greek prepi
2. NPI modals: as other NPIs, need to be licensed by being in a DE
context
Examples: need, German brauchen, Dutch hoeven
3. Neutral modals: are OK in upward-entailing contexts, but in the pres-
ence of negation scope under it.
Examples: have to, German miissen
Iatridou and Zeijlstra employ two mechanisms to derive the empirically observed
scope configurations from the surface structure. First, they argue that the modal
appearing in the TP zone may reconstruct to a position within VP, and thus below
negation: this is how I&Z derive the narrow scope for the NPI modal need in 184.
(184) Mary needn't leave.
= 'It is not that Mary needs to leave' OK
# 'Mary needs to not leave' * 1 >
Second, when a modal that occurs below negation in the surface syntax needs to
scope above it, as in 185, I&Z posit covert, QR-like movement of the modal over the
negation.
(185) 0 Yanis dhen prepi na figi.
John NEG LI-DEONTIC leave
185
# 'It is not that John has to leave' * , > E
-'John has to not leave' OK - > ,
Thus reconstruction takes care of the cases when the modal needs to scope lower
than it stays in the surface syntax, and covert QR-like movement applies when the
modal needs to scope higher than its surface position. In the case of NPI or PPI
modals, I&Z's analysis straightforwardly derives the facts: 1) due to the polarity
requirements, only one of the two possible scope configurations allows the polarity-
item-modal to be licensed; 2) if the only licensed scope configuration can be read off
the surface structure, so be it; and if not, then either reconstruction or covert QR-
like movement derives it. But for the third type of modals, which I&Z call "neutral",
more must be said. Those modals are happy in upward-entailing environments, unlike
NPIs. Yet when they occur in the same clause with negation, they obligatorily scope
under it. So on the one hand, they are not polarity items, but on the other, they
have fixed scope with respect to negation. English have to and German miissen are
two examples:
(186) Mary doesn't have to leave.
-'It is not that Mary has to leave' OK -, >
#'Mary has to not leave' * El>-,
(187) Hans muss nicht abfahren.
Hans E-DEONTIC NEG leave
-'It is not that John has to leave' OK > Fl
#'John has to not leave' * R > ,
In the surface structure, have to appears below negation, while miissen appears
above it. [Iatridou and Zeijlstra, 2013] take modals like have to to pose no problems
in their system: "we do not need to say anything further for those that surface at the
right of negation, as they are simply interpreted where they are in the overt syntax,
that is, their syntactic and semantic scopes are identical". Now, that is not quite
correct: as I&Z themselves discuss, modals have to have the option of undergoing
covert QR-like movement for scope purposes; that option, other things being equal,
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should be available to have to in 186. Yet it is not available, and I&Z do not explain
why.
I&Z's account for non-NPI modals like German miissen or Spanish tener que
which appear above negation in the surface structure is not unproblematic either.
For such modals, I&Z have to explain why their scope cannot be just read off the
surface structure. To do that, I&Z introduce a principle forcing such modals to have
narrow scope:
(188) [Iatridou and Zeijlstra, 2013, (69b)]:
Head-movement reconstructs unless reconstruction would result in a gram-
matical violation.
I&Z argue that given the principle in 188, the scopal properties of 187 follow: 1)
as miissen is a non-polarity modal according to I&Z, there is no reason that would
prevent it from scoping under the negation; 2) from 188, we derive that miissen
obligatorily reconstructs.
There are two problems with this explanation. First, the principle in 188 only
rules out one class of derivations that may lead to the E > , construal. There are at
least two other types of derivations that need to be independently blocked: A) after
reconstructing due to 188, a modal like miissen may undergo QR-like movement
upwards across the negation; B) the modal may undergo QR-like movement from
its surface position, ending up in a position above the negation; for modals like
mussen, that would block head-movement reconstruction, rendering the principle in
188 irrelevant.
I do not claim that one absolutely cannot introduce constraints that would rule
out all the derivations that lead to illicit scope construals. But for have to-type
and miissen-type modals, we would have to introduce very different constraints that
result in the same interpretational restrictions. For have to we need to prohibit
QR-like movement from the base position of the modal. For miissen we need to
prohibit QR-like movement from a raised position at T. At the same time, we can-
not prohibit QR-like movement for modals in general, as it is needed to derive the
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observed scope configurations for other modals. There seems to be no principled
way to carve out the relevant constraints on covert movement which would apply to
have to and miissen without directly mentioning those modals -rather than some
structural configuration-in the definition. In other words, the narrow scope of have
to and miissen seems to be an idiosyncratic property of those modals, and not the
consequence of how general syntactic mechanisms work.
The second problem with I&Z's explanation only reinforces that conclusion. In
addition to non-polarity modals with fixed scope, there exist freely-scoping deontics.
For example, I&Z themselves discuss French devoir which has free scope freely in
simple present sentences like 189:
(189) Il ne doit pas partir.
He EXPL.NEG O-DEONTIC NEG leave
= 'It is not that John has to leave' OK -, >
= 'John has to not leave' OK W > ,
Modals like devoir do not quite fit into I&Z's classification in 183, but I&Z suggest
that perhaps the principle 188 forcing obligatory reconstruction of head movement is
language-specific, and does not exist in French. Setting aside the question of whether
it is plausible that languages differ with respect to such general properties of their
syntax, saying that French does not obey 188 is still not enough to account for the
behavior of devoir. It is not that French permits free scoping for devoir in all cases:
as [Iatridou and Zeijlstra, 2013] note, in indicative perfectives, devoir is required to
scope below the negation, 190.
(190) Jean n' a pas du prendre l'autobus.
Jean EXPL.NEG have NEG EL-DEONTIC take the bus
- 'It is not that John had to take the bus' OK , l
$ 'John had to not take the bus' * 1 > -
While in 189, devoir has moved over the interpretable negation pas (with higher
ne being an expletive, omittable negative particle), in 190 the T position above pas
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is occupied by the auxiliary avoir that blocks head movement by devoir. I&Z hy-
pothesize that the presence of the auxiliary that blocks head movement of the modal
to T may be the reason why scope of devoir is restricted in 190, and call for future
research on the issue. Further research is warranted, as such blocking actually cannot
explain the unavailability of the E > -, reading in 190: the presence of an auxiliary
would not prevent covert QR-like movement by devoir, especially given the fact that
in infinitivals, as I&Z themselves observe, devoir occupies a surface position below
the negation, but is capable of covertly moving over it, 191.
(191) Ne pas devoir fumer pendant 5 heures, c'est terrible.
EXPL.NEG NEG O-DEONTIC smoke during 5 hours that's terrible
OK 'To be forced to not smoke for 5 hours is terrible'
And what is even worse, in irrealis perfectives as in 192, the scope of devoir is
fixed not below, but above negation. In both 190 and 192, there is an auxiliary that
blocks head movement over negation by devoir. Yet the scope is fixed differently
in the two constructions. Such scope restrictions thus have nothing to do with the
surface syntactic configuration.
(192) Jean n' aurait pas du prendre l'autobus.
Jean EXPL.NEG would.have NEG D-DEONTIC take the bus
# 'It is not that John should have taken the bus' * > E
-'John should not have taken the bus' OKW> > ,
The problems with devoir add to the problems with have to and miissen: there
are plenty of restrictions on the scope of non-polarity-item modals, but they do not
appear to be caused by general syntactic principles. Rather it seems that individual
lexical items, or even the pair of a lexical item and a particular tense-aspect-mood
combination, may have associated scope constraints.
Summing up the discussion so far, we can conclude the following:
(193) Positing that modals by default reconstruct to VP-internal positions cannot
by itself derive the narrow scope of I&Z's "neutral" modals with respect to
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negation.
(from German miissen and English have to)
(194) Constraints on the scoping of modals and negation may be specific to partic-
ular tense-aspect-mood combinations.
(from French devoir)
In the next section, I will introduce data from Russian deontics that further il-
lustrate the insufficiency of I&Z's system. While French devoir scopes freely in the
present and the non-finite forms, its scope is at least sometimes fixed, but Russian fea-
tures modals that are truly neutral in that they always permit both scope construals
with respect to clausemate negation. In view of the existence of such true neutrality,
it becomes even more obvious that the scope restrictions of modals such as German
miissen, English have to and French devoir are the idiosyncratic properties of those
particular words.
5.2 Russian deontics: true neutrality with respect to
negation
Normally, if a scope-bearing expression is neither an NPI or a PPI, its scope with
respect to negation is not fixed. For example, indefinites such as two books are
polarity-neutral, and therefore may scope both above and below clausemate negation.
In contrast to that, in the modal domain I&Z assign the label of polarity-neutral
modals to have to and miissen which obligatorily scope below clausemate negation.
This was a reasonable move given that I&Z did not find any necessity deontic that
would be completely neutral with respect to negation. French devoir gets closest
to that, but it still has restricted scope in some tense-aspect-mood forms. In this
section, I provide data from Russian necessity deontics that are truly neutral: they
scope freely with respect to their clausemate negation. From here on, I will reserve
the term neutral to such truly polarity-neutral expressions. Thus I&Z's category of
"neutral" modals in fact features modals subject to scope restrictions, even though
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those may stem from something different than polarity sensitivity.
Another important feature of the Russian system is that in addition to free-scope
deontics, Russian also has both D > , and -, > El fixed-scope necessity deontics.
Free-scoping and restricted deontics have similar syntax in Russian, all occurring
below negation in the surface structure. This further illustrates that scope restrictions
are often specific to particular modals, rather than stem from the general properties
of the syntactic system (contra I&Z, who propose the language-specific principle of
obligatory reconstruction of head movement in order to derive the fixed scope of
German miissen and Spanish tener que).
In this section, I first introduce the data on free-scope deontics, Section 5.2.1.
Then I discuss modal Neg-raising in Section 5.2.2, showing that free-scope Russian
modals have genuine, not Neg-raised El > , readings. While doing so, I point out
problems with [Homer, 2013]'s Neg-raising analyses of English modals. In Section
5.2.3, I provide data on Russian fixed-scope deontics.
5.2.1 Russian free-scope deontics
Morphologically and syntactically, most deontics in Russian are predicative adjectives
taking as arguments a Nominative or a Dative subject, and an infinitive clause. Pred-
icative adjectives in Russian require the presence of copula bytj 'be'. In the present,
the copula's form is 0, so it is not visible on the surface.
Russian modals dolind (that can have the deontic, teleological and epistemic
modal flavors) and ndnio (need /deontic/ teleological) have free scope with respect
to clausemate negation:
(195) Ona ne dolzna upominatj o svojom znakomstve s Anej.
she NEG O-DEONTIC mention about her acquaintance with Anya
l > ,: 'She mustn't mention she's acquainted with Anya.'
(196) Masa objasnila, sto Anja ne dolzna pisatj oteot.
Masha explained that Anya NEG EL-DEONTIC write report
- > El: 'Masha explained that Anya does not have to write a report.'
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segodnja prinositj svoj obed:
she.DAT NEG L-DEONTIC today bring her lunch
'She {mustn't / doesn't have to} bring her lunch today: '
a. ... xolodiljnik slomalsja, i
fridge
edu.
food
dekan poprosila poka ne prinositj svoju
broke, and chair asked yet NEG bring
L > -: '... the fridge broke down, and the chair asked (everyone) to not
bring their food until further notice.'
... na fakuljtete budet furset.
on department will.be catered.food
-, > l: '... there will be catered food in the department.'
The same freedom of scoping is retained in the past tense:
Ona ne dolina byla upominatj o svojom znakomstve s
she NEG LI-DEONTIC was mention about her
Anej.
acquaintance with
Anya
L > -,: 'She had to keep silent about her acquaintance with Anya.'
, > 0: 'She didn't have to keep silent about her acquaintance with Anya.'
(199) Ej ne nuzno bylo upominatj o
she.DAT NEG O-DEONTIC was mention about
svojom znakomstve s
her acquaintance with
Anej.
Anya
L > -,: 'She had to keep silent about her acquaintance with Anya.'
, > 0: 'She didn't have to keep silent about her acquaintance with Anya.'
Both dolina and nuino appear below sentential negation in the surface syntax:
negation in Russian always occupies a high position, cliticizing on the left to the high-
est finite element in its clause.2 Thus the scope configuration -, > l may be read off
the surface structure, but the 0 > , interpretation has to be derived by covert QR-like
2The role of that "highest finite element" in 198 and 199 is taken up by the predicative adjective:
on the surface, it looks as if the adjective has head-moved across the copula, in a pattern similar
to the well-known "long head movement" pattern in South and West Slavic. It is still an open
question what exact underlying structure corresponds to the linear order (Neg) Adj Aux in different
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one's
b.
(198)
(197) Ej ne nuzno
movement of the modal (assuming the general system of [Iatridou and Zeijlstra, 2013];
in a different system, another covert scope-changing operation would apply.)
5.2.2 Free-scope deontics and (the absence of) Neg-raising
[Homer, 20131 extensively argues that modals may not only have genuine wide scope
with respect to negation, but also create Neg-raised readings. Homer assumes the
semantic analysis of Neg-raising along the lines of [Gajewski, 2007], wherein Neg-
raisers carry the presupposition of possible-world uniformity. For example, the Neg-
raised reading of I don't think Barcelona is in Spain is derived from the literal, weak
meaning of the sentence 'It is compatible with my thoughts that Barcelona is not in
Slavic languages, the several analytical options being: (1) [Rivero, 19941 argues for a long head
movement analysis, with the adjectival element (a participle or an actual adjective) appearing in
C; (2) [Boskovi6, 19951 argues for incorporation analysis, in which the adjectival element merges
into the copula head; (3) [Ackema and Camdzid, 2003] arguing for base-generating the adjectival
element in the higher position. This does not exhaust the analytical options, and some authors,
esp. [Embick and Izvorski, 1997], caution against lumping together all instances of the order Adj Aux,
within the same language or across different Slavic languages (cf. also [Borsley and Rivero, 1994] and
[Broekhuis and Migdalski, 20031).
Russian data, previously not described in connection to "long head movement"/"Adj movement
across the copula" in other Slavic, should bear on that debate, though much future research is
needed. For example, the fact that the Russian sentence in (i) is grammatical shows that either
the incorporation analysis of Boskovid does not work for Russian, or it does not work for BCS.
Boskovid argues that if there is a need for the incorporated adjectival element to move further up,
it necessarily excorporates, stranding the copula below. So when Adj has an independent reason to
move higher from the complex Neg-Adj-Aux, it strands Neg-Aux - as can be observed in BCS. But
in the Russian (i), negation is not stranded, but taken along by the moving adjective. Thus either
Russian orders Adj Aux do not feature Boskovi6-style incorporation, or Boskovid is wrong about the
excorporation requirement, which would destroy his account of the BCS data.
(i) Ne nuino Mase bylo tuda ezditj.
NEG EL-DEONTIC Masha.DAT was there go
S> -,: 'Masha should not have gone there.'
, > E: 'It is not that Masha should have gone there.'
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Spain', and the presupposition that the attitude bearer either believes p or believes
-p. In this case, the presupposition states that I either believe that Barcelona is in
Spain or that Barcelona is not in Spain. Given such presupposition, the weak reading
entails the stronger Neg-raised reading "I think that Barcelona is not in Spain". In
the general case, Gajewski's presupposition rules out situations where the attitude
bearer has no opinion regarding p, and that causes the weaker meaning -,(Dox C p)
to entail the stronger meaning Dox C -,p, where Dox is the set of belief worlds.
Given the theoretical possibility of Neg-raising for intensional operators, we can
ask whether the E > , construals of the Russian examples above are due to the modal
genuinely taking wide scope, or to Neg-raising. Assuming Gajewski's theory of Neg-
raising which Homer adopts, it is easy to check that directly. The presupposition of
uniformity is crucial for the generation of a Neg-raised reading in Gajewski's system.
We can then construct a context where the presupposition is clearly not met, and
check whether Russian free-scope deontics may still show the D > , interpretation.
If yes, then their scope is genuine. If not, then it was due to Neg-raising.
In the case of obligation deontics, the presupposition creating the Neg-raising
effect is as follows:
(200) Presupposition enabling Neg-raising for modals:
Either it is necessary that p, or it is necessary that -p.
To make sure the presupposition does not hold, we need to use a context where it
is established that it is clearly an option that neither p nor -,p is necessary. In other
words, if the context does not rule out (0p) A (0-,p), then the presupposition in 200
is not met. The context in 201 is of the proper kind: for each particular day, it says
that either D(office) or 0(office) A 0-,(office) is true. We can see that for both
dolina and nuino the F > , reading still remains available in that context. That
means those Russian free-scope inodals can scope over clausemate negation without
the help of Neg-raising.
(201) Po pravilam ej inogda polagaetsja provoditj vesj denj v
According rules she.DAT sometimes supposed.to spend whole day in
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svoem ofise, xotja 6asto ona voljna rabotatj tam, gde ej
her office though often she.NOM free to.work there where for.her
udobnee.
more.convenient
'According to the rules, she sometimes has to spend the whole day in her
office, but quite often she is free to work wherever it's convenient for her to
do that.'
a. ... I vot zavtra ona ne dolina pokidatj ofis.
and so tomorrow she.NOM NEG l-DEONTIC leave office
El > -: 'And as for tomorrow specifically, she must not leave her office.'
b. ... I vot zavtra ej ne nuzno pokidatj ofis.
and so tomorrow she.DAT NEG D-DEONTIC leave office
E > ,1: 'And as for tomorrow specifically, she must not leave her office.'
Having established that Russian free-scope deontics can have genuine wide scope,
we can turn to correcting several misconceptions about modal Neg-raising introduced
by [Homer, 20131. First, Homer's empirical test for modal Neg-raising in English is
methodologically problematic. Second, Homer's classification of English should as
assessor-dependent and must as assessor-independent is based on incomplete data,
and is incorrect: the contrasts Homer notices are due to differences in modal flavor
(for which he did not control), not to the lexical properties of the modals. Third,
Homer's generalization stating that only assessor-dependent predicates may be Neg-
raisers is based on a misunderstanding of what assessor-dependence is.
First, let's consider the test for Neg-raising in English that Homer introduces.
Both must and should which he tests are PPI modals, so it is not easy to detect
whether they are capable of Neg-raising: they normally produce the 0 > , inter-
pretation. But as other PPIs, they may scope under negation as long as there is an
intervening operator such as a universal quantifier over individuals that shields them.
In particular, the scope configuration , > V > El is admissible for a PPI modal. This
observation leads Homer to formulate the following test. 202, with the modal taking
narrowest scope, has the literal meaning , > V > 0, equivalent to 3 > -, > 0. Under
Neg-raising, that meaning would entail the stronger meaning 3 > E > -. So if we
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detect a sentence of the form in 202 to have the stronger meaning El > El > ,, that
means the modal involved is a Neg-raiser.
(202) Not everyone MODAL p.
Literal meaning: , > V > l, equivalent to El > -, > L
Neg-raised meaning: I > 0 > -,
According to Homer, should passes the test, while must does not. Applying the
test, however, is problematic because the Neg-raised reading being tested for entails
the non-Neg-raised reading. Even a non-Neg-raising predicate may get a Neg-raised
reading if the context is right. Given that, one cannot tell if a particular single
instance of the test features the stronger meaning because of the context, or because
of the modal's properties. In order to reach definite conclusions, one has to consider
multiple instances of the test, but that is not straightforward either.
For suppose for the sake of the argument that should is a Neg-raiser. Even in this
case we do not expect to see every instance of the test with should to feature the
stronger meaning: it is well known that the Neg-raising presupposition sometimes
fails to be triggered by true Neg-raising predicates. So the existence of examples like
203 does not falsify Homer's claim that should is a Neg-raiser.
(203) Not everyone should file their taxes on April 15. (Some people have the right
for an extension.)
OK El> -i> E] # 3 > [ >
Second, as must is a non-Neg-raiser, we expect it to only give rise to the relevant
reading due to the special contextual strengthening. Indeed, we find naturalistic
examples where the strengthened reading is conveyed, as in 204.
(204) (These two studies suggest that the widely held assumption that presumes it is
important for everyone to find meaning in loss is incorrect.)
These authors suggest that not everyone must embark on a painful jour-
ney toward meaning to experience peace and come to terms with significant
loss.
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(from Caring for the Vulnerable, ed. Mary de Chesnay, p. 108)
So if Homer's classification of should as a Neg-raiser and must as a non-Neg-raiser
is correct, we expect to find both strengthened and non-strengthened meanings for
either modal. But if that is what we see, then how do we know that one modal is
a Neg-raiser and the other is not? Strictly speaking, it might still be possible to
argue for that by showing that for should, the Neg-raised readings are systematically
available, while for must, they only occur sporadically. But Homer does not even
acknowledge the difficulty, and seems to have assumed that examples like 204 are
impossible in English.
Turning to the alleged link between assessor-dependence, in the relativist sense,
and Neg-raising, consider the following generalization:
(205) [Homer, 2013, (100)]:
Generalization: Only assessor dependent predicates are neg-raisers.
Homer argues that the behavior of must and should supports his generalization:
he takes must to be a non-Neg-raiser and non-assessor-dependent, and should to be
a Neg-raiser, and an assessor-dependent predicate. But if Homer's characterization
of should as a Neg-raiser and must as a non-Neg-raiser is just hard to either falsify or
verify, his claim that should is assessor-dependent and must is not assessor-dependent,
is outright false.
Homer argues that the infelicity of 206 indicates that should is assessor-dependent,
and that the felicity of the parallel example 207 with must shows that must is not.
(206) [Homer, 2013, (76a)]:
# Hermann shoulddeon marry Zelda, but I don't have an opinion about this
marriage.
(207) [Homer, 2013, (79a)]:
OK Hermann mustdeon marry Zelda, but I don't have an opinion about this
marriage.
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But the difference between 206 and 207 that Homer reports is spurious. Once
we control for whether the deontic in that sentence frame is subjective or objective,
we can easily build parallel good examples with should, as in 208, and parallel bad
examples with must, 209. The infelicity of 206 and 209 is due to the fact that the
sentence form (0p) Ano.opinion(p) is bad when l has the subjective deontic reading.
It does not depend on whether l is should or must.
(208) OK Given the law regarding royal offspring, Hermann shouldco0 marry Zelda,
but I don't have an opinion about this marriage.
(209) # My child, you mustdeon go to sleep now, but I don't have an opinion about
your going to sleep.
Moreover, the fact that Homer happened to use a subjectively-leaning example
with should and an objectively-leaning example with must is in itself an accident:
[Ninan, 2005] argued that it is matrix must that requires a greater degree of speaker
endorsement than should, finding a difference between the two which goes in the
opposite direction from the one found assumed by [Homer, 2013].
Thus contrary to [Homer, 2013], there is no difference in assessor-dependence be-
tween deontic should and must, and the two modals lend no support to his general-
ization in 205.
Unfortunately, the problems with Homer's generalization 205 do not end with
modals. To support his claim, Homer argues that the whole list of Neg-raising pred-
icates given in [Horn, 1978] features only assessor-dependent predicates. But it is
hard to see in what sense predicates like imagine, feel like, plan or desirable may be
analyzed as assessor-dependent, unless one is willing to say that predicates like table
are.
I refer the reader to [MacFarlane, 2012] for a brief introduction to the issues of
assessor-dependency, and note that the crucial feature of assessor-dependent predi-
cates is that a single utterance featuring them may be judged as true by one person
and false by another with both of the assessors being correct. It is thus not just the
facts of the matter, but also facts about the assessor's state of mind and context that
198
determine the truth of an assessor-dependent statement - a quite unusual situation in
natural language. To give an example, in the case of the arguably assessor-dependent
epistemic might, Mary's utterance of Bill might be in Boston may be true with her as
an assessor, but false with the assessor being Ann who knows that Bill is in Berkeley.
To say that imagine is assessor-sensitive, as Homer does, is effectively to say that
when Mary says 210, she may have said something true even if her assertion is false
for a certain Ann as the assessor. But this is not the case: either Beth imagines she's
friends with a unicorn, or she doesn't, and whether 210 is true does not depend on
whether it is Mary herself or Ann who assesses Mary's assertion.
(210) Beth imagines that she is friends with a unicorn.
If we allow the objective truth of 210 to depend not just on the state of the world,
but also on the assessor (as relativists do for epistemic modals, taste predicates, etc.,
but, importantly, not for predicates like imagine), we will have to claim that 211 is
also assessor-sensitive.
(211) Beth saw a table.
To sum up the discussion of [Homer, 20131, while he makes a valuable suggestion
that certain apparent wide-scope construals of deontic modals may be due to Neg-
raising rather than genuine wide scope, his diagnostics for Neg-raising in English are
much less clear-cut than he takes them to be; Homer's results on assessor-dependence
of must and should are spurious as he fails to control for modal flavor; and finally, the
alleged connection between the ability to Neg-raise and assessor-dependence is based
on a misunderstanding of what assessor-dependence is.
5.2.3 Russian fixed-scope deontics
It is not that all Russian modals have free scope with respect to clausemate negation.
In particular, stoit (an "advice" modal) always takes scope over clausemate negation,
while obyazana (deontic) always scopes below it:
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(212) Tebe ne stoit begatj po utram.
you.DAT NEG E-ADVICE run on mornings
OK F1 > -,: "You should not run in the mornings."
* ,> L: "It is not that you should run in the mornings."
(213) Ona ne objazana byla pisatj oteot o poezdke.
she NEG El-DEONTIC was write report about trip
* Li> -: "She was required to not write a report about the trip."
OK - > L: "She did not have to write a report about the trip."
Objazana belongs to the same morphosyntactic category as dol.ia, so the com-
parison between the two shows that it really depends on the lexical item alone which
scope construals are allowed. Stoit is an impersonal verb, not a predicative adjec-
tive, but its surface position is under negation, just as for predicative adjectives, so
there is no reason to think the morphosyntactic differences between stoit and nuzno or
dolina should have any consequence with respect to their interaction with clausemate
negation.
New Russian data we reviewed above thus add further evidence that scope restric-
tions of modals are so diverse for modals with otherwise similar syntactic behavior
that such restrictions are likely to be associated directly with individual modals, and
not stem from major principles regulating the work of the syntactic component.
5.3 Semantic-convention filters on modal scope con-
struals
Adding the Russian modals reviewed in the previous section to the overall dataset to
be analyzed, we may conclude the following:
(214) Modals may be PPIs (like must) or NPIs (like need), or they may be not
polarity-sensitive at all (like English have to, French devoir, Russian nuzno).
(215) The syntactic component allows a non-polarity-sensitive modal to have either
scope with respect to clausemate negation.
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(After [Iatridou and Zeijlstra, 2013], we can take the mechanisms responsible for
this to be reconstruction and scope-changing covert movement.)
(216) Not every modal uses all the possibilities made available by the syntax.
Namely, there may be further constraints in place that rule out a particular scope
configuration for a given modal word (English have to, Russian objazana), or for a
modal word within a particular environment (French devoir in indicative vs. irrealis
perfectives).
Thus polarity-sensitivity is not the only mechanism that may constrain how a
modal scopes with respect to clausemate negation. In particular, the case of devoir
suggests that scope restrictions may be tied to particular "constructions" rather than
attached to lexical items. It is hardly possible to derive such construction-specific
constraints using general-purpose syntactic mechanisms. But do we have any way to
account for scope constraints not using syntactic mechanisms?
I argue that we do, and that fixed-scope constraints may be imposed by the lexical
and construction-specific semantics and pragmatics of the language. We know inde-
pendently that certain meanings may be indexed to particular constructions rather
than follow from the compositional semantics of the lexical items alone. For example,
Can you pass me the salt? conventionally conveys a request, while Are you capable
of passing me the salt? is not (cf. [Horn and Bayer, 1984]). Even the latter sentence
may give rise to the implicature of a request, but only the first does so convention-
ally, without requiring much pragmatic reasoning. There is no a priori reason why
restrictions on relative scope could not be conventionalized, too.
A semantic convention imposing fixed scope would be learned in the same way
speakers learn the lexical meanings of words. After language learners hear a word
used a large number of times in a similar way, they abstract from those occurrences
a semantic representation for the word. The semantics of a word gets generalized
from individual instances in such a way as to be capable of explaining each of those.
Statistically significant absence of positive evidence works as negative evidence in the
creation of such conventions: we know that rabbit cannot denote a frog because we
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never heard people use rabbit that way. Finally, meanings may be associated not
with individual words, but with larger chunks of structure, as the existence of idioms
shows.
The acquisition of a semantic filter on scope construals would proceed similarly.
For example, the learners would hear surface string such as E Neg, and due to the
existence of the constraint in the speech of competent speakers, that string would
only be used in sentences conveying the Neg>D reading. With only a few examples
of this sort encountered, the learners could have not noticed the pattern. But the
more frequent the surface string 0 Neg is, the more striking it becomes that it is
only used to convey the Neg>I reading. As learners are sensitive to such statistical
evidence, interpreting it as a sign that something should be ruled out by the grammar,
they acquire a scope constraint. If the constraint can be tied to the workings of a
general syntactic mechanism (e.g., to the licensing of polarity items), then learners
may acquire a syntactic constraint. But if the constraint seems to be idiosyncratically
tied to a particular modal, or even to its combination with a particular tense-aspect-
mood form, a semantic filter may become established in the grammars being acquired.
Once a semantic convention is established, it will perpetuate itself, other things
being equal. The usage of all members of the linguistic community will be constrained
by the convention, and new speakers will learn to conform to the same convention as
they acquire language, unless there is pressure for language change. So the explana-
tory burden associated with positing a particular semantic convention restricting
modal scope is to demonstrate how it got conventionalized: once it is established,
the speakers will use the restriction until they have a good reason not to; it is the
rise of the restriction that is not a trivial matter. Below, I present two case studies
that show how such conventionalization proceeds. One case study considers the wide
scope of Russian stoit 'should', and another, the narrow scope of English have to.
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5.4 Diachronic conventionalization of the wide scope
of Russian stoit
5.4.1 stoit in Present-Day Russian
Russian modal verb stoit (infinitive stoitj) belongs to the general category of priority
modality, "the most common types of priority modality" being "deontic, bouletic, and
teleological" (cited from [Portner, 2009, Ch. 4.31). The distinctive feature of stoit
is that it is specialized for the semantic flavor of symbouletic (from uv-puovAEvw
'advise'), or, in other words, advice/ suggestion modality. In matrix clauses, stoit
has a performative effect, urging the subject of the modal (which takes the Dative
and does not trigger verbal agreement) to bring about the prejacent (that is, the
complement clause of the modal). For example, stoit is good in suggestions, 217, but
cannot neutrally describe obligations, 218.
(217) OK {Tebe/Mase} stoit poexatj v otpusk.
you.DAT/Masha.DAT STOIT go to vacation
'{You/Masha} should take a vacation.'
(218) * Soglasno pravilam, tebe stoit sdatj oteot do zavtra.
according rules you.DAT STOIT submit report before tomorrow
'According to the rules, you should submit the report before tomorrow.'
Furthermore, stoit may be used in teleological contexts, but in such a case it does
not neutrally describe a means to reach the goal, but actively urges the subject to
use that means. E.g., in teleological 219, a general-purpose priority modal nuino
may be followed up by advice not to use the means described (presumably because
the speaker does not find the goal justifying the means). But if we substitute stoit
into the example, it becomes bad. With stoit, the speaker of 219 has to endorse the
subject of the modal taking the described action, while the continuation urges the
same person to not take that action, creating a contradiction.3 (In the first sentence
3The endorsement requirement arises in declarative matrix contexts (targeting the speaker), as
well as under attitude verbs (targeting the attitude bearer). I leave a more complete discussion of
the endorsement effect for another occasion.
203
of 219 in isolation, stoit is fine.)
(219) Ctoby povysitj svoi sansy, Mase {*stoit / 1Onuzno} kupitj
in.order.to improve her chances Masha.DAT STOIT/NUZNO buy
vtoroj loterejnyj bilet. No ja by ej ne sovetoval.
second lottery ticket. But I would to.her not advise
'To improve her chances, Masha ought to buy a second lottery ticket. But I
wouldn't advise that.'
As can be seen from 217 and 219, the "advice" provided by a stoit-clause need not
target the addressee, so the distribution of the modal is not restricted to what one
would pre-theoretically call advice. Moreover, stoit may be embedded under a wide
range of elements, including questions, past tense (resulting in counterfactual sugges-
tions about past situations), attitude complements, and antecedents of conditionals:
(220) Question:
Stoit li mne zapisatjsja na etot klass?
STOIT Q I.DAT register for that class
'Should I register for that class?'
(221) Attitude complement and past tense:
Masa teperj dumajet, sto Ane stoilo tuda pojti.
Masha now thinks that Anja STOIT.PAST there go
'Masha now thinks that (according to Masha's current information) it would
have been better (given the circumstances back then) if Anya went there.' 4
4 It is common, since [Condoravdi, 2002], to distinguish two temporal characteristics of a modal.
The temporal perspective determines at which time the accessibility relation is computed; e.g., in
epistemic Mary must arrive soon, the temporal perspective is present as it is the present knowledge
that forms the epistemic accessibility relation. The temporal orientation of the modal, on the other
hand, concerns the relation between the time provided by the temporal perspective, and the time
at which p in modal(p) gets evalutated. In the same example Mary must arrive soon, the temporal
orientation is future: Mary's arrival is in the future from the moment relative to which the epistemic
accessibility relation is computed.
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(222) Conditional antecedent:
Stavjte palcy vverx, esli mne stoit prodoliatj snimatj takie video.
put fingers up if IDAT STOIT continue shoot such videos
'Put your thumbs up if I should continue to make such videos.'
found using Google at twitter. com/MishaMalvin/status/277846247623245824
Turning to the interaction between stoit and negation in Present-Day Russian,
we have observed in Section 5.2 that unlike most other priority modals in Russian,
stoit always scopes over its clausemate negation. However, before proceeding to show
how the fixed scope of stoit came about, we need to observe that semantically, there
is nothing wrong with with stoit figuring in a -, > El interpretation: in 224 the
upper-clause negation creates just such a semantics.
(223) Context: The addressee has a choice of going to Boston, NYC or Philadelphia.
Tebe ne stoit exatj v NYC.
you.DAT not STOIT go to NYC
= 'You shouldn't go to NYC' OK E > -
# 'It's not that going to NYC is your best option.' * , > 0
(224) OK Eto ne znadit, sto tebe stoit exatj v NYC, vedj v Bostone toe
this not means that you.DAT STOIT go to NYC as in Boston also
interesno.
interesting
'That does not mean you should go to NYC, because in Boston it's also fun.'
224 has an extremely weak semantics: it may be informally paraphrased as "It is
premature to commit to a particular course of action yet; I do not know whether p
In 221, we need not two, but three temporal parameters: first, it is Masha's present opinion that
matters; second, it is the past circumstances that matter; third, the event of Anya going there is
in the future counting from the time at which the relevant circumstances hold. In other words, the
temporal orientation of stoit is future, but there are two different temporal perspectives: one for
the opinion, another for the circumstances of the situation for which the suggestion is relevant. The
former is tied to the upper-clause tense, or to global evaluation parameters in matrix cases, and the
latter to the local, clausemate tense.
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or q or r is the option I should urge you to take". Since such an interpretation is in
principle available for speakers of Russian, there is no reason why 223 could not in
principle mean something similar, paraphrasable as: "I am not recommending you to
take a vacation (and not recommending you to not take it either)".
As the semantics of the modal is compatible with interpreting it immediately under
negation, and indeed we have seen above that stoit may occur with narrow scope in
a wide range of embedding environments, there must be a separate grammatical
constraint restricting the scope of stoit with respect to clausemate negation. Here I
remain neutral on whether that constraint is syntactic or semantic in the present-day
Russian, and show in the next section how this constraint could arise historically
given the meaning change that stoit underwent.
5.4.2 The rise of advice/suggestion stoit
Once we consider the historical rise of modal stoit, we can see that the new modal
meaning arose as a conventionalized implicature from the construction "It is (not)
worth it to p". The implicature triggered by sentences with full-verb stoitj describing
metaphorical worth of a particular action gradually became conventionalized as the
assertion of utterances with the new symbouletic modal stoit.
The lexical source for Russian modal stoit is a homophonous lexical verb with
the basic meaning 'to cost', still existing in Present-Day Russian. To distinguish
between the modal and all of the lexical verbs related to it, I refer to the latter by
the infinitive stoitj. Unlike modal stoit which takes non-agreeing Dative subjects, the
lexical stoitj takes a Nominative subject that triggers agreement, and an object that
is usually expressed by a DP. The object DP may denote literal, monetary price, 225,
or metaphorical worth, 226.
(225) Eta kniga stoit dva rublja.
that book.NOM STOITJ.PRES.3SG two roubles
'That book costs two roubles.'
(226) Celoveeeskoe dostoinstvo nieego dlja nego ne stoit.
human dignity.NoM nothing.AcC for him NEG STOITJ.PRES.3SG
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'For him, human dignity is worth nothing.'
In metaphorical-worth cases, the subject or the object of the lexical verb stoitj
may be expressed by an infinitive construction. We find such examples in the early
19th century, and presumably they date back to earlier times: 5
(227) Subject infinitive with stoit:
a1820 no 6ego nam stoilo vesti vas k
but what.GEN we.DAT STOITJ.PAST.SG.NEUT lead.INF you to
pobede?
victory
'But what did it cost us to lead you to (that) victory?'
from Karamzin, Istoriya, vol. 9.
(228) Object infinitive with stoit:
1814 Ty ne stois bytj v moem kruge.
you.NOM not STOITJ.PRES.2SG be.INF in my circle
'You are not worth being in my circle.'
from Nareinyj, Rossijskij Zilblaz.
Already in the early 19th century, there existed a construction where the only overt
argument of the verb was an infinitive. In such cases, it is often impossible to tell
whether the construction was derived from the subject infinitive, 227, or the object
infinitive construction, 228.6 For example, in 229 it is possible to parse the infinitive
as a subject, and assume that the omitted object is some general noun like "effort"
or "work" (both of which are commonly used with stoitj overtly in the language of
the time). However, it is also possible to parse the sentence with the infinitive as an
'All the dated examples from Russian have been found using the Russian National Corpus, which
can be accessed freely at http://ruscorpora.ru/.
6 Sometimes it is possible to disambiguate thanks to the agreement morphology on stoitj: infinitive
subjects trigger 3-person singular neuter agreement, so any other agreement on the verb indicates
that the infinitive is the object. But the 3sG.NEUT agreement on the verb may either be triggered
by the infinitive or by the omitted subject such as the common situational anaphor eto 'that'.
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object, and recover a subject that roughly means "the present situation". Whether
the infinitive is the goal (in the subject construction) or the means (in the object
construction), it still refers to an action that needs to be taken in order to reach the
relevant (larger) goal. Thus the general message of the sentence is similar on both
readings, and the speaker meaning gets conveyed, at least vaguely, regardless of the
syntactic analysis:
(229) 1813 ne stoilo i izvesatj o sebe
not STOITJ.PAST.SG.NEUT PART let.know about oneself
glavnokomandujusego
commander-in-chief
Subject infinitive paraphrase: 'To let the commander-in-chief know about one-
self was not worth the effort.'
Object infinitive paraphrase: 'The present circumstances were not worth let-
ting the commander-in-chief know about oneself.'
from Sterbinin, Voennyj zurnal 1813 goda.
At least since the 1830s, we can commonly find examples where the construction
"(Neg) stoit INF" is clearly used to imply that one should (not) bring the infinitive
clause about. Such examples occur in didactic writing styles where the author in-
structs the audience, 230, in fictional dialogues, 231, and in deliberations, 232. Those
contexts are inherently oriented towards speaker-hearer pragmatic interaction, and
thus provide particularly fertile ground for generating and recovering implicatures.
(230) 1833 Iskljuenija iz pravila tak redki, 6to ne stoit i
exceptions from rule so rare that NEG STOITJ.PRES.3SG even
upominatj o nix!
mention. INF about them
'The exceptions for this rule are so rare that it is not worth the effort to even
mention them!'
from Bulgarin, Peterburgskie zapiski.
(231) 1834 Ne stoit i otve6atj na klevetu, Maus! Vedite
NEG STOITJ.PRES.3SG even answer.INF about slander Maus lead
ix! skazal Geyer.
them said Geyer
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'It is not worth the effort to answer the slander, Maus! Lead them on!
Geyer.'
from Masaljskij, Regentstvo Birona.
(232) 1835 o, da eto takoj kus, pri kotorom ne stoit obrasatj
oh but this such prize with which NEG STOITJ.PRES.3SG pay.INF
vnimanija na vse proeie kuei.
attention at all other prizes
'Oh, but this is such a prize that it is not worth it to think about any other
prizes.'
from Veljtman, Erotida.
In the positive case, the pragmatic practical reasoning deriving the action-guiding
implicature from the metaphorical-worth literal meaning of stoit can be reconstructed
as in 233. Given the context in which the rationality of acting towards p is entertained,
a metaphorical-worth statement about the present implicates a directive statement
regarding future action. 7
(233) Action-guiding implicature, the positive case:
Assuming a contextually supplied agent x...
1. Assumption of control: "x has control over bringing p about"
7Not all metaphorical-worth examples gave rise to the action-guiding implicature, and we can still
find such examples with lexical, metaphorical-worth stoit in Present-Day Russian. For example, in
1, the assumption of decision problem is not present in the context, and given the absence of actual
choice, the action implicature is not generated.
(1) 2005 I ty znaeg... - pribavil on, 6utj pomoleav, - za takoj moment
and you know added he a.bit having.been.silent for such moment
stoit potom god 6istitj nuzniki.
STOITJ.PRES.3sG afterwards year wash toilets
'And you know what... - added he after being silent for a bit, - for such a moment it is
worth it to be cleaning the toilets for a whole year.'
from Gluxovskij, Metro 2033.
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said
2. Assumption of decision problem: "x needs to choose whether to
work towards p or not"
3. Assumption of rational effort investment: "if something is worth
the effort, it should be done"
4. Literal meaning: "bringing p about is worth the effort for x" (subject
infinitive) or "The present situation is worth bringing p about for x"
(object infinitive)
5. Conclusion from 1, 2, 3, 4: "x should bring p about"
For modern speakers of Russian, such examples as 230-232 may be analyzed as
directly action-guiding rather than simply describing the worth of a particular action
choice. However, in the first half of the 19th century, we do not find cases which
cannot be analyzed as literally conveying a statement about metaphorical worth.
Compared to that, by the beginning of the 20th century uses of stoit appear which
are unambiguously action-guiding, and cannot be interpreted as literally conveying a
statement about worth. For example, in 234 the speaker deliberates not about the
relative worth of ringing the bell, but about whether to do it or not. Thus we cannot
point with certainty the very first cases of stoit asserting a direct action-guiding
statement, but from the unambiguous cases like 234 we may conclude that by the
early 20th century, such uses already existed.
(234) 1915 Xoroso by pozvonitj na kolokoljne!.. Kakoj sedni denj. Sereda?..
good SUBJ ring at belltower which today day Wednesday
Koli sereda, to ne stoit... A vot ezeli by
if Wednesday then NEG STOITJ.PRES.3SG but then if SUBJ
voskresenje, objazateljno nado by pozvonitj!
Sunday without.fail must SUBJ ring.some
'It would be good to ring the bells in the belltower. Which day is it t'day?
Wednesday?.. If it's Wednesday, then one should not... But if it's Sunday,
one should ring the bells for some time without fail!'
from Bogdanov, Nikita Prostota.
A practical test for distinguishing examples amenable to the metaphorical-worth
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interpretation, like 230, 231 and 232, from the ones which can only be analyzed as
action-guiding, like 234, is as follows:
(235) Test of the metaphorical-worth interpretation:
Scope of application: a stoit-clause with an infinitive argument, but with-
out either overt object or overt subject.
The test: add truda 'effort. ACC' as a direct object of stoit, and check with
present-day speakers whether the resulting sentence still conveys roughly the
same thing in the context.
Interpretation of the test: If the resulting sentence conveys roughly the
same thing, then the original example can be analyzed with a metaphorical-
worth stoitj. Otherwise, it cannot.
Tracing the semantic evolution of stoit numerically is not trivial, as in a large
proportion of historical examples that pass the test in 235, it is virtually impossible
to distinguish whether we have a metaphorical-worth statement with an inference or
a true modal statement. Such ambiguous examples bridge the gap between the earlier
lexical uses and the new modal uses, in the type of development commonly observed
in semantic change (cf. [Traugott and Dasher, 20021, a.m.o.) 8
8 Another impersonal construction with a different lexical stoitj could also have played a support-
ing role in the creation of the action-guiding modal stoit. On the one hand, the temporal-sequence
stoitj (which may also be called sufficient-condition stoitj) is prototypically used in a markedly
different kind of context from one where action-guiding stoit arises. But on the other, the temporal-
sequence stoitj is tightly connected with actions. (i) is a typical case that shows both points.
(i) a1862 Stoit toljko raz uvidetj rusalku, tak do smerti vsjo po
STOITJ.PRES.3sG just once see mermaid then up.to death all.the.time after
nej toskovatj budes;
her grieve will
'It is enough to see a mermaid just once, and you will grieve after her until your death;'
from A.K. Tolstoj, Knjazj Serebrjanyj.
(i) conveys that after the argument situation of temporal stoit happens, the situation described
in the second clause will follow the next moment. There is no suggestion to take an action towards
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But there is a numerical effect that can be traced nevertheless. Consider Table
5.1. The first row lists examples that do not give rise to the action-guiding impli-
cature. Most examples in the second, and especially in the third row, provide the
bringing about the argument situation of the verb; in fact, seeing a mermaid is clearly described as
a negative thing in the wider context of (i). The lexical verb stoitj in the construction is almost
synonymous with predicative adverb dostatoino 'enough', and can be replaced by it, for modern
speakers. But at the same time, the construction bears some formal similarity to the innovative
advice construction with stoit (in both constructions, the modal takes an infinitival clause argument),
and even more importantly, its semantics concerns bringing about the argument situation rather than
any statement about the situation's worth.
Those formal and semantic similarities to an existing construction could have made it easier for the
speakers to construct the new action-guiding meaning for modal stoit. In particular, examples like (ii)
come close to an analytical "semantic merger" of the two constructions: the conveyed meanings under
the temporal-sequence and the action-guiding analyses of the sentence are too close to distinguish,
from the present-day point of view.
(ii) a1859 Stoit toljko vspomnitj svojo detstvo: s kakim, byvalo,
STOITJ.PRES.3SG just remember self's childhood with what used.to
naslazdeniem razdavis ili daze edak metodieeski pomuaaes
pleasure crush.PRES.2sG or even in.some.way methodically torture. for. some. time
kakoe-nibudj nasekomoe!
some insect
from Gonearov, Pisjma.
a. Temporal-sequence paraphrase: "It is enough to just remember one's own childhood,
(and one would immediately recall) how one oneself would sometimes crush or even
methodically torture some insect!"
b. Action-guiding paraphrase: "One should just remember one's own childhood, (so
that one can recall) how one oneself would sometimes crush or even methodically torture
some insect!"
However, I believe that from the synchronic point of view of the mid-19th century, such sentences
as (ii) were rather intended to include temporal-sequence stoitj: such examples form a cohesive group
that often shares certain formal properties (e.g., there is often an overt second clause with temporal
markers indicating sequencing; the stoitj-clause is often reinforced by further limiting adverbs like
toljko 'only'); there is a sizable portion of that group that is unambiguously temporal-sequence rather
than action-guiding; and finally, there are no unambiguously action-guiding examples in that group.
This is expected if all examples in the group feature temporal-sequence stoitj. I therefore exclude
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literal meaning which can be used for the computation of the implicature as in 233.
(Though whether the implicature is triggered depends on whether the context sup-
ports the required assumptions.) The category "can add truda", in the fourth row, is
the category of ambiguous examples that pass the text in 235, and on their own they
cannot be readily classified into those that implicate and those that assert the action-
guiding statement. Finally, the fifth row, "cannot add truda", features unambiguously
action-guiding examples that fail the test in 235.
Table 5.1: Evolving distribution of INF-taking stoit
1841-1845 1914
POS NEG QUE POS NEG QUE
jego 'what.ACC'/niijego 'nothing.ACC' 3 4 0 0 4 0
other ACC noun 5 0 1 7 0 0
truda 'effort.ACC' 11 1 1 1 0 0
can add truda 9 12 7 15 14 6
cannot add truda 0 0 0 1 1 6
Total: T-28 17 9 Tf24 19 12
Pos corresponds to positive examples (including wh-questions), NEG to negative ones, and QUE to
yes-no questions (both positive and negative, matrix and embedded ones) and, for the 1914
subcorpus, exclamations derived from questions.
The numbers are given for searches in subcorpora of the Russian National Corpus, with the "exact"
setting for dates. 1841-5 subcorpus: 2,557K words; 1914 subcorpus: 2,119K words.
The query was for verb stoitj followed by an infinitive not farther than 3 words to the right. The
results of the search thus do not reflect the overall distribution of INF-taking stoitj, but appear to
be representative enough for our purposes in this chapter. Analysis of all cases was done by hand
by the author, and only those sentences were considered where 1) there was no DP NOM subject,
and 2) dostatoino substitution was not possible (cf. fn. 8).
Comparing the counts for the middle of the 19th century with those for the early
20th century, we can observe that the weight of the distribution has shifted down-
wards in the table. When the mid-19th-century speakers interpreted the ambiguous
fourth-row examples without an overt object, they did so in the context of encoun-
tering metaphorical-worth stoitj statements with an overt DP object quite often.
from the counts in Table 5.1 all examples where stoit may be replaced by dostatochno 'enough' with
preservation of the intended meaning.
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Therefore, other things being equal, they were more biased towards interpreting the
stoitj-statement conservatively, as a metaphorical-worth statement. But by the early
20th century, this support for the conservative meaning from instances of stoitj with
an overt direct object has greatly diminished. At the same time there already ap-
peared a small number of cases which could only be interpreted as action-guiding
rather than as discussing metaphorical worth. Using these data, we can conclude
that the mid-19th century and early-20th century speakers would have had opposite
biases for analyzing the ambiguous cases. We should thus assume that the majority
of the fourth-row examples from the mid-19th century were intended to literally con-
vey metaphorical worth, while the majority of the early 20th-century ones directly
asserted an action-guiding statement.
Thus while there may be uncertainty about the speaker's intentions in individual
cases, conventionalization of what has been only an action-guiding implicature has
occurred by the early 20th century, though the new modal construction with stoit
continues to coexist with earlier non-modal constructions up to Present-Day Rus-
sian. We can sum up the trajectory of change that led to the conventionalization of
advice /suggestion stoit as follows:
(236) Semantic evolution of stoit
Stage 1. stoit(p) conveys a statement about metaphorical worth.
Stage 2. In contexts where it is at issue whether x should work towards
bringing p about, the non-modal meaning of stoit(p) "p is worth (the work)"
or "the present situation is worth p" implicates an action-guiding statement
"x should p".
Stage 3. The implicature conventionalizes as the literal meaning of a new
modal lexeme stoit.
Having established the general trajectory, we can finally address the question of
modal stoit's scope with respect to negation. Other things being equal, we expect
the new action-guiding meaning to be able to appear both with wide and narrow
scope, 237. The question is why we only find the wide scope construal in Present-Day
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Russian.
(237) Two scope construals for the modal NEG (stoit(p)):
E > -,: x should not p
-, > El: it is not (necessarily) the case that x should p
But once we consider the implicature from which the new action-guiding mean-
ing arose in negative cases, the puzzle is immediately solved. In 238, we keep the
assumptions of control, decision problem and rational effort investment from the pos-
itive case, and consider the negated literal contribution of the metaphorical-worth
stoitj-claim. Put together, those three premises are enough to derive the stronger
0 > , reading that entails the weaker , > El reading. Thus when the new modal
meaning of stoit was conventionalizing, there were no examples where only the weaker
meaning -, > FI would be implicated.
(238) Action-guiding implicature, the negative case:
Assuming a contextually supplied agent x, the premises are:
1. Assumption of control: "x has control over bringing p about"
2. Assumption of decision problem: "x needs to choose whether to
work towards p or not"
3. Assumption of rational effort investment: "if something is worth
the effort, it should be done"
4. Literal meaning: "bringing p about is not worth the effort for x" (sub-
ject infinitive) or "The present situation is not worth bringing p about
for x" (object infinitive)
5. Conclusion from 1, 2, 3, 4: "x should not p" (E]> ,)
Entailed by the conclusion:
"it is not (necessarily) the case that x should p" (, > LI)
Without any actual cases where stoit with clausemate negation would be used
to implicate the weaker , > l reading, the speakers conventionalized the l > -
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construal as the only available option for suggestion/ advice stoit. As the modal
develops further, the scope restriction could eventually be lifted, especially if there
would be pragmatic pressure to express the presently absent meaning concisely.
Now, I have not shown that the Present-Day Russian restrictions on the scoping
of stoit should not be encoded in the grammar as polarity-item restrictions. In fact,
they may very well be. But what has just been shown is that the historical rise
of this restriction was caused by the semantic and pragmatic, not by the syntactic
factors. Furthermore, given the close ties of the wide-scope symbouletic stoit with its
metaphorical-worth source word stoitj 'to be worth (it)', which scopes under negation,
and the gradualness of the rise of the new item, semantic-filter analysis of the scope
constraint was perhaps preferable to polarity-item analysis for language users, as it
wouldn't require positing a change in the syntactic properties between the source and
the emerging new modal.
To sum up, we have seen that a plausible story about the rise of a semantic
filter on scope constraints can be told for stoit. When we view that in the context of
typological evidence from Sections 5.1 and 5.2, this case study bolsters the case for the
introduction of semantic filters of scope construals: the typological evidence suggests
that there should be non-syntactic, lexically idiosyncratic constraints on scope, and
the study of the rise of stoit demonstrates that a semantic filter ruling out some scope
construals may in principle arise diachronically in the course of semantic reanalysis.
In the next section, we will see a case where the semantics and pragmatics create a
scope restriction that cannot be even accounted for synchronically as a polarity-item
restriction. As we discussed in Section 5.1, the narrow scope of have to, analyzed as
"neutral" by [Iatridou and Zeijlstra, 2013], cannot be attributed to polarity effects.
We will now show how the semantic evolution of that modal over the 19th century
has led to the conventionalization of the scope restriction.
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5.5 Diachronic conventionalization of the narrow scope
of English have to
5.5.1 The rise of deontic have to from futurate have to in the
19th century
It is not uncommon for a HA VE lexical verb to eventually develop into a necessity
modal: Spanish tener (que), Haitian Creole gen (pou), Ukrainian maty are examples.
However, such a development is far from necessary: English have (to) developed into
a modal, while cognate Dutch hebben didn't. Not much is currently known about the
typology of historical meaning change that leads to such development: it is not clear
whether all HA VE-based modals develop along similar lines, and we do not know
which exact constructions with HAVE may serve as the immediate source for the
modal.
English modal have to is one of the better-studied cases in this respect, but even its
history was not fully studied. Researchers such as [van der Gaaf, 1931], [Visser, 1973]
attribute the emergence of the obligation reading of have to to the Old English period,
but [Bock, 1931] and [Mitchell, 1985] show that it is hardly the case, with Mitchell
specifically noting that modern speakers may be susceptible to seeing the modern
readings of the construction in old texts where in fact there was nothing of the sort for
the Anglo-Saxons themselves. [Brinton, 1991] agrees with van der Gaaf and Visser in
positing some obligational component of meaning for have as early as in Old English,
but attributes the full development of the true obligational have to to a much later
stage, namely Early Modern English. Finally, [Fischer, 1994] shows that all earlier
examples where Brinton finds the obligation meaning in fact cannot have featured it,
once we view them in their linguistic context rather than in isolation. Fischer does
not find evidence for the establishment of the modern-type deontic have to up to the
end of the Early Modern English period (the 18th century). Specifically, she finds
only one example in the last Early Modern English section of the Helsinki corpus that
features what can be analyzed as an obligation have to, out of the 38 cases for the
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period where the construction features an NP that may serve as the argument of the
infinitive complement of have.
Examining the Late Modern English data, I do not find solid evidence for the
establishment of true deontic have to until the middle of the 19th century. 9 While
many early 19th century examples may sound as obligational to the modern years, it is
only in the second half of the century that the construction "there has to P" arises (for
example, COHA lists the first such example in 1867). Such syntactic evidence points
that the earlier have to was something different from today's. Semantic analysis of
early 19th-century occurrences of have to confirms that: they turn out to be futurates,
not deontics. I illustrate this using Captain Frederick Marryat's Masterman Ready,
or the Wreck of the Pacific, published in 1841, as the source. Marryatt's language is
a perfect example of the state of the language immediately before futurate have to
was semantically reanalyzed as a deontic.
Consider example 239. It only allows for a futurate, not for a deontic, interpreta-
tion of have to.
(239) 1841, from Marryat's Masterman Ready
"You see, William, it is fortunate for us that we shall always have a fair wind
when we come down loaded, and only have to pull our empty boat back
again."
To show that have to is unambiguously futurate in 239, let's modify the example
putting it into the present tense. If have to is obligational in 239, we should be able
to replace it with must in the present tense version. But such a replacement does not
make sense, 240, nor does a replacement with be forced to, 241: there is no deontic
force that makes the 'we' to pull the boat back, though they plan to do so. The
9The data discussed in this section were obtained from the Corpus of Late Modern English
Texts (extended version) (CLMETEV) and the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA),
available at http: //corpus. byu. edu/coha/. In addition to those, the Corpus of Early English
Dialogues 1560-1760 (CED), compiled under the supervision of Merja Kyt6 (Uppsala University)
and Jonathan Culpeper (Lancaster University), and available through the Oxford Text Archive,
http: //ota. ahds .ac. uk/, was used for the author's pilot research on the rise of deontic have to.
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appropriate present paraphrase for 239 is thus 242, and shall have to in the original
example is very close in its semantic import to plain shall.
(240) It is fortunate for us that we always have a fair wind when we come down
loaded, and only must pull our empty boat back.
(241) It is fortunate for us that we always have a fair wind when we come down
loaded, and are only forced to pull our empty boat back.
(242) It is fortunate for us that we always have a fair wind when we come down
loaded, and only pull our empty boat back.
The following passage from Marryat highlights the paradigmatic relationships into
which the have to construction enters in his language:
(243) 1841, from Marryat's Masterman Ready
"We have a great deal of work to do, more than we can get through before
the rainy season; which is a pity, but it can't helped; by this time next year
we shall be more comfortable."
"Why, what have we to do besides putting up the tents and shifting over
here?"
"In the first place we have to build a house, and that will take a long while.
Then we ought to make a little garden, and sow the seeds which your father
brought from England with him."
From the perspective of the Present-Day English speaker, the third sentence of
the passage in isolation may be analyzed as featuring modern deontic have to that
expresses deontic necessity. But from within the mid-19th-century text, we see that
this have to appears in a direct answer to the question with the non-modal have
(something) to do. The syntactic structure of that answer is parallel to that of the
question, suggesting that the proper interpretation should also be parallel. At the
same time, here, unlike in 239, a paraphrase with must would make sense: "we have
to build a house" may be interpreted both as futurate "we are predestined to build
a house" and as deontic "we must build a house". This possibility to interpret the
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example both ways is precisely what enabled semantic reanalysis. In this case, such
reanalysis may be reinforced by the parallel use of deontic ought in the last sentence
of the passage.
However, the mere possibility to analyze an older example substituting in the
innovative meaning is by itself not a proof that the new meaning was already available
for the speaker. It is only when we find a case where the old meaning will not fit
that we can conclude that the semantic shift occurred (cf. extensive discussion in
[Eckardt, 2006].) Marryatt's language features unambiguously non-modal examples
like 239 together with example ambiguous for the modern eye such as 243, but it does
not feature a single example with unambiguously deontic have to. That indicates that
in Marryatt's language, the semantic shift most likely did not yet occur.
The semantic reanalysis of futurate have to as deontic have to could have hap-
pened at slightly different times for different speakers or in different dialects, but the
examination of texts in CLMETEV, coupled with the evidence on the rise of imper-
sonal "there has to" in the 2nd half of the 19th century, points to the middle of the
19th century as the rough point when the change occurred.' 0
'OMy impression from the British English data of CLMETEV is that have to hardly acquired true
obligational uses until the second half of the century. However, the data from COHA suggest that
in American English, particular speakers, though not all of them, may have started to use modal
have to a bit earlier. The pair of examples in (i) and (ii) illustrates the basis for that conjecture.
In (i), the time of the battle is chosen by the speaker's side, so it is not that there are any external
circumstances that would justify the use of a modal have to. But in (ii), the speaker is clearly
making a normative, deontic statement about how things should be.
(i) Unambiguous futurate have to:
1830 "When do you think, Ephraim," said he, "we shall have to fight the whigs? I guess
when we muster our forces, Indians and all, they wont stand us long." "The time of marching
will be fixed to-morrow," said Ephraim. "Who fixes it?" inquired Joseph. "The Indian chiefs
are to hold a council for the purpose," replied Ephraim, "and our leaders are to assist at their
deliberations."
from McHenry, The Betrothed of Wyoming
(ii) Unambiguous modal have to:
1835 But is there not some rule, asked the other, for making verses? I conclude all the lines
220
Having established the rough timing of the turning point and the change trajectory
(from futurate to deontic), we can now turn to the question of fixed narrow scope.
5.5.2 Why deontic have to has narrow scope
While little is known about the trajectory of change from futurates to deontics (e.g.,
the extensive study of [Bybee et al., 1994] does not discuss such change at all), such
development is not unprecedented. Even within English, [Visser, 1973, §1369j pro-
poses that a similar development occurred to the Northern English modal mun, bor-
rowed from Old Norse munu:11
The prehistoric meaning was doubtless 'to intend'. In the earliest
Middle English examples its sense seems to have developed into a kind of
synonym of shall with a futuric connotation. This might be inferred from
the substitution of sal in G6tt. MS of the Cursor Mundi for mon in the
Cott. MS in the passage: (20164) 'Her mon to noght lang be'. That later
the meaning became must is not hard to understand, since the notion of
have to be of a particular length: For unless we know how long each one is to be, how can
we get the others right?
from Thompson, The Adventures of Timothy Peacock, Esquire
"In this description, Visser draws from [Adams, 1862, pp. 126-7], who in turn attributes the
following passage to Dr. Guest in the Transactions of the Philological Society, 1852, p. 155 (which
appears to be a miscitation: no authors named Guest ever published in the journal):
In old English mun often indicates mere futurity, like the Icelandic 'mun;' and
the peculiar sense now given to it-that of obligation-appears to have been its latest
derivative meaning. The phrase 'we mun go', may have taken successively the meanings
'we think of going', 'we shall go', 'we must go'.
Examples from Early Middle English provided by Visser seem to support that hypothesis, cf. for ex-
ample Orm 7927 'offdredd, Patt all hiss gode dede Ne mune himm nohht beon god inoh To berr5henn
himm fra pine' (=9"feared that all his good deeds mune not be good enough for him to save him from
pain").
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coercion, compulsion, etc. was originally already clearly present in sceal.
[Cf. Icel. 'ek mun' = 'I must' (Skeat)]
However, the scope of mun with respect to negation didn't have to be narrow: e.g.,
the Dictionary of the Scots language lists the example in 244, where mun (written as
man, in this text) takes wide scope.
(244) (1607) Glasgow B. Rec. I. 264.
This man not mak me for3iett nor omitt my deutie;
'This man (~'must') not make me forget nor omit my duty.'
Thus not all deontics with a futurate source have narrow scope as have to does.
Similarly, not all HAVE-based deontics have narrow scope with respect to nega-
tion. For example, Ukrainian maty 'have' in its deontic uses may have both wide and
narrow scope (cf. 245 and 246, respectively).
(245) nedolugyj Jusenko ne zrobyv nieogo z togo, so may
sick Yuschenko not did nothing from that which MATY.PAST.3SG
zrobyty, ale zrobyv 6ymalo togo, 6ogo ne may robyty
to.do but did much that which not MATY.PAST.3SG to.do
'The sick Yuschenko didn't do anything from what he should have done, but
did do a lot of what he shouldn't have.' (from http: //www. pravda. com.
ua/articles/2009/11/20/4328133/)
(246) Vodij i ne may jixaty prjamo vidrazu, zakonom daetjsja 2
driver PART not MATY.PAST.3SG go right at.once by.law is.given 2
godyny pislja skladannja protokolu (jakyj ne sklaly)
hours after writing report which not wrote.PL
'The driver didn't have to go at once, the law gives them two hours after
the report is written (which was not written in this case at all)' (from http:
//www.ogo.ua/vybir20lO/articles/view/2012-07-04/34215.html?all)
Evidence from Northern English man and Ukrainian maty thus suggests that we
should look for the reasons that have to has narrow scope in that particular modal's
situation, not in some general principles of how HAVE-based deontics function.
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I argue that the crucial fact for the rise of the narrow scope restriction of deontic
have to was the following. In the mid-19th century, the actual distribution of have to
was such that the argument situation of futurate have to was always either undesirable
for the subject, or requiring a substantial effort on their part, or both. This is a
non-trivial fact: not all futures have to describe that kind of unpleasant situation,
cf. by this time next year we shall be more comfortable from 243, or we shall always
have a fair wind in 239. This feature of the distribution of futurate have to may
have been encoded directly within the construction's fine-grained semantics, or could
have been just an accident of usage, with high-frequency collocations like "have to
do (something)", "have to deal with certain (unpleasant) people" making it easier
to use have to with unpleasant or effort-requiring argument situations, and harder
with desirable ones. But whatever the status of this pattern, its existence supported
the reasoning schema in 247. The conclusion of the schema was then available for
conventionalization, resulting in the innovative deontic-necessity or circumstantial-
necessity literal meaning.
(247) Deriving the deontic necessity implicature from futurate have to:
1. Literal meaning: have.to(p)(x) conveys roughly "x has p in x's future".
2. Usage pattern: in have.to(p)(x), situation p is something one better
avoid, other things being equal
3. Assumption of rational avoidance: If it is better for one to avoid p,
one would avoid p unless forced otherwise.
4. From 2 and 3: if one does not avoid p, one was forced to do p.
5. Conclusion from 1 and 4:
there are forces that require x to do p in the future.
What we need to explain is why the innovative modal have to took the narrow
scope relative to clausemate negation as in 248a, and not the wide scope as in 248b.
(248) a. -,have.to(p)(x) => it is not that x is forced to bring about p
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b. -,have.to(p)(x) =: x is forced to bring about -p
Consider the case when futurate have.to(p)(x) is negated. The literal meaning
then would be roughly "x does not have p in x's future". Assuming that 2 and 3
of the reasoning schema 247 still hold, as they do in the positive case, this negative
literal meaning does not implicate either 248a or 248b: if x does not have p in x's
future, the conditional 4 in the schema 247 is irrelevant. So the positive-case schema
does not apply to the negative case (unlike in the case of stoit, where the positive and
negative cases were parallel to each other.)
If neither possible scope configuration could be implicated by the older meaning,
how would speakers know which scope they may use when negating the innovative
deontic have to? Given that p is something to avoid, the narrow-scope meaning in
248a is more natural than the wide-scope meaning in 248b. If one would do -p on
their own, there is not much sense in externally requiring x to do -,p. So while neither
scope construal in 248 is implicated through the schema that gave rise to the positive
modal have to, the narrow scope meaning is something which it makes more sense to
want to convey.
Turning to the empirical facts, negated futurate have to was a very rare creature
in the mid-19th century. In the 5,724K-words corpus CLMETEV2, covering 1780-
1850, there are only six instances of the string "not/n't have to", compared to the 34
instances of positive have to in just the 100K-words Captain Marryat's Masterman
Ready alone. Moreover, out of those six instances of the "negative" string in CLME-
TEV2, four feature negation attached to the higher future-tense marker (e.g., 1830
You'll not have to wait long, from Borrow's Mary Burton), another one has expletive
negation, and only one case, from Marryat, features true negated have to, see 249.
(Note that the argument situation of the negated have to in 249 is something to avoid,
just as in the positive case.) There is thus at least a 35-times difference between the
rates of positive and negative futurate have to on the threshold of semantic change.
(249) 1841, from Marryat's Masterman Ready
If we do that, we shall not have so large a space to watch over and defend;
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and then we must contrive to have a large fire ready for lighting, that we may
not have to fight altogether in the dark. It will give them some advantage
in looking through the palisades, and seeing where we are, but they cannot
well drive their spears through, so it is no great matter.
We are now ready to give an account of why the negated have to conventionalized
into a modal with narrow scope. The three factors that determined that are as follows:
(250) Factors leading to the conventionalization of narrow scope for have
to:
a. The reasoning schema 247, which gave rise to the positive modal have to,
did not apply at all in the negated case.
b. There were very few instances of negated have to used by the speakers in
the mid-19th century.
c. Given that the argument situation p of have to was always a situation
to avoid in the actual usage of the mid-19th century speakers, there were
more reasons to want to express the narrow scope reading 248a than the
wide scope reading 248b.
All three factors in 250 are specific to the have to construction at a particular
period, so we should not assume that all emerging HA VE-based deontic modals would
follow the same path. Without knowing the turning point of the change for Northern
English mun, we cannot directly compare the conditions in 250 with the conditions
for mun: we do not know what to compare. But whatever evidence we have suggests
that the negative connotations regarding the argument situation of futurate have to
is not something which mun shared. At least, modal mun could express obligations
about pleasant things, as in 251:
(251) 1540 Lynd. Sat. Procl. 86.
I mon ga drink ane penny or twae;
'I mun (~must) go drink a penny or two'
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Thus it is plausible that the factors in 250 to be what predetermined that deontic
have to would have fixed narrow scope. The rise of fixed scope then could have
proceeded as follows. Given that the reasoning schema did not apply, 250a, the new
modal have to didn't have an established preferred meaning in the negative case
(unlike stoit, which we discussed in Section 5.4). Given that negated have to was
rare, the pressure to consider negative cases at all during the conventionalization of
positive have to should not have been very significant. Those two factors essentially
created the situation of "other things being equal" regarding the meaning for the new
negated modal have to. Finally, given that the narrow scope meaning of negated have
to would be a more natural meaning to recover, and that other things were equal, it
was the narrow scope meaning that conventionalized.
Summing up, we have formulated a plausible story for how a semantic-convention
filter on scope for deontic have to could have been established. The deontic meaning
as such doesn't require that the modal always take narrow scope. However, the
contexts where deontic have to arose favored the narrow scope over the wide scope
reading. That preference led to the narrow-scope use pattern, which later speakers
internalized in their grammars as stemming from the existence of a semantic-filter
constraint.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued for two points. First, there exist scope restrictions of
deontic modals that cannot be accounted for using only the apparatus of polarity-
item licensing. More mechanisms ruling out particular scopal construals are needed,
including such that may apply to a specific tense-aspect-mood form, and not on the
level of a lexical item. Second, I argued that such mechanisms may be situated
within semantics, taking the form of semantic conventions filtering particular scope
construals of a modal.
The general framework for analyzing modal scope restrictions that emerges from
the present work is as follows. The role of the syntactic component of a language is
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to provide speakers with a wide range of possible scope construals. For some lexical
items, certain construals may be ruled out within the syntax. But there always exists
a second level of filtering: the semantics and pragmatics of the language may further
rule out some of the scope construals that are in principle provided by the syntax.
Among other things, this new perspective on scope filtering provides a way to
solve one of the puzzles regarding the scope of modals. [Iatridou and Zeijlstra, 20131
conclude their paper (cf. their Section 5) by noting that it is hard to see how to provide
a principled account of the differences in the scopal properties of deontic and epistemic
variants of the same modal: syntactically, no clear solution emerges. But as we need
to admit the existence of semantic scopal restrictions specific to particular tense-
aspect-mood forms anyway, it is not surprising that there may exist conventionalized
restrictions sensitive to the conversational backgrounds a modal uses.
A scope restriction associated with a given modal may thus be encoded on the level
of syntax, or on the level of semantics and pragmatics. This view is less restrictive
than the view under which all scope restrictions belong to the syntactic component.
But such decrease in restrictiveness seems inevitable once we consider the full range of
data. We have seen that the purely syntactic system of [Iatridou and Zeijlstra, 20131
does not provide tools fine-grained enough to account for the rich empirical landscape
of modal scope restrictions. Moreover, the existence of scope restrictions specific to
particular tense-aspect-mood forms that are parallel syntactically, as in the case of
French devoir, suggests that no purely-syntactic system would be capable of doing
any better.
At the same time, the diachronic case studies we conducted point a different
way to make our theories of fixed scope more restrictive. The case studies on the
conventionalization of the wide scope of Russian stoit 'should' and the narrow scope
of English have to suggest that when a scope restriction has semantic nature, we
should be able to trace the diachronic reasons for the restriction's rise. Therefore
it will not do to posit completely arbitrary constraints, using the semantic level of
filtering as a garbage dump: if a scope restriction belongs to that level, we should
be able to show why it conventionalized in the first place. So while we lose in "local
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restrictiveness" by acknowledging that not all scope constraints have syntactic nature,
we do not lose in "global restrictiveness", as introducing semantic-convention scope
constraints makes diachronic predictions that can be checked empirically.
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Appendix A
Alfredian OE examples with *motan
from CP, Bo and Sol, accompanied
by philological translations, and Latin
correspondences for CP and Bo
Examples have been found with the help of YCOE and CorpusSearch, with search
queries of the following form:1
node: $ROOT
query: (*MD* Dominates mo*) AND (*cosolilo*I*coprefsolilo* inID)
As YCOE does not always use the latest edition of the text, I provide the examples
according not to their YCOE form, but to the form of the latest edition. The only
'Restricting the search to modal constituents starting in mo is safe in the sense that it returns all
the instances of *motan tagged as modals in YCOE (presumably, there are no instances of *motan
which are not marked so in the corpus.) Actual searches have been more sophisticated in order to
ensure that no examples are lost because of unexpected spellings.
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exception is Pastoral Care, for which I consistently provide the text according to
[Sweet, 1871], even though a partial newer edition exists, namely [Schreiber, 2003].
Translation variants are provided for all full translations of the relevant works
known to the author (namely, all those listed in [Waite, 2000], plus the recent trans-
lation of Boethius in [Godden and Irvine, 2009]).
A.1 Old English Cura Pastoralis
IDs of the form cocura, CP:9.57.5.356 are from YCOE. The first number of the ID
points to the chapter; the second, to the page in [Sweet, 1871]; the third, to the line
in [Sweet, 1871]; the fourth, to the number of the "syntactic fragment" in YCOE.
OE text is given according to the edition [Sweet, 1871], the version based on
the Hatton 20 manuscript. Translations under (b) are from the same edition and
are by Sweet. Latin text under (c) provides the corresponding passage from the
original, where there is such. Translations under (d) are from the partial translation
by H. W. Norman, printed in [Giles et al., 1858] (the translation ends at Chapter 10).
(252) a. Donne he to funda6, he ondraet 6aet he ne mote to cuman, and sona swa
he to oare are cymo, swa 6ync6 him boat se hie him neidscylde sceolde se
se hie him sealde, & bryco &2ere godcundan are worldcundlice, & forgitt
swibe hraebe 8amt he mer ofastlices gebohte. (CP:9.57.5)
b. While he is aspiring to it, he dreads not attaining it, and when he attains
the honour he thinks he who granted him the honour was bound to grant
it out of necessity, and enjoys the divine honour in a worldly spirit, and
very soon forgets his former pious resolutions.
c. Tendens enim, ne non perveniat, trepidat: sed repente perveniens jure
sibi hoc debitum, ad quod pervenerit, putat.
d. When he is seeking it he dreads that he may not come to it, and, soon as
he comes to the honour, so seems to him that he who gave it him owed
it him, as a necessary debt, and brooks the spiritual benefice in a worldly
manner, and forgets very quickly what he before religiously thought.
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(253) a. Hu mmg he bonne beon butan gitsunge, bonne he sceal ymb monigra
monna are bencan, gif he nolde 6a 6a he moste ymb his anes?
(CP:9.57.19)
b. How can he be without covetousness when he has to consult the interests
of many, if formerly he would not avoid it when he had to consult his own
interests alone?
c. Nequaquam vincere avaritiam potest, quando ad multorum sustentationem
tenditur, is, cui sufficere propria nec soli potuerint.
d. How can he be without covetousness when he must think about many
men's sustenance, if he would not when he might think about his own
alone?
(254) a. Dat sindon ba be gehierab Godes word, & mid baere geornfulnesse & mid
aimre wilnunge 6isse worlde & hiere welena bib asmorod &et saod Godes
worda, beah hie upasprytton, 6ait hie ne moten fulgrowan ne wostmbaore
weorban. (CP:11.67.20)
b. That is those who hear the word of God, and by the cares and desires of
this world and its wealth the seed of God's words is smothered, although
they spring up, so that they cannot flourish or bear fruit.
c. No direct parallel:
Semen autem, quod in spinis cecidit, hi sunt, qui audierunt verbum, et a
sollicitudinibus et divitiis et voluptatibus vitae euntes suffocantur, et non
referunt fructum.
(255) a. & ne gefeon hie na 6at hie ofer o6re menn bion moten sua suibe sua oes
6at hie o6rum monnum magen ny[t]toste beon. (CP: 17.109.2)
b. nor rejoice so much in having authority over others as in being most
useful to them.
c. nec praeesse se hominibus gaudeant, sed prodesse.
(256) a. Da be ofer obre biob giemen hie geornlice 6aotte sua micle sua hira on-
wald bib mara gesewen ofer obre menn boat hie sua micle ma sien innan
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gebryccede mid ea6modnesse, 8ylms bamt geooht hine ofersuioe & on lust-
fulnesse his mod geteo hwelces unbeawes, 6amt he hit moge oonne to his
willan gewealdan, for~aeme he him aor to un~eawum his ag[enine willan
underoeodde, & him ge6afade bet hit mid anwalde him moste oferriesian,
bette 6at ofsetene mod mid Oamre lustfulnesse his anwaldes ne sie getogen
to upahafenesse. (CP: 17.119.13)
b. Let those who are above others be very careful that the greater their visible
authority over others the more they be inwardly subdued by humility, lest
his imagination overcome him and lead his mind to the desire of some vice
so that he cannot subject it to his will, because he formerly had made his
own will subservient to his vices, and allowed it to rule over him with
authority, lest the troubled mind through the intoxication of authority be
led to pride.
c. No direct parallel:
Studeant igitur sine intermissione, qui praesunt, ut eorum potentia quanto
magna exterius cernitur, tanto apud eos interius deprimatur, ne cogita-
tionem vincat, ne in delectationem sui animum rapiat, ne jam sub se mens
eam regere non possit, cui se libidine dominandi supponit.
(257) a. foroem Net woere his willa 8aet he moste ymb swincan, ond oync{8I him
gesuinc 6at he bi butan woroldgesuincium. (CP:18.127.24)
b. since it was his desire to be allowed to toil therein, and it seems to him
a hardship to be without worldly troubles.
c. Voluptatem namque censent, si actionibus deprimantur, laborem dep-
utant, si in terrenis negotiis non laborant.
(258) a. Ac se se 6e unwmerlice 8one wuda hiew6, & sua his freond ofslieh6, him
bib nid6earf 6aet he fleo to 6ara 6reora burga anre, aimt on sumere bara
weoroe genered, 6at he mote libban; (CP:21.167.15)
b. But he who carelessly hews the wood, and so slays his friend, must flee to
one of the three cities, that he may save himself in one of them, that he
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may live;
c. Sed is, qui incaute ligna percutit et proximum extinguit, ad tros necesse
est urbes fugiat, ut in una earum defensus vivat:
(259) a. Be 6am saglum is suibe gesceadlice gecueden 6at hie sculon simle stician
on 6am hringum, & nofre ne moton him beon ofatogene, foroamm is micel
niedoearf baitte ba be beo6 gesette to Omre Oenunga bos lareowdomes bait
hi namfre ne gewiten from 6are geornfulnesse baere raedinge & leornunge
haligra gewrita. (CP:22.171.17)
b. It was very wisely directed that the poles were always to remain in the
rings, and never be pulled out, because it is absolutely necessary that
those who are appointed to the ministration of instruction never swerve
from the desire of reading and learning the holy Scriptures.
c. De quibus apte subditur: "Qui semper erunt in circulis, nec unquam ex-
trahentur ab eis." Quia nimirum necesse est, ut qui ad officium praedi-
cationis excubant, a sacrae lectionis studio non recedant.
(260) a. Lamtt bonne an 6at gefeoht sua openlice sume hwile, & ongien6 hine dio-
gollicce loren, & slitan his inngebonc, & bit 6are tide, hwonne he 6ms
wieroe sie bat he hine besuican mote. (CP:33.227.10)
b. So he ostensibly gives up the contest for a time, and begins to advise him
secretly, and to wound his mind, waiting for the time when he is fit to be
deceived.
c. interim quiescens, et secreta suggestione cogitationem lacessens aptum
deceptionis tempus inquirit.
(261) a. Donne is aefter bam gecueden omt he sargige amt niehstan, bonne his li-
choma & his fimasc sie gebrosnod, forbamm oft sio halo b6as lichoman on
un6eawas wierO gecierred, ac bonne he 6are halo benumen wierb mid
monigfaldum sare 6ms modes & 6aes flmsces, se lichoma bonne wierb
gedrefed, for6am sio saul, bonne hio hire unbonces gebamdd wierO 6at
yfel to forlotanne bat hio amr longe on woh hire agnes bonces gedyde,
233
seco 6onne 6a forlorenan hmlo, & wilna6 6mre, suelce he oonne wel &
nytwyrolice libban wolde, gif he for8 moste. (CP:36.251.8)
b. It is further said, that he will then sorrow, when his body and flesh are
consumed, because often the health of the body is directed to vices, but
when he is deprived of his health with manifold pains of mind and body,
the body is afflicted, because the soul, when unwillingly compelled to for-
sake her wickedness, which she formerly for a long time wickedly exercised
of her own free will, seeks her lost health, and desires it, as if she were
going to live well and profitably, if spared.
c. No direct parallel:
Bene autem subditur: "Et gemas in novissimis, quando consumpseris
carnes et corpus tuum." Plerumque enim accepta salus carnis per vitia
expenditur; sed cum repente subtrahitur, cum molestiis caro atteritur,
cum jam egredi anima urgetur, diu male habita quasi ad bene vivendum
salus amissa requiritur.
(262) a. Hu micle sui6or sculon we oonne beon gehiersume 6amm 6e ure gosta
Fader bio wi6 baim 6et we moten libban on eenesse! (CP:36.255.8)
b. How much more, then, must we obey our spiritual Father, that we may
live eternally!
c. (Patres quidem carnis nostrae habuimus eruditores, et reverebamur eos;)
non multo magis obtemperabimus Patri spirituum, et vivemus?
(263) a. Daot wmter, 6onne hit bib gepynd, hit miclab & uppa6 & fundao wi6 6ms
be hit aor from com, 6onne hit flowan ne mot 6ider hit wolde.
(CP:38.277.6)
b. When water is dammed up, it increases and rises and strives after its
original place, when it cannot flow whither it would.
c. No direct parallel:
Humana etenim mens aquae more circumclusa ad superiora colligitur,
quia illud repetit, unde descendit, et relaxata deperit, quia se per infima
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inutiliter spargit.
(264) a. Eac is to wietanne 6aotte hwamthwugu bib betweoh 6am irsiendan & baem
ungebyldgan, 6at is baet ba unge6yldan ne magon aberan nanwuht Nms
laes be him mon on leg6 o66e mid wordum o66e mid daedum ba iersigen-
dan bonne him to getio6 6at 6atte hie ea6e butan bion meahton: beah
hie nan mann mid labe ne grete, hie wiellab griellan obre menn to aem
bot hie niede sculon, & secea6 6a be hie fleo6, & styrigab geflitu & geciid,
& fmgniab 6at hie moten suincan on unge6waernesse.
(CP:40.293.14)
b. It is also to be known that there is a difference between the passionate and
the impatient, which is, that the impatient cannot bear any annoyance
to which they are subjected either by the words or deeds of others, while
the passionate incur what they could easily avoid: although no one annoy
them, they try to provoke others, and compel them to strife, and seek
those who avoid them, and stir up strife and abuse, and rejoice in being
able to busy themselves with discord.
c. Sciendum quippe est, quia in hoc ab impatientibus iracundi differunt,
quod illi ab aliis illata non tolerant, isti autem etiam, quae tolerentur,
important. Nam iracundi saepe etiam se declinantes insequuntur, rixae
occasionem commovent, labore contentionis gaudent;
(265) a. Forbam hie beo6 to myndgianne bara goda be hie aer dydon, baot hie
sien be lus6bmrran to gehieranne 6at him mon bonne beodan wielle. Swa
[swa] wildu hors, bonne we h[iel aresO gefangnu habba6, we hie baccia6
& straciad mid bradre handa & lemiab, to bon bat we eft on fierste hie
moten mid gierdum fullice [gelmeran & 6a temian. (CP:41.303.7)
b. Therefore they are to be reminded of the good they formerly did, that
they may the more cheerfully hear what is to be enjoined on them; like
wild horses, which, when first caught, we soothe and stroke with the palm
of our hands, and subdue, that afterwards in course of time we may make
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them completely docile and tractable with whips.
c. Nam et equos indomitos blanda prius nanu tangimus, ut eos nobis plenius
postmodum etiam per flagella subigamus.
(266) a. Gehiren 6a fostendan hwmt he eft cume, he cuae &et ge moston drincan
gewealden wines for eowres magan mettrymnesse. (CP:43.319.5)
b. Let the abstinent also hear what he said again; he said that "ye may drink
wine moderately for the weakness of your stomachs."
c. Vetus Latina 1 Tim. 5:23:
X: modico vino utere propter stomachum et adsiduas imbecillitates
D: noli adhuc aquam bibere sed vino modico utere propter stomachum et
frequentes tuas infirmitates
I: iam noli bibere aquam sed vino modico utere propter stomachum et
crebras tuas infirmitates
V: noli adhuc aquam bibere sed vino modico utere propter stomachum
tuum et frequentes tuas infirmitates
(267) a. Swa se fliebeam ofersceadab 6at lond 6at hit under him ne mmg gegrowan,
foroamm hit sio sunne ne mot gescinan, ne he self nanne wasom Oairo-
fer ne bireo, ac oat land bi6 eal unnyt swa he hit oferbrmt, swa bio
aem unnytwyroan & aemm unwisan menn, bonne he mid 8ere scande
his slmw~e oferbramt 8a scire Oe he bonne hmfO, & bonne nauber ne 6one
folgab self nytne gedon nyle, ne 6one tolotan be hine 6urh 6a sunnan
goodes weorces giendscinan wille, & nytwyrbne & waesambamrne gedon
wille. (CP:45.337. 10)
b. As the fig-tree overshadows the land, so that nothing grows under it,
because the sun's rays cannot reach it, and it does not bear any fruit
above it itself, but the land is all useless, it spreads over it so; so it is with
the useless and foolish man, when with his disgraceful sloth he covers the
district he possesses, and will neither himself make his authority beneficial,
nor admit him who is ready to shine over it with the sun of good works,
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and make it useful and fruitful.
c. No direct parallel
(268) a. Eall moncynn wos to Gode gewend, ba ba hi wrest gesceapene waeron on
neorxna wonge; & he 6a hie manode andwearde, & him forgeaf baet hie
moston stondan on frioum anwalde, & him getaehte hwaet hi on Oamm don
sceolden, hwaet ne scolden. (CP:52.405.27)
b. All mankind, when first created in Paradise, were inclined to God; and he
admonished them in his presence, and granted them freedom of action,
and directed them what they were to do with it, and what not to do.
c. Humanum quippe genus Dominus in faciem monuit, quando in paradiso
condito homini atque in libero arbitrio stanti, quid facere, quidve non
facere deberet, indixit.
(269) a. Damm monnum is gecy6ed hwelce stowe hi moton habban beforan urum
foder, swa swa we or cwodon, baet hie sceolden habban ece eardungstowe
on oes faeder huse fur6or bonne his ognu bearn. (CP:52.409.2)
b. To these men it is proclaimed what a place they are to have before our
father, as we said above, they are to have eternal mansions in the Father's
house in preference to his own children.
c. Quo autem apud Patrem loco habeantur, ostenditur: quia in domo Pa-
tris videlicet aeterna mansione etiam filiis praeferuntur.
(270) a. For~amm oft se mildheortaa Dryhten swi6e hraodlice 6a gebohtan synna
awega~wiho, bonne he him ne gebafa6 6at hi hi burhtion moten.
(CP:53.419.1)
b. For often the merciful Lord very quickly washes away the meditated sins,
when he does not allow them to carry them out.
c. Saepe enim misericors Deus eo citius peccata cordis abluit, quo haec exire
ad opera non permittit,
(271) a. Hwaot, se bonne ne rec6 hwamber he cliene sie, [6e ne sie], se be ofter
6are hreowsunga hine ryhtlice & claonlice nyle gehealdan: ealne weg hi hi
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oweac, & ne beoo hie namfre clwne, 8eah hi ealneg wepen; ealneg hi wepao,
& ofter oamm wope hi gewyrcea6 oat hi moton eft wepan.
(CP:54.421.17)
b. He does not care whether he is clean or not, who after repentance will not
conduct himself virtuously and purely: they are always washing and are
never clean, although they are always weeping; they are always weeping,
and after their weeping they bring on themselves the necessity of weeping
again.
c. Post lavacrum enim mundus esse negligit, quisquis post lacrymas vitae
innocentiam non custodit. Et lavantur ergo, et nequaquam mundi sunt,
qui commissa flere non desinunt, sed rursus flenda committunt.
(272) a. For6am him mtwat Petrus 6a daed be he walde, si5an hi ongeaten hiora
wolhreownesse, bat hi waoren gedrefde & geeabmedde, & bes be nytwe-
or6licor gehierden 6a halgan lare, be hi aor wilnodon 6ait hi gehiran mosten.
(CP:58.443.10)
b. Peter reproached them with the deed, because he wished them, after per-
ceiving their cruelty, to become contrite and humble, that they might hear
the holy doctrine with more advantage, after previously desiring to hear
it.
c. No direct parallel
(273) a. For~amm sceal se gesceadwisa lace lmtan aer weaxan 6one lmessan, & tilian
bms maran; oo5at sio tid cume 6at he 6ms obres tilian mote, buton he
begra amtgamddre getilian mmge. (CP:62.457.12)
b. (Often it also happens that two vices assail the same man, one less, the
other greater. Therefore the physician of the mind must first direct his
attention to the one which he thinks likely to be the first to bring the man
to perdition. Sometimes, however, when the attention is concentrated on
the one, the other increases.)
Therefore the wise physician must first let the lesser one increase, and
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direct his attention to the greater; until the time comes when he can see
to the other, unless he can attend to them both together.
c. Quod cum agit, non morbum exaggerat, sed vulnerati sui, cui medica-
mentum adhibet, vitam servat, ut exquirendae salutis congruum tempus
inveniat.
A.2 Old English Boethius
IDs of the form coboeth,Bo:2.8.13.81 are from YCOE, which used the edition of the
text in [Sedgefield, 1899]. The structure of the ID is similar to the one for Cura
Pastoralis: in coboeth,Bo:2.8.13.81, 2 is the chapter number, 8 is the page number,
13 is the line number, and 81 is the number of the syntactic fragment within the text
in YCOE, counting from the very beginning of the book.
I give the OE text by the modern edition [Godden and Irvine, 2009]. As Godden
and Irvine mark Sedgefield's page numbers and thus allow one to identify the examples
in the text easily, I do not add page references for Godden and Irvine's edition.
The (b) translations are from [Godden and Irvine, 2009]. The (c) translations
are from [Sedgefield, 1900]. In several cases, I provide the translation of a larger
portion of the text than the OE example itself, to make clearer the context. In such
cases the part which is not given in Old English is taken into brackets. Under (d),
corresponding places in the Latin original are provided.
(274) a. He gehet Romanum his freondscipe swa bat hi mostan heora ealdrihta
wyroe beon. (Bo:1.7.7)
b. He promised the Romans his friendship, so that they could be entitled
to their old rights.
c. To the Romans he promised his friendship, and that they should keep
their old rights.
d. Chapter not based on the Latin text
(275) a. Hu maeg se beon gesolig se be on bam gesalbum burhwunian ne mot?
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(Bo:2.8.13)
b. How can he be happy who is not allowed to continue in those felicities?
c. How can he be happy that cannot abide in happiness?
d. No direct parallel
Indirectly parallel text:
Quid me felicem totiens iactastis, amici?
Qui cecidit, stabili non erat ille gradu. (LatinBo: imi.21-2)
a. Forbam went nu fulneah eall moncyn on tweonunga gif seo wyrd swa
hweorfan mot on yfelra manna gewill and bu heore nelt stiran.
(Bo:4.10.23)
b. And so nearly all mankind will fall into doubt, if fate is allowed to go
according to the pleasure of the wicked, and you are not willing to control
it.
c. Wherefore well-nigh all men shall turn to doubt, if Fate shall change
according to the will of wicked men, and Thou wilt not check her.
d. No direct parallel
a. Swa hwa bonne swa bms wyr~e bib baot he on heora beowdome beon mot,
bonne bib he on 6am hehtan freodome. (Bo:5.11.23)
b. Then whoever is worthy of being allowed to be in their service is in the
highest freedom.
c. Whosoever then is worthy to be in their service hath perfect freedom.
d. No direct parallel
Indirect parallel: < ... > cuius [=the basileus's] agi frenis atque obtem-
perare iustitiae summa libertas est. (LatinBo: Ip5.4)
(278) a. Mot ic nu cunnian hwon bin fostrodnesse boat ic banon ongiton moge
hwonan ic bin tilian scyle and hu? (Bo:5.12.12)
b. May I now explore a little your resolution so that I can understand from
that with what means I am to cure you and how?
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(276)
(277)
c. May I then put thy fixed belief to the proof, that I may thereby get to
know by what means and in what manner I am to cure thee?
d. Primum igitur paterisne me pauculis rogationibus statum tuae mentis
attingere atque temptare, ut qui modus sit tuae curationis intellegam?
(LatinBo: lp6. 1)
(279) a. Eala hu yfele me do6 manege woruldmenn mid bam bamt ic ne mot weal-
dan minra agenra [beawa].
(Bo:7.17.21)
b. Alas, how badly I am treated by many worldly people, so that I am not
allowed to determine my own customs.
c. Oh how evilly I am entreated of many worldly men, in that I may not
rule mine own servants!
d. An ego sola meum ius exercere prohibebor? (LatinBo:2p2.8)
(280) a. Se heofen mot brengon leohte dagas and eft bamt leoht mid beostrum
behelian;
(Bo:7.17.23)
b. The sky is allowed to bring bright days and then to hide the light with
darkness;
c. The sky may bring bright days, and anon hide the light in darkness;
d. licet caelo proferre lucidos dies eosdemque tenebrosis noctibus condere,
(LatinBo:2p2.8)
(281) a. bot gear mot brengan blosman and by ilcan geare geniman;
(Bo:7.17.23)
b. the year is allowed to bring flowers and take them away in the same year;
c. the year may bring flowers, and the same year take them away again;
d. licet anno terrae vultum nunc floribus frugibusque redimire nunc nimbis
frigoribusque confundere, (LatinBo:2p2.8)
(282) a. seo sa mot brucan smyltra yba,
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(Bo:7.17.23)
b. the sea is allowed to enjoy pleasant waves;
C.
d.
the sea may enjoy her gentle heaving,
ius est mari nunc strato aequore
horrescere:
(283) a. and ealle gesceafta motan heora
butan me anum.
b. and all created things are allowed
except me alone.
c. and all things created may follow
d.
blandiri nunc procellis ac fluctibus in-
(LatinBo:2p2.8)
gewunan and heora willan bewitigan
(Bo:7.17.23)
to keep their customs and their desires,
their course and fulfil their desire.
No direct parallel
(284) a. Ac hie hine habba6 on me genumen and hie [hine] habba6 [geseldenej
heora wlencum and getohhod to heora leasum welum boet ic ne mot mid
minum [beowum] minra benunga fulgangan swa eallao obra gesceafta mo-
ton. (Bo:7.17.31)
b. But they have taken that from me and given it to their riches and assigned
it to their false wealth so that I am not allowed to perform my duties
with my servants as all other created things are allowed.
c. this they have wrested from me. Moreover, they have given me over to
their evil practices, and made me minister to their false blessings, so that
I cannot with my servants fulfil my service as all other creatures do.
d. No direct parallel
Indirect parallel:
nos ad constantiam nostris moribus alienam inexpleta hominum cupiditas
alligabit? (LatinBo:2p2.8)
(285) a. Nu bu eart scyldigra bonne we mgber ge for binum agnum unrihtlustum
ge eac fortbam be we ne moton for be fullgan ures scippendes willan;
(Bo:7.19.19)
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b. Now you are guiltier than we [the worldly felicities] are, because of your
own wrongful desires and also because we are not permitted on account
of you to perform our maker's will;
c. Thou art indeed more guilty than I, both for thine own wicked lusts and
because owing to thee I am not able to do the will of my Maker.
d. No direct parallel
(286) a. bot gewyrb for bam dysige be ge fogniao bmat ge moton sceppan [wone]
naman, hatan baet samlba baet nane ne beo6 and baot medumnes [baet nan
medumnes] ne beob;
(Bo: 16.39.4)
b. That happens on account of your folly, that you men delight in being able
to give the wrong names, calling those things felicity which are not such
and that excellence which is no excellence;
c. This comes, 0 men, from your foolish delight in making a name, and
calling that happiness which is no happiness, and that excellent which
hath no excellence;
d. Gaudetis enim res sese aliter habentes falsis compellare nominibus, [quae
facile ipsarum rerum redarguuntur effectu;] (LatinBo:2p6.19)
(287) a. Heo forseoh6 bonne ealle Oas eorolican bing and fagena6 bas bat heo mot
brucan jos heofonlican [sib6an] heo bi abrogden from bm eor6lican.
(Bo: 18.45.28)
b. It despises then all these earthly things and rejoices that it may share in
the heavenly things after it is removed from the earthly things.
c. and she despiseth all these things of earth, and delighteth in being able
to enjoy the heavenly things after she is sundered from the earthly.
d. < ... > nonne omne terrenum negotium spernat, quae se caelo fruens
terrenis gaudet exemptam? 2  (LatinBo:2p7.23)
2 [Godden and Irvine, 2009, vol. 2, p. 3251 provide the following insular gloss: totus homo qui
corpore et anima constat. et omnes homines moriuntur. sunt autem toti quia anima non moritur.
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(288) a. Ac se anwealda haofb ealle his gesceafta swa mid his bridle befangene and
getogene and gemanode swa bt hi nauber ne gestillan ne moton, ne eac
swibor styrian bonne he him bot gerum his wealdleberes to forlaot.
(Bo:21.49.2)
b. But the sole ruler has so embraced and drawn and instructed all his crea-
tures with his rein that they may neither cease nor also move further
than he allows them the scope of his bridle.
c. but the Lord hath so caught and led, and managed all His creatures with
His bridle, that they can neither cease from motion, nor yet move more
swiftly than the length of His rein alloweth them.
d. No direct parallel
(289) a. Swa haof se mlmihtiga God geheaborade ealle his gescefta mid his an-
wealde bmt heora melc win6 wib o~er and beah wrame oer bkat hie ne
moton toslupan, ac bio6 gehwerfde eft to bam ilcan ryne be hie aor urnon,
and swa weor~aO eft geedniwade. (Bo:21.49.5)
b. The almighty God has so restrained all his creatures with his power that
each of them contends with others and yet supports others so that they
may not fall away, but are turned back to the same course that they ran
before, and so are renewed again.
c. Almighty God hath so constrained all His creatures with His power, that
each of them is in conflict with the other, and yet upholdeth the other, so
that they may not break away but are brought round to the old course,
and start afresh.
d. No direct parallel
etiamsi corpus moritur. This interpretation is relevant for the use of *motan because in Boethius's
original text, both options of existing after one's death and not existing are considered (with the
second notion rejected by him, and yet entertained seriously). The more Christian medieval inter-
pretation exhibited by the gloss and by the OE translator show a presupposition that the soul lives
after a person's death.
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(290) a. Se ilca forwyrn6 kmaram sae bet heo ne mot bone beorscwold oferstoeppan
bmere eorban maeru. (Bo:21.49.22)
b. The same [=the power of God] restrains the sea so that it cannot cross
the threshold of the earth's boundary,
c. He forbiddeth the sea to overstep the threshold of the earth,
d. ut fluctus avidum mare
certo fine coerceat,
ne terris liceat vagis
latos tendere terminos,
hanc rerum seriem ligat
terras ac pelagus regens
et caelo imperitans amor. (LatinBo:2m8.9-15)
(291) a. Ac he hamfO heora mearce swa gesette baot [hio ne] mot heore mearce
gebramdan ofer ba stillan eorban. (Bo:21.49.23)
b. but he has so set their boundary that it cannot extend its bounds over
the motionless earth.
c. having fixed their boundaries in such wise that the sea may not broaden
her border over the motionless earth.
d. ut fluctus avidum mare
certo fine coerceat,
ne terris liceat vagis
latos tendere terminos,
hanc rerum seriem ligat
terras ac pelagus regens
et caelo imperitans amor. (LatinBo:2m8.9-15)
(292) a. Hu licab be nu se anweald and se wela, nu bu gehired hmefst boet hine man
nawber ne buton ege habban ne mmg ne forlmtan ne mot beah he wille?
(Bo:29.67.12)
b. How do you like power and wealth now, now you have heard that one can
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neither have it without fear nor relinquish it when one wishes?
c. How do power or wealth please thee now that thou hast heard that no
man can possess them and be free from dread, nor give them up if he so
desire?
d. Quae est igitur ista potentia, quam pertimescunt habentes, quam nec
cum habere velis tutus sis et cum deponere cupias vitare non possis?
(LatinBo:3p5.12)
(293) a. Forgif nu drihten urum I modum baet hi moton to be astigan burh bas
earfo~u bisse worulde, and of bissum bisegum to be cuman, and openum
eagum ures modes we moten geseon bone aobelan Eewelm ealra goda, baet
eart 6u. (Bo:33.82.6)
b. 0 lord, grant now our minds that they may ascend to you through these
tribulations of this world, and from these cares come to you, and that
with open eyes of our mind we may see the noble source of all goods,
which is you.
c. Grant unto our minds, 0 Lord, that they may rise up to Thee through
the hardships of this world, and from these troubles come to Thee, and
that with the eyes of our minds opened we may behold the noble fountain
of all good things, even Thee.
d. Da, pater, augustam menti conscendere sedem,
da fontem lustrare boni, (da luce reperta
in te conspicuos animi defigere visus.) (LatinBo:3m9.22-24)
(294) a. Forgif us bonne hale eagan ures modes bamt we hi bonne moton afmstnian
on be, and todrif Oone mist be nu hanga6 beforan ures modes eagum and
onliht ba eagan mid 6inum leohte; (Bo:33.82.10)
b. Grant us then healthy eyes of our mind that we may then fasten them
on you, and drive the mist that now hangs before our mind's eyes arid
lighten the eyes with your light;
c. Grant us health for our minds' eyes, that we may fasten them upon Thee,
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and scatter the mist that now hangeth before out minds' sight, and let
Thy light lighten our eyes;
d. (Da, pater, augustam menti conscendere sedem,
da fontem lustrare boni,) da luce reperta
in te conspicuos animi defigere visus.
Dissice terranae nebulas et pondera molis
atque tuo splendore mica; (LatinBo:3m9.22-26)
(295) a. and ic wolde mid unarimedum feo gebycgan baet ic hit moste gesion.
(Bo:34.89.29)
b. and I would pay countless treasure so that I might see it.
c. and I would pay a sum beyond counting that I might see it.
d. Indirect parallel:
Infinito, inquam, si quidem mihi pariter deum quoque, qui bonum est,
continget agnoscere. (LatinBo:3p11.3)
(296) a. fribab and fyr~reO swibe georne swa lange swa hiora gecynd bi6 baot hi
growan moton. (Bo:34.91.24)
b. (For it is the nature of every kind of land that it fosters similar plants and
trees, and it does so); it protects and advances them very keenly for as
long as it is their nature that they may grow.
c. (for the nature of every country is to bring forth plants and trees like
itself, and it does so in this case.) It nurses them and helps them very
carefully so long as their nature allows them to grow.
d. Indirect parallel:
Sed dat cuique natura quod conuenit, et ne, dum manere possunt, in-
tereant elaborat. (LatinBo:3p11.20)
(297) a. Hwat wenst bu forhwi aolc saod greowe innon ba eor6an and to cibum
land] wyrtrumum weorbe on baore eoroan buton oy be hi tiohhia6 boat se
stemn and se [helm] mote by faostor and by leng standon?
(Bo:34.91.25)
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b. Why, do you think, does each seed grow within the earth and develop into
shoots and roots in the earth if not because they intend that the stem and
crown may be allowed to stand the firmer and longer?
c. Why, thinkest thou, does every seed creep into the earth and grow into
shoots and roots but because it wants the trunk and the tree-top to stand
the firmer and the longer?
d. No direct parallel
(298) a. IElcere wuhte is gecynde bkt hit willnige bot hit a sie be ban daele be his
gecynde healdan mot and mag. (Bo:34.93.22)
b. For each thing it is natural that it should desire always to exist to the
extent that its nature may and can endure.
c. For each being it is natural to desire to live for ever, in so far as its nature
may admit.
d. <...> dedit enim providentia creatis a se rebus hanc vel maximam ma-
nendi causam, ut, quoad possunt, naturaliter manere desiderent.
(LatinBo:3p11.33)
(299) a. Ac hit gebyrede, swa hit cynn was, b1et se godcunda anweald hi tostente
aor hi hit fullwyrcan moston, and towearp bone torr, and hiora manigne
ofslog, and hiora spraoce todalde on twa and hundseofontig gebeoda.
(Bo:35.99.13)
b. But it came about, as was fitting, that the divine power scattered them
before they were allowed to complete it, and cast down the tower, and
killed many of them, and divided their speech into seventy-two languages.
c. But it fell out, as was fitting, that the divine might dashed them down
before they could bring it to a head, and cast down the tower and slew
many a man among them, and split their speech into two and seventy
tongues.
d. No direct parallel
(300) a. Ac bmr ic nu moste bin mod gefiberigan mid bam fiberum bmat Ou mihtest
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mid me fliogan, bonne miht bu ofersion ealle bas eorblican bing.
(Bo:36.105.5)
b. But if I now am permitted to feather your mind with those wings so that
you can fly with me, then you can look down on all these earthly things.
c. But if only I might fledge thy mind with wings, so that thou mightest fly
with me, then mightest thou look down upon all these earthly things.
d. No direct parallel
Indirect parallel:
Sunt etenim pennae volucres mihi
quae celsa conscendant poli;
quas sibi cum velox mens induit
terras perosa despicit. (LatinBo:4ml.1-4)
(301) a. Ic wat beah, gif be ofre gewyr6 bat 6u wilt oboe most eft fandian bara
biostra bisse worulde, bonne gesihst bu ba unrihtwisan cyningas and ealle
ba ofermodan rican bion swibe unmihtige and swi~e earme wreccan, ba
ilcan be bis earme folc nu heardost ondramt.
(Bo:36.105.24)
b. I know however that if it ever happens to you that you wish or are al-
lowed 3 to experience again the darkness of this world, then you will see
the unjust kinds and all the arrogant men in power, the very ones whom
this wretched people now most severely dread, to be very unpowerful and
very wretched exiles.
c. Nevertheless I know that if ever it shall happen to thee to desire or to
be allowed to visit once more the darkness of this world, then wilt thou
see that the unrighteous kings and all the overweening rich ones are very
31n the commentary to the text, Godden and Irvine write (vol. 2, p. 427): "Wisdom seems to
think of Boethius wishing to return to the earthly darkness, or being obliged to" (emphasis mine).
What is interpreted as a permission modal in their translation, is interpreted as an obligation modal
in the commentary.
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feeble and poor wretches, even those same men whom this poor folk now
most sorely dreadeth.
d. Quodsi terrarum placeat tibi
noctem relictam visere,
quos miseri torvos populi timent
cernes tyrannos exsules. (LatinBo:4m1.27-30)
(302) a. and swa hwilc swa wrest to bmem beage cym6, bonne mot se hine habban
him.
(Bo:37.112.24)
b. (as was customary among the Romans, and still is in many nations, that
someone hangs a golden crown up at the end of some race-course; then a
great crowd goes there and all run together, those who have confidence
in their running), and whoever comes first to the crown, he is allowed to
have it.
c. (even as once it was the custom of the Romans, and still is among many
peoples, for a golden crown to be hung up at the end of a race-course;
many men come together and all start level, as many put their trust in
their running.) And whosoever first reaches the crown may have it for
himself.
d. No direct parallel
(303) a. For~amm he mot cuman after baem earfo~um to ecre are.
(Bo:38.120.17)
b. And so it is allowed to come after those hardships to eternal favour.
c. These, having deserved some measure of mercy, are allowed, after their
troubles, to come to eternal glory.
d. No direct parallel
(304) a. Forby wena6 ba ablendan mod bat bot sie sio mmste gesaol6 bmet men seo
alefed yfel to donne, and sio daed him mote bion unwitnod.
(Bo:38.121.17)
250
b. So the blinded minds think that the greatest felicity is that man is allowed
to do evil, and that he might not be punished for the act.
c. Therefore these purblind minds account it the greatest happiness that a
man be allowed to work evil, and his deed to go unpunished;
d. No direct parallel
(305) a. Gif bu nu deman mostest, hwaeberne woldest bu deman wites wyr ran,
be [bone be bone unscyldgan] witnode, be I bone be beet wite bolode.
(Bo:38.122.28)
b. If now you were allowed to judge, which would you judge worthier of
punishment, the one who tormented the innocent or the one who suffered
the torment.
c. If you hadst to decide, which wouldst thou deem the more worthy of
punishment, him that punished the innocent, or him that suffered the
penalty?
d. Si igitur cognitor, ait, resideres, cui supplicium inferendum putares,
eine qui fecisset an qui perulisset iniuriam?
(306) a. Ac se godcunda forebonc heabera6 ealle gesceafta boat hi ne moton toslu-
pan of heora [endebyrdnesse].
(Bo:39.128.20)
b. But the divine providence restrains all creatures so that they may not
slip from their ordering.
c. The divine forethought holdeth up all creatures, so that they may not
fall asunder from their due order.
d. No direct parallel
(307) a. Me wore liofre bot ic onette wi6 bI s boat ic moste gelaestan boat ic be
aor gehet, and be moste getaecan swa sceortne weg swa ic scyrtstne findan
mihte to binre cyb6e. (Bo:40.139.24)
b. I would rather hasten towards the aim of fulfilling what I promised be-
fore, and might teach you the shortest way that I could find to your
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homeland.
c. I would rather hasten on to make good my earlier promise to thee, and
point out to thee the very shortest way I can find to thy native land.
d. <...> Festino, inquit, debitum promissionis absolvere viamque tibi, qua
patriam reveharis, aperire. (LatinBo:5pl.4)
(308) a. baom he geaf micle gife freodomes, bot hi moston don swa god swa yfel
swa hi wolden. (Bo:41.142.8)
b. To them [=angels and men] he gave the great gift of freedom, so that they
could do either good or evil as they wished.
c. to them He gave the great gift of freedom, that they might do good or
evil, whichever they pleased.
d. No direct parallel
(309) a. He sealde swi6e fmste gife and swi~e fmste ae mid bmare gife alcum menn
[o8] his ende. bamt is se frydom bmt be mon mot don bmat he wile, and bkt
is sio ae bot [he] gilt alcum be his gewyrhtum, aegber ge on bisse worulde
ge on baere toweardan, swa god swa yfel swa~er he de6.
(Bo:41.142.11)
b. He gave a very fixed gift and a very fixed law with that gift to every man
until his end. That is the freedom, that man may do what he wishes, and
that is the law that he [=zrGod] rewards each according to his deeds, both
in this world and the next, whatever he does, whether good or evil.
c. To every man until his end He hath given an abiding grace, and the grace
an abiding law; that is, freedom to do what he will, and the law whereby
He rewardeth each according to his deeds, both in this world and in the
world to come, with good and evil, according as the man acts.
d. No direct parallel
(310) a. Nu bincO me bmt he do woh bonne he ara6 ba godan and eac bonne lie
witna6 ba yfelan, gif maet so6 is baet hit him swa gesceapen I wms bot hi
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ne moston elles don.
(Bo:41.142.28)
b. Now it seems to me that he does wrong when he favours the good and
also when he punishes the wicked, if it is true that it was so shaped for
them that they might not do otherwise.
c. Now, I think He doeth amiss when He showeth favour unto the good, and
also when He chastiseth the wicked, if it be true that they are so made as
to be unable to act otherwise.
(311) No direct parallel
Indirect parallel:
Frustra enim bonis malisque praemia poenaeve proponuntur, quae nullus
meruit liber ac voluntaris motus animorum, idque omnium videbitur iniquis-
simum quod nunc aequissimum iudicatur, vel puniri imrpobos vel remunerari
probos, quos ad alterutrum non propria mittit voluntas, sed futuri cogit certa
necessitas. (LatinBo:5p3.30-1)
A.3 Old English Augustine's Soliloquies
I add to the IDs from YCOE page and line numbers from [Carnicelli, 1969] and
[Hargrove, 1902]: Carnicelli's is the most modern edition, and it does not provide cor-
responding page numbers of the earlier editions of [Hargrove, 1902] or [Endter, 1922].
As Carnicelli rearranges the order of the text of the Book III, following the sugges-
tions of [Jost, 1920] (endorsed by Endter as well, but not reflected in the edition
[Endter, 1922]), I chose to provide page and line numbers for all three mentioned
editions. Car refers to [Carnicelli, 19691, Har to [Hargrove, 1902], and Endter's page
and line numbers can be found in the YCOE IDs.
The (b) translations are from [Hargrove, 1904] (made from the text in [Hargrove, 1902]).
The (c) translations are from the partial translation, containing the preface and two
first books, from [Giles et al., 1858], and were made by E. Thomson.
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(312) a. ac alene man lyst, si66an he anig cotlyf on his hlafordes lane myd his
fultume getimbred hofO, baet he hine mote hwilum bar-on gerestan, and
huntigan, and fuglian, and fiscian, and his on gehwilce wisan to bere lanan
tilian, amgbaer ge on se ge on lande, o6 bone fyrst be he bocland and mece
yrfe burh his hlafordes miltse geearnige.
(coprefsolilo,SolilPref:2.1.10; Car:48.5; Har:2.7)
b. (It is no wonder that one should labor in timber-work, both in the garden-
ing and also in the building;) but every man desireth that, after he hath
built a cottage on his lord's lease and by his help, he may sometimes rest
himself therein, and go hunting, fowling, and fishing; and use it in every
manner according to the lease, both on sea and land, until such time as he
shall gain the fee simple of the eternal heritage through his lord's mercy.
c. (It is no wonder, though men 'swink' in timber-working, and in the out-
leading and in the building;) but every man wishes, after he has built
a cottage on his lord's lease, by his help, that he may sometimes rest
him therein, and hunt, and fowl, and fish, and use it in every way to the
lease, both on sea and on land, until the time that he earn bookland and
everlasting heritage through his lord's mercy.
(313) a. se god sealde fridom manna saulum, baet hy moston don swa good swa
yfel, swoaber hy woldon;
(cosolilo,Solil_1:10.16.102; Car:54.3; Har:10.17)
b. (And all the creatures, about whom we say that they seem to us inhar-
monious and unsteadfast, have yet somewhat of steadiness, because they
are bridled with the bridle of God's commandments.) God gave freedom
to men's souls, that they might do either good or evil, whichever they
would;
c. (And all the creatures about which we are speaking that they seem to us
unharmonious and unsteady-they have however some deal of steadiness,
for they are bridled with the bridle-God's commandments.) God gave
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freedom to men's souls, that they might do either good or evil, whether
they would;
(314) a. and gedo me ows wyrine bet ic be mote geseon.
(cosolilo,Solil_1:13.9.163; Car:55.23; Har:13.14)
b. (If I love naught above Thee, I beseech Thee that I may find Thee; and
if I desire any thing beyond measure and wrongly, deliver me from it.)
Make me worthy to behold Thee.
c. (If I love naught over thee, I beseech thee that I may find thee; and if I
immoderately and unlawfully desire anything, free me of that,) and make
me worthy that I may see thee.
(315) a. Nat ic be nanwiht to bebeodanne b1s be be mare 6earf sie to bam crofte
be Ou wilnast to wittanne bonne bet bmet bu forseo swa Ou swi6ost mage
weorlde ara, and huru ungemetlice and unalifedlice, forbam ic ondrede bmat
hy gebynden bin mod to hamom and ba gefon myd heora grine, swa swa
man deor o65e fugelas feht, kcet bu ne mote began bmt bet bu wilnast;
(cosolilo,Solil_1:47.6.600; Car:78.29; Har:46.6)
b. I know not anything to command thee of which thou hast more need for
the science which thou wishest to know, than that thou despise, so much
as thou art able, worldly honors, and especially intemperate and unlawful
ones, because I fear that they may bind thy mind to themselves and take
it with their snare, just as one catcheth wild beasts or fowls, so that thou
canst not accomplish what thou wishest;
c. I wot naught to command thee, of which thou hast more need for the
craft which thou wishest to know, than that thou despise as thou most
strongly canst the world's honours, and especially the immoderate and
unlawful: for I dread that they bind thy mind to them, and catch it with
their snare, so that thou may not go about that which thou wishest.
(316) a. Wost bu bonne genoh gif ic gedo bet bu bet Wost boet bu most simle
lybban?
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(cosolilo,Solil_2:57.1.741; Car:84.14; Har:56.9)
b. Wilt thou, then, know enough if I cause thee to know that thou mayest
live always?
c. Shalt thou then know enough, if I make thee know that thou mayest
always live?
(317) a. and efter domes dmge us ys gehaten bat we moten god geseon openlice,
ealne geseon swylce swylce he ys, and hyne a sy6can cunnan swa georne
swa he nu us can.
(cosolilo,Solil_3:67.25.939; Car:93.18; Har:67.6)
b. And after Doomsday it is promised that we may see God openly, yea, see
Him just as He is; and know Him ever afterwards as perfectly as He now
knoweth us.
(318) a. ... meahte oe mosten on bas wurlde, o5e hwe~er hy enige geminde
hefde bara freonda be hi be(m)ftan heom lefdon on bisse weorulde.4
(cosolilo,Solil_3:67.32.946; Car:95.2; Har:67.17)
b. ...might or could in this world, or whether they had any rememberance
of the friends whom they left behind in this world.
(319) a. Da cwam Abraham: "nese, min cyl(d) 5, nese. Ac gebenc bamt bu hym
forwyrndest ilcra getesa 8a git begen6 on lichaman weron, and bu hefdest
alc good, and he hefde aelc yfel. ne mot he be nu by mare don to getmsan
be Ou ba hym woldest."
(cosolilo,Solil_3:68.14.953; Car:95.15; Har:67.30)
b. Then said Abraham: 'Nay, my son; but consider that thou didst withhold
from him all comforts when ye were both in the body, thou having every
good, and he every misfortune. He cannot now do more for thy comfort
than thou wouldst do for him.'
4 There is a gap in the manuscript text, so it is impossible to restore the context of this fragment.
5[Hargrove, 19021 substitutes sunu instead of cyl, hence the translation in (c).
6[Hargrove, 19021: becgen
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(320) a. Di me kincO swi~e dysig man and swibe unlede, be nele hys andgyt mecan
ba hwile be he on bisse weorulde byO, and simle wiscan and wilinian bot
he mote cuman to bam ecan lyfe bmar us nanwiht ne byb dygles.
(cosolilo,Solil_3:70.16.988; Car:97.14; Har:69.34)
b. Therefore methinks that man very foolish and very wretched who will not
increase his intelligence while he is in this world, and also wish and desire
that he may come to the eternal life, where nothing is hid from us.
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